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Abstract
This thesis studies the development and social character of Indian 
nationalism in the Midnapur district of Bengal*
It begins by showing the Government of Bengal in 1907 in a deepening 
political crisis. The structural imbalances caused by the policy of active 
intervention in the localities could not be offset by the ’paternalistic* 
and personalised district administration. In Midnapur, the situation was 
compounded by the inability of government to secure its traditional 
political base based on zamindars. Real power in the countryside lay in 
the hands of petty landlords and intermediaries who consolidated their 
hold in the economic environment of growing commercialisation in 
agriculture. This was reinforced by a caste movement of the Mahishyas 
which injected the district with its own version of 'peasant-pride'.
The thesis also argues that till 1921, the nationalist movement failed 
to involve the rural activists. Urban and rural political activity 
developed autonomously and without mutual reference.
The radical change in nationalist politics in 1921 enabled some 
politicians to make the connection between these two currents. During 
the Non Co-operation movement, Midnapur witnessed a successful 
movement against additional rural taxation.
It has also been contended that after 1922 the district Congress consciously 
strove to articulate the interests of 'well-to-do cultivators', 
especially the jotedars and tenure-holding ryots, and established its 
political hegemony on that basis. This was put to the test during the 
Civil Disobedience movement, when Midnapur, almost alone in all Bengal, 
was able to put up a formidable challenge to British rule.
The thesis concludes that given the seemingly 'non-antagonistic' strategy 
employed by Congress in its relations with indigenous society, the social 
character of the nationalist movement was determined by the existing 
hierarchical patterns of class domination. In Midnapur, this found 
expression in the aggressive, but ideologically conservative, movement of 
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Chapter 1 3
Introduction
"(w)hose freedom are we particularly striving for, for nationalism
1
covers many sins and includes many conflicting elements?" Mors
than three decades after India kept her initial * tryst with destiny*
this problem posed by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1933 remains unambiguously
unanswered. Perhaps the problem lies in the phenomenon of nationalism
itself, which as historians have discovered, constitutes an enigma.
Though in the colonial world nationalism has generally been equated
with the struggle against European domination, the political identities
of the various nationalist movements have been by no means uniform.
In Asia for example, there was little similarity between the
Vietnamese nationalism of Chi Minh on one hand, and the non-violent
A
Gandhian nationalism on the other. The phenomenon of nationalism as 
such, defies definition, except in the most general sense. In the 
words of Eric Hobsbawm, "Nationalism has been a great puzzle..., not only 
because it is both powerful and devoid of any discernable rational theory 
but also because its shape and functions ere constantly changing. Like 
the cloud with which Hamlet taunted Polonius, it can be interpreted 
according to taste as a camel, a weasel or a whale, though it is none of 
these" 2
Notwithstanding these obvious hazards, historians, ever since the 
process of decolonisation began, have increasingly focused their attention 
on the problem of nationalism, whether as a separate entity, or as an 
element of overall 'politics’. There is a general recognition that 
barring radical discontinuities, the course of politics in the Third 
World after 'independence* have been determined considerably by the 
nature and social character of their various nationalisms. In India, 
the nature and course of post independence political and economic 
development has been determined by the political legacy of the freedom 
struggle coupled with later structural changes in society. It is for 
these reasons that the study of Indian nationalism has acquired a 
direct contemporary relevance. This thesis charts the particular 
course and political identity of Indian nationalism as it existed in 
Midnapur, a district in South-West Bengal.
1. Quoted in Gyanendra Psndey, ’Review Article', IESHR, XI, 2-3 
1974, p.328.
2. E. Hobsbawm, 'Some Reflections on 'The Break-Up of Britain',
New Left Review, 105, 1977, p.3.
4Bengal has received some attention from historians by virtue of being
a birth-place of modern nationalism in India. Anil Seal argued that it
was the frustrations caused by the diminishing opportunities within
the colonial state that channelled the energies of the educated Bengali
3
in the direction of nationalism. Indian nationalism was therefore 
’’born in frustrated bastardy out of the miscegnation of imperial
4education and the diverse forces of elitism and social factionalism" •
John Broomfield, like Seal, emphasised the elitist character of 
bhadrolok-dominated Bengali nationalist politics, especially the 
growing estrangement with the substantial Muslim population in East
5
Bengal. In an attempt to rehabilitate the bhadrolok, Sumit Sarkar placed
them in the category of Gramsci's concept of 'traditional intellectuals',
displaced from their immediate class backgrounds and responsive to
intellectual currents, nationally and internationally. He used Trotsky's
notion of ''substitutionism' to demonstrate that the bhadrolok were
acting as a proxy for yet-unresponsive social classes - the national
6bourgeoisie and the peasantry.
The manoeuvres and idiosyncracies of the Bengali Hindu politician were
7
also the chief concern of John Gallagher. Using Seal's model of 
government intervention as providing the main impetus to the development 
of nationalist reaction, he argued that Congress in Bengal was over­
whelmingly based in Calcutta. As a result it was unable to benefit from the 
extension of franchise and the establishment of Union Boards and other 
organs of local self-government. The Congress leadership consequently 
lacked any real base in the districts and consciously strove to keep real 
power in the hands of their narrow upper-caste clique. "When B.N.Sasmal 
became Secretary of the PCC in 1927, the combined efforts of the four 
Calcutta DCC's quickly pushed him out of office; not only was he an 
up-country man from Midnapore, he was also a Mahishya. The true heirs of 
Das were more presentable men, such as Subhas Bose, J.M.Sen Gupta, K.S.
Roy (all three educated at Oxford or Cambridge), Anil Baran Ray -and
Q
P.C.Guha Roy". In 1933, the government introduced the Communal
3. Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism, Cambridge 1971.
4. Barun De, *Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian Freedom Struggle', Indian 
Historical Review. II, 1 , 1975, p.391.
5. J.H.Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society, Berkeley 1968.
Marcus Franda,Radical Politics in West Bengal, Cambridge Mass 1971, 
argues that even the Marxist movements maintain the continuity of 
elitist bhadrolok politics.
5Award and the Congress was permanently assigned to the opposition 
benches. It was able to recover its hegemony in Bengali politics 
only after the partition of 1947.
Rsjat Ray's works were a complete departure from this obsession with
elite politics. Analysing the power structure in rural Bengal, Ray -
demolished a long-standing myth that the British conquest and the
Permanent Settlement had revolutionised rural Bengal". He distinguished
between the zamindars, who had control over revenue, and the jotedars
g
who had real control over land. He saw nationalism as the movement
which in rural areas, articulated the assertiveness of what D. A.
10Low described as the 'dominant peasants' , born "primarily from
the internal dynamics of social conflict triggered off by colonial
11economic and institutional changes" The Indian nationalist movement
was therefore, a ''broad political alliance between urban and rural
intermediate elements whose roots went back to the pre-colon£,al
12
social and political system in India"
It is against the background of this historiography that this thesis
is undertaken. It seeks to examine the dynamics of politics (especially
nationalist politics) in a predominantly rural district of Bengal that
won some notoriety end acclaim for its effective participation in the
Gandhian movements. Methodologically, the work is largely inspired
by the Marxist analysis of political behaviour, especially that stream
of Marxist tradition that has come to be characterised as 'classical 
13Marxism' Large sections of the discussion are centred within this 
'problematic'.
Chapter 2 discusses the role of government and institutional politics 
in Midnapur in the two decades prior to the Government of India Act of 
1919. The topic is examined in the context of the contention by the 
so-called 'Cambridge School' of historians that government initiatives, 
especially in the arena of local self-government, opened up the process
6 . Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-8, Delhi 
1973, pp. 513-4. Paradoxically, Trotsky used the term to ^grn 
against the Party substituting itself forihe working class, cf.
Duncan Hallas, Trotsky's Marxism, London 1979, p.77.
7. John Gallagher, 'Congress in Decline: Bengal 1930—39' in Gallagher,
Johnson, Seal, ed. Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian
Politics 1870-1970, Cambridge 1973.
8 . Ibid, pp. 276-7.
9. Rajat and Ratna Ray, 'Zamindars and Jotedars: A Study of Rural
Politics in Bengal', MAS, XI, 1, 1975 and 'The Dynamics of 
Continuity in Rural Bengal Under the British Imperium' IE-5HR X,2, 1973.
614
of politicisation. The chapter examines the structure of local 
government at all levels in Midnapur, especially the role of District 
and Local Boarcs and Union Committees and the extent of participation 
therein. It poses the question: to what extent had the Raj succeeded 
in legitimising its alien rule by incorporating a network of local 
'collaborators*. In short, what was the political basis of British 
rule in Midnapur?
Since Midnapur was a predominantly rural district and agriculture was 
the major source of livelihood of the people, Chapter 3 looks at the 
structure and pattern of landholding. To what extent did the juridical 
categories of landholding reflect the real pattern of rural power?
The chapter examines briefly the pattern of rent, credit and marketing, 
and attempts to relate this to the indigenous power structure in the 
localities.
A notable feature of Midnapur was the numerical preponderance of the 
Mahishya caste. Chapter 3 also examines the sudden upsurge in caste 
consciousness in the wake of the Census operation. It examines the 
direction of the Mahishya caste movement in Bengal and its underlying 
political content. V/hat effect did this caste movement have on the 
pattern of rural control in the district?
Chapter 4 studies the political life of Midnapur between 1907 and 1918.
The emphasis here is placed on that aspect of politics which existed 
outside the orbit of institutional politics. Four political 'movements' 
are singled out for close scrutiny. Emphasis is placed on discovering 
the connections (if any) between the intelligentsia in the urban 
enclaves and the rural activists. How far had non institutional  ^
politics in this period laid the basis for the emergence of the 
Gandhian movement in 1921?
10. D . A . Low, Congress and The Raj: Facets of Indian Struggle 1917- 
47, London 1977, p.2 .
11. Rajat Ray, 'Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal, 1875- 
1908* unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1972, p.322.
12. Rajat Ray, 'Political Change in British India1, IESHR, XIV, 4, 1977, 
p .503.
13. cf. Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, London 1976.
14. Article by Anil Seal in Gallagher, Johnson, Seal, ed, oo.cit, 
pp.1-27.
7Chapter 5 is divided into three sections. The first section analyses 
the elections to the Bengal Legislative Council in 1920, the first 
after the 1919 Act.. It looks at the personalities involved in the 
elections and the issues raised before the electorate, and poses 
the question whether the introduction of reforms per se had brought 
a qualitative shift in the nature of politics in Midnapur. The 
second section considers the process of the non-cooperation movement 
concentrating on the Union Board agitation in southern Midnapur. Since 
this movement had a considerable impact, the chapter attempts to 
discover the political basis of the movement and locate the interests 
which it articulated. The last section is devoted to a study of an 
agitation peripheral to the mainstream of the non-cooperation, but one 
which presents a contrast to the Union Board issue.
Chapter 6  is devoted to the period of Congress participation in the 
Dyarchy system of government. The extension of franchise under the 
new scheme is studied and this is related to the existing pattern 
of rural power. Examined secondly is the nature of the organised 
Congress intervention within the structures of local self-government 
notably the District Board. The Congress organisation in Midnapur 
and its intervention in politics are analysed with particular emphasis 
on their social basis and class character. Was the Congress merely 
a 'ramshackle coalition' based on the immediate peculiarities of 
'factional' politics, or did it possess a definite class base? The 
discussion is conducted with special reference to the passage of the 
Bengal Tenancy Act of 1928. Lastly, the political process in Midnapur 
is related to the pattern of regional politics in Bengal. In particular, 
the chapter focusses on the relationship of the Bengal Congress with 
the local Congress. Was the Congress organisation in Midnapur merely 
an appendage to the leadership in Calcutta or did it have an independent 
base? In examining these questions, attempt has been made to explain 
the social character of nationalist politics, as it existed in one 
district.
The Civil Disobedience Movement is the theme of Chapter 7. The 
various ph ases of the movement are examined in some detail with special 
emphasis on the mechanics of mass mobilisation. But, in particular, 
through an examination of the ideological content of the movement 
and the social character of the leadership, the chapter examines the
a
contention that movements such as the one in Midnapur objectively
threatened the political hegemony of the national bourgeoisie in
15the nationalist movement. Was Midnapur a deviation from the 
logic of Gandhian nationalism?
The Conclusion [Chapter 0) rounds off the discussion in the
preceding chapters. In the main, it attempts to relate the pattern
of Midnapur politics to the mainstream of Bengali and national
Congress politics. It focusses on the nature of the political
identity in the district and the factors that led to its distinctive
form. Moreover, in the light of the orthodox Indian 'left' view of
rural politics or what Eric Stokes called the 'Punch and Judy' view- 
1S
point, it investigates the specificities of the class dimension
in Midnapur politics, especially the implications of those strategies
for radical change which stress the necessity "to unite all the
17peasants, from the agricultural worker to the rich peasant" The 
thesis argues that the specific example of the Midnapur experience 
might serve as a pointer to the improbability and the antagonistic 
class nature of such a 'peasant1 bloc.
15. This is the claim advanced by Sumit Sarkar, 'The Logic of 
Gandhian Nationalism: Civil Disobedience and the Gandhi- 
Irwin Pact1, Indian Historical Review, III, 1, 1976.
16. Eric Stokes 'Jawaharlal Nehru in the Making', MAS, XI, 2,
1977, p.297.
17. Interview with Harkishan Singh Surjeet, Member of Politbureau, 
Communist Party of India-Marxist, Problems of Communism, Summer 
1977.
Chapter 2 9
GOVERNMENT IN MIDNAPUR 1907 - 1920
By the turn of the 20th Century, the administration of Bengal was
posing a few headaches for British administrators. Calcutta,
besides being the capital of the Raj, was also the administrative
centre of the province of Bengal - a huge unwieldy province of
189,000 square miles and a population of 76.5 million. Though
Lieutenant Governor Bourdillon claimed in 1903 that "we are proud
of the burden and of the importance and magnitude of our- province,
and do not shrink from labour" , officials often complained of
the ’excessive burden' which the sheer size of the province 
2
imposed on them. Lord Curzon who recognised the problem, attempted 
to meet it by partitioning Bengal in 1905, although this was not 
dictated by considerations of administrative expediency alone. Yet, 
while sheer size contributed significantly to the development of 
administrative bottlenecks, it was only part of the story. The 
administrative structures of the Raj at the turn of the century 
corresponded to the political needs of the pre-1857 days. Then, 
the smooth collection of the agricultural surplus coupled with the 
maintenance of lav/ and order had been hoped to provide the necessary 
climate for British entrepreneurs to expand their markets. It was 
possible to run extensive districts with a vigilant Divisional 
Commissioner, an enlightened Collector aided by inexperienced 
Subdivisional Officers and experienced Bengali clerks, a handful of 
policemen and chaukidars, and distant familiarity with local notables.
The turmoil of 1657 altered the picture fundamentally. To balance its
books and maintain political control effectively, the Raj was compelled
to abandon its relatively passive role in government and intervene more
3
actively in the affairs of the localities. Since alternative sources 
of revenue had to be found and tapped without causing political turmoil, 
there was the need to $arch out and accommodate mare Indians in the
1. Bourdillon to Curzon 21st June 1903, quoted in Sumit Barkar 
The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903 - 1906,Delhi 1973, p.13,
2. Resolution No. 3678, 3rd December 1903, quoted in Sumit 
Sarkar, op. cit, p.1 2 .
3. This argument is well set out by A. Seal, ''Imperialism and 
Nationalism in India’, M .A .S ., Vll,3,1973 and C. A. Bayly 
The Local Roots of Indian Politics - Allahabad 18S0 - 1920,
Oxford 1975, pp. 1-18.
10
institutional structures of British rule. The Famine Code, 
the Survey of Settlement operations, the Bengal Tenancy Act of 
1885, and Ripon's Local Self Government Act were some of the 
measures adopted to make government more * efficient' and which 
defined political arenas for intervention, Curzon, on his part, 
reactivated moribund departments and emphasised the role of the 
state (albeit in a limited way) in development endeavours within 
the colonial framework. This shift in government orientation also 
required a corresponding shift in the machinery of government, but 
this was not forthcoming.
In Bengal, the partition of the province in 1905 was genuinely seen 
by a section of the administration as paving the way to greater 
efficiency. But partition merely split the province into two, and 
its sole effect, in terms of administration, was to reduce the burden 
of paperwork among officials and clerks in Writer's Building by 
transferring it to a new set of officials in Dacca. The move 
involved no qualitative change in the administrative set-up. Indeed, 
the roots of the problem lay not in the provincial centre at Calcutta 
or Dacca, but lower down in the administrative rung. It is in the 
arena of the districts, sub-divisions and thanas that we must look 
to for any analyses of the crises that engulfed the Raj in Bengal 
during the 2 0 th century.
District Administration in Midnapur
The power and duties of the Collector embrace almost every 
subject which comes within the functions of modern 
government'?
This generalisation by the Royal Commission on Agriculture, was a fair 
description of government as it existed in Midnapur before 1922. The 
Collector was the central figure around whom district administration 
revolved:
He was the head of everything...He was the moving and regulating 
spirit in the whole vast and complicated human machine which we
5
call the Administration.
The Collector was assisted by his Subdivisional Officers and an 
Additional District Magistrate, first appointed in 1907°, to relieve
4. Quoted in D. A. V/ashbrock The Emergence of Provincial Politics:
The Madras Presidency 187G - 1920, Cambridge 1976, p.27.
5. R. Carstairs The Little World of An Indian District Officer,
London 1912, pp. 4b-4V.
6 . Bengal Political Progs. December 1911, No. 23-26.
him of some juridical duties ; all these appointments were made
from the I.C.S. Also aiding the Collector were the various
Deputy Collectors, Sub-Deputy Collectors, the District Engineer,
and a band of lesser officials, mostly Indian. The Police, 944
strong, occupied a special position not only as keepers of the
7
peace, but as 'local officers of the government'. This was 
necessary as the subdivisional officers had no staff of their 
own and were compelled to use the police as gatherers of all 
local information*
Certain local peculiarities made the task of governing Midnapur
especially complex. The first of these was the unusually high
proportion of Khas Mahals or government estates, especially in
Contai, from which alone the government derived an annual income
8
of Rs 5,262,401 in 1912. The Khas Mahals were managed by a total 
of 18 officers, 1 0  of whom were stationed at district headousrters 
and only 3 in Contai. The Subdivisional Officers supervised the 
work of the Khas Mahals managers, but the returns were screened 
by the Collector. This latter task did not appear to be a mere 
formality, and E. H. Walsh, the Divisional Commissioner in 1905
claimed that Khas Mahal work took up at least one fourth of the
g
Collectors time . Nor was the burden merely confined to paper
work. Government regulations made it obligatory for the
Collector to inspect Khas Mahal offices at regular intervals and
decide appeals in certificate cases. Non-official opinion
accused Collector's of shirking this aspect of administration and
claimed that Khas Mahal work took up only a week's time per
10year of the Collector . There was some truth in this accusation. 
The work of the Subdivisional Officers, usually fresh I.C.S. 
recruits, who did not have much idea of the intricacies of the 
revenue system and were thus totally dependent on the guidance of 
experienced Indian subordinates. Most of the work of the 
Collector consisted in straightening out irregularities th.t 
occurred in spite of this.
7. Royal Commission upon Decentralisation 1909 (Hobhou~e 
Commission) Cmd 4360, Vol. 4, para 14395. Evidence of 
E. A. Gait. (Hereafter referred to as DCR)
8 . Bengal Political Progs. October 1912.
9. E. H. '.'/alsh to Chief Secy. GOB 16th March 1905, General 
Vll/56/1905-6 (MRR).
10. Medini Bandh-sb 4th August, 1913, RNP Bengal loth Auoust 
1913.
12
The supervision of the elaborate system of Khals (canals) and 
embankments added to the problems of district administration.
Being a coastal area, Midnapur was particularly susceptible to 
the vagaries of nature. Between 1823 and 1874, there occurred 
8  severe cyclonic storms causing immense loss of life and 
property. To meet this threat, government built and maintained 
a great sea-dyke; government also maintained Khals with sluices 
for the drainage of the Madhur Mahals - agricultural land close 
to the sea. However, it was the embankments which attracted the 
greatest attention from the government. They were the most 
significant factors in the economies of the Jalamutha, Majnamutha 
and other low-lying temporarily-settled government estates.
Although the embankments dated back to pre-East India Company days, 
it was only after two big floods in 1864 and 1874 that government 
gave any serious attention to their maintenance? the motive was to 
preserve the economic livelihood of two of the most lucrative 
Khas Mahals^ .
On paper at least, the administration of the dykes, Khals, and 
embankments was entrusted to the Public Works Department with the
12
Executive Engineer of the Cossye Division playing the le-ding role
However, the frequency of floods in the district resulting from breaches
in embankments meant that the Collector could not entrust the entire
responsibility to the Executive Engineer or the P.W.D. An entire
section of the peasantry whose livelihood was dependent on the
efficient functioning of the P.VV.D. evinced a keen interest in the
running of the department. In 1913, when floods affected the whole
of Contai, the demand went up for the government to implement a long
abandoned scheme costing Rs 21 lakhs which would entail the construction
of irrigation canals with a broad channel falling into the Kaligha
13
river, and with feeder canals protected by embankments . In 1920,
after Contai and Tamluk were flooded, the Congress leader B . N .
Sasmal claimed that this was due to the want of repairs to the Khoja
■ 14’
and Bhograi embankments, both under the charge of the P..7.D. . In
1922 when the Ghatal Circuit Embankment was breached:
11. Ramaoada Chatterji Final Report on the Survey and Settlement 
of the Government and the Temporarily Settled E^t~-tes in the 
District of Midnapore 1903 - 11, Calcutta 1912, op. 3-5.
12. Ibid, p.3.
13. Bengalee 28th September 1913, ■ Rf-JP Bengal 4th October, 1313.
• D^inik B-sumati 15th August 1920, RMP Bengal 21st August 19' G.
Ibid 24th Aurrust 192G, AMP Bengal 4th -September 1920.
13
... the universal feeling was that Government was 
responsible for the conditions of the subdivision 
owing to the Embankment policy which had been pursued 
in the past, and that it was1 the duty of Government to 
repair the breaches at once and put things right as 
far as possible^.
In an atmosphere where the government agencies had the task of 
regulating the 'waters of Midnapur, but did not or could not for 
lack of efficiency or finance, the work of the P.W.D. was inevitably 
politicised, calling for the intervention of the Collector. It was 
the Collector and not the Engineer who had to recommend the course 
of an embankment to the higher authorities after weighing the mood 
of the district and the financial resources of government.
The tauzi system of revenue collection, peculiar to Bengal, further
contributed to the centralisation of district administration. This
system demanded the direct payment of land revenue to the Collector
at district headquarters. Again, the Collector alone was authorised
IS
to take coercive action in case of default . The system was 
popular with the larger zamindars, especially those with land in 
more than one subdivision. In Midnapur, where the government held 
more than 2 0 0  estates, it reduced the number of personnel required 
for revenue collection. Tt also enabled the government to assemble 
all the various land revenue 'experts' in the Collectorate to sort 
out the intricacies of the revenue system. But the disadvantages of 
the system far outweighed its benefits. Though the minor revenue 
officials prepared the groundwork for the Collectorate officials, 
the paper work at headquarters was increased substantially. The 
mobility of the Collector, the key figure in administration, was 
severely reduced. At a tima when government was making concerted 
attempts to increase efficiency, and given that district admini­
stration was highly personalised, the tauzi system contributed 
significantly to administrative bottlenecks. More important, from 
the political point of view, this rigid centralisation removed one 
of the main areas of government from the grass-roots and made
17government itself very remote from the majority of the population
15. Collector to Commissioner 27th February 1925, Rsv-Gen X/21/1925 
( M R R ) .
IS. Report of the District Administration Committee 1913 - 14 
Calcutta 1915 p.31.
17. Rajat Ray - Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bence.l 
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis Cambridge University 1972 p.321.
Centralisation seems to have pervaded all aspects of district
administration. Examination of the Collectorate records reveal
that the Collector was personally involved to an extraordinary
extent in routine administrative tasks, for example in the
voluminous correspondence over the acquisition of land for a
police station, the construction of a dak bungalow, or the
annual returns for the Poisons Act. In 1920, the district
administrators decreed that "No more temporary or permanent
vacancies in the cadre of peons shall be filled up and no
additional peons should be employed without the previous
18permission of the Commissioner" Nor did the administrators
in Calcutta help matters. In 1917, the Accountant General
sanctioned the opening of a personal ledger in the district
treasury to credit all receipts in connection with chaukidari 
19uniforms . These actions ’were almost inevitable traits in a 
colonial regime, and showed the unmistakable signs of political 
nervousness.
Communications within the district impeded administrative 
efficiency too. Roads were few and in severe need of repairs.
At the turn of the century an official wrote about Midnapur:
I drew on the map with a pair of compasses a circle 
enclosing 300 square miles thickly populated and all 
rate paying, in v'hich there was not a yard of District 
road
According to the returns for 1907 - 1908, the District Board
maintained 284^ miles of metalled roads ?.nd 358 miles of
unmetalled roads. There were also a number of village tracks
with an aggregate length of 756 miles, which were managed by
21
Local Boards and Union Committees . By 1921 things had
improved marginally, and total mileage of all roads amounted to 
22
1,498 miles . Major areas of the district were connected by 
rail, but not the coastal regions of Tamluk and Contai where
18. Revised Instructions for Dafadars and Chaukidsrs. 24th Jun 
1920, Jud-Gen VI/5/1920. (i\iRR) .
19. Jud-Gen V/l-a/1917-18 (MRR).
20. R. Carstairs op. cit. pp. 196-7.
21. Midnapore District Gazetteer p. 122.
22. BLC Frogs. 1/5/1921 p.321.
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communications were difficult. Nor were all the rivers bridged, 
and movement of goods and people depended to a considerable extent 
on ferries, not all of which were safe. There were, for example, 
frequent boat disasters at Petuaghat where people crossed to
23
the Sunderbans. There were telegraph offices at only 12 places ,
24
and only 41 of the 145 chaukidari unions possessed posr offices 
It seems extraordinary that a government committed to increasing 
efficiency did not invest in the essential infrastructure that 
was a precondition of progress. The Raj showed all the 
characteristics of a regime working for the interests of profit 
not the needs of the people.
The Sadar subdivision too, was rather unwieldy in size, comprising
3271 square miles and embracing 12 thanas. The Sadar area included
the Jungle Mahals around Jhargram, Gidni and Gopiballavpur mainly
inhabited by Santhals and other tribals. This area, with infertile
soil and a particularly exploitative ^amindari run by the Managing
Agency of Andrew Yule, was economically backward enough to merit
some special attention and generous grants from government, none of
25which was forthcoming . In 1903, the Government of Bengal 
communicated to the Commissioner ”... -That the Sadar subdivision 
of Midnapore both on account of its area and population is too
25
large to be effectively supervised as a sub-division" But the
decision took an incredibly long time to implement. It was only
in 1922, after railways had made land valuable in Jhargram and the
Santhals had joined in the non co-operation movement of 1921, that
government finally created:, the new subdivision of Jhargram comprising
27
the thanas of Jhargram, Binpur, Gopiballavpur and Nayagram
In Bengal, more than anywhere else in India, it was the law that 
was instrumental in regulating and keeping in check the stresses 
and strains in society. Colonial government was remarkable successful 
in imposing upon a largely pre-capitalist society the ideological 
hegemony of its legal institutions. This was due in part to the 
absence or weakness of indigenous village-based or caste-based
23. Midnapore District Gazetteer, B.Volume p.38
24. 3LG Progs, v/5/1921 p.47.
25. Medinipur Hitaishi 22rd January 1922, RNP Bengal 11th February 
1922.
26. Letters No. 2568 J.D. 25th August 1903, Rev-Gen Vll/58/1903 (MRR).
27. The decision was bitterly opposed by a section of the Midnapur 
town lawyers fearful of losing their clients. 3LC Progs. 
X11/1/1S22 pp. 398-4G8.
parellel systems of arbitration, and to a phenomenal increase
in the number of lawyers trained in the British system and ever
hungry for litigation. There were even the bands of touts who
toured villages promoting litigation and bringing clients to
2 0
lawyers for a small commission . In Midnapur, court work
was increased also by the activities of the ’criminal tribes',
mainly the Lodhas, who operated around Naraingarh, and the
Tantias who took to crime following the destruction of silk
29
cultivation in the district . The result, given the sheer 
size of the district was that the number of cases tended to 
overwhelm the judicial staff and the District Magistrate and 
Additional District Magistrate (See Table 2:1).
The District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge-, had to be on the
look out for any competent or semi-competent man to serve as
Honorary Magistrate and relieve the judicial staff of some of 
30the petty cases . These officers also had to supervise the
conduct of the judges, ensuring for example that those with a
high record of acquittals in criminal cases were kept away from
31delicate cases involving the police . An indication of the heavy
pressure on the judicial services comes from the fact that the
average duration of a criminal case before the Sessions Court
32
was over 32 sittings . The congestion in the courts was 
another example of the crisis that had pverwhelmed the district 
administration in Midnapur.
By 1907, official circles in Bengal were alive to the difficulties
34
of district administration, especially in Midnapur . It was
generally recognised that reforms were needed at once. The rise
of the terrorist movement in the wake of the Swadeshi agitation
convinced the government that "nothing could be more unfortunate
than the lack of personal contact between the District Officer and
35the people which at present prevails" . To the conservative
28. Ni har 14th May 1918.
29. Midnapore District Gazetteer p. 151
30. Jud-Gen IV/3/1927 and IV/3/1928 (MRR)
31. See the case of Judge Delevingue of Midnapur Court GOB' H. Poll
443/1915 (v/BSA) .
32. Rev-Gen XX/28(11a)/1926 (MRR).
33. Gen Vll/56/1905-6 (MRR).
34. Gen Vll/56/1905-6 (MRR) .
35. 3sngal Political Progs. Political Dept, July 1913 No. 5.
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officials of the Bengal government, the only way forward which 
also kept intact the paternalistic rule in the districts, was 
the partition of the large districts like Mymensingh and Midnapur:
........ there is no doubt that the amount of work which the
Collector has to da is so great that, however energetic
he may be, he cannot have the time to devote to the
various departments of his work which the Collector
should have and at the same time be able to visit the
30
various parts of this extensive district
Moreover, it was argued that large districts like Midnapur were
precisely the ones which had 'given trouble' during the Swadeshi
movement. It was felt that the personal influence of the British
District Officer would be adequate to check the major causes of
discontent, but that officer would have to be relieved of a
37substantial amount of paper work . This attitude, exemplified 
by Bengal officials to stall more 'radical' proposals coming from
other quarters, which challenged the basic idea of paternalistic
. 38 
rule
There is little doubt that had the partition of Midnapur been 
effected, it would have created an additional Collector/District 
Magistrate and reduced some of his paper work. The ‘wheels of 
bureaucracy would undoubtedly have turned a little faster. But 
there is little to suggest that this simple division of labour 
would have geared the administration to either coping with political 
discontent or pursuing a more active policy of intervention in the 
localities, some of a vaguely developmental nature. The Government 
of Bengal and its officers during the first two decades of the present 
century, viewed the political crisis arising from the growth of 
nationalism as a purely administrative problem. The symptoms of 
the administrative crisis outlined in this section were recognised 
by them, but their remedy was an even stronger dose of paternalism
36. Commissioner to Chief Secy, GOB ISth March 1905, General 
Vll/56/1905-6 (MRR)
37. Report of the District Administration Committee p.28.
38. One aspect of this controversy, between the conservative 
"Bengal Zamindari" School and the "peasant" School advocated 
by officials in Punjab, is covered in Peter Robb Peasants, 
Politics and Empire: the British Dilemma in India
Chapter 2  (unpublished).
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coupled with 'ma-baap' dedication and mass contact . It was this 
particular perception of events in Bengal that blinded them to the 
problems of local self-government, village government and nationalism 
as integral elements of the crisis. Essentially, the Bengal 
government advocated solutions which time and events had rendered 
obsolete.
Local Self Government
Lord Ripon's famous Resolution on Local Self-Government of 10th May 
1032 had established the institutional parameters of development works 
in India. The problems of sanitation, health, communications and even 
primary education, which would provide the infrastructure for the 
expansion of market relations, was .to be vested in various bodies 
created by colonial government. By 1008, the Government of Bengal had 
established in Midnapur a District Board, seven municipalities and five 
Union- Committees. These were follo’wed by the establishment of Local 
Boards with subdivisions as the unit. In his Resolution, Ripon had 
observed: "It is not primarily with a view to improvement in admini­
stration that this measure is put forward and supported. It is chiefly 
designed as an instrument of political and popular education . What this 
meant in practice was, in the words of O'Malley, that they would "provide 
an outlet for the ambitions and aspirations which had been created by
the education, civilisation, and material progress introduced by the 
41
British" . To take it one step further, the establishment of these
boards reflected the general policy of the Raj of intervening in the
localities to institute independent sources of revenue to finance
local projects. Since this involved additional doses of taxation, the
Boards were useful in roping in additional collaborators who would play
an active role in dispensing patronage. They were a means for the
42
integration of new leaders and men in the political process . As such, 
the policy reflected by far the most subtle move after 18S7 to strengthen 
the material and political foundations of British rule.
39. Peter Robb - The Government of India and Reform: Policies 
towards Politics and the Constitution 1916-21 Oxford 1976 p ,12
40. H. Tinker The Foundations of Local Self Government in India 
Pakistan, and Burma London 1954, p.44
41. Ibid, p.44.
42. John G. Leonard 'Urban Government Under the R^j: A Case Study 
of Municipal Administration in Nineteenth Century South India*
M.A.5. 7.2.1973 p.250.
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But thanks to the intransigence of the officials in Calcutta, the
policy turned out to be a half-measure. In rural Bengal, the District
Boards were the main agencies of rural development, with the Local
Boards acting as clearing houses. So concerned was the government
about the articulate bhadrolok swamping the Boards that almost all
power was vested in the hands of the District Magistrate who was also
43Chairman of the District Board , It was felt by government that:
As long as the District Magistrate is the Chairman of the
District Board, that body must have the greater prestige and
must attract the bigger zamindars whose interest it is most
44
important to evoke
Nominated and ex-officio members together comprised a majority in the
45
District Board and two of the Local Boards . The results were
disastrous, as overworked District Magistrates rode roughshod over any
46dissent v.'hich arose . Government succeeded in imposing its effective
control over the District Board, but at the cost of any worthwhile
Indian participation. In 1909, the average attendance in the 15
quorate Midnapur District Board meetings was a mere 9.5 out of a 
47membership of 25 .
The assumption that the presence of the District Magistrate would
attract the bigger zamindars also turned out to be erroneous. "I think”,
noted a prominent zemindar, "Membership of a District Board at present-
is not very attractive to the best people, because they think that they
cannot do much on the Board, and the will of the District Magistrate 
48will prevail" Bhupendranath Basu, the Moderate leader said: "The
District Officer interferes too much in every trifling detail, causing
49
unnecessary friction, and where it is probably not at all needed"
43. This phenomenon! was by no means confined to Bengal. Francis 
Robinson, * Municipal Government and Muslim Seperatism in the 
United Provinces 1BB3 to 19161 in Gallagher, Robinson, Seal (ed) 
Loc~lity, Province and Nation. Essays on Indian Politics 1870 
to 1940, Cambridge 1973, p70 - points to the same phenomenon
in UP. John Leonard, op. cit p.233, argues that in South India 
the British'created a profSessional municipal bureaucracy to 
negate the influence of politicians.
44. Bengal Municipal Progs. (Municipal) p/8934, No. 614 LS-G 20th 
March 1912.
45. Resolution 126 LS-G, 18th January 1910, Bengal Municipal Progs, 
February 1910, No. 5.
46. Tinker, op. cit, p. 54,
47. Bengal Municipal Progs, February 1910 No. 15.
Vol 4, para 15429. Evidence of Rai Kishore Lai Goswami Bahpdu^
4s. UuR, vol 4, para ISllo.
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Thess sentiments were also echoed by Surendranath Bannerjea,
50from.the moderate standpoint . In Midnapur, between 1907 and
1917, only one big zamindar of any consequence - Radha Gobinda
Pal - 'was on the District Board. True there were some minor
zamindars like Atal Behari Sinha, Brajendra Nath Ray, Heramba
Chandra Ray and Kailash Chandra Bhunia. But they owed their
position to official patronage, and did not possess the independent
base of the zamindars of say, Nsrajole, Mahisadal or Gopiballavpur.
It is also to be noted that the sharp confrontation between the
officials and the zamindars during the Swadeshi agitation in Midnapur
also kept the latter from . (identifying too closely with government
51
inspired institutions like the District Board
There was also a conscious resentment against the concentration of
power in the hands of the District Magistrate. In 1909, the
Decentralisation Commission expressed the view that the District
Magistrate should continue to remain the Chairman of the District
Board, but that his position, should be akin to a 1 constitutional
52ruler1 abiding by the feelings of the Board . This view provoked 
much discussion in the Vernacular Press, and the views of Basumati, 
published from Calcutta, were fairly reflective of existing educated 
Bengali opinions
We are of the opinion that District Magistrates already 
possess too much power. They are already each a lat in his 
own district. At their nod the most influential man in the 
district can be imprisoned. Moreover, he cannot be brought 
to book if even he does something most objectionable for the 
sake of prestige.■* If over and above this their powers are 
further increased the result is bound to be deplorable. The 
young civilians before they have quite freed themselves from 
impetuosity of youth, are entrusted with such powers as are 
calculated to drive even angels off their heads. None but 
the Tsar of Russia and the Kaiser of Germany possess such 
powers. It is true that the people of this country do not 
willingly come forward to offer advice to the rulers. The 
reason is that most of the rulers do not want advice properly 
so called^'.
50. Bengal Municipal Progs. (Municipal] January 1916 No. 3.
51* Jt>is is discussed in^a later section.
o2. Tinker, □□. cn:. p.35.
53. Basums-ci' 1st May 1909, RNP Bengal 3th May 1903.
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In Midnapur, the pressure of work forced the District Magistrate
into a position wherEby ha took only a cursory interest in the
actual running of the District Board. In any case, their
superiors in Calcutta never encouraged them to give priority to
this arena of administration. The day-to-day work of the Board
was supervised by a non-official Chairman, enjoying the confidence
of the local officialdom, who devoted part of his energies to the 
54
District Board . Between 1910 and 1916, the Vice Chairman of the
Midnapur District Board was Sital Prasad Ghose, the Public Prosecutor
55
and a great favourite of the officials
Given the lack of public interest in the.functioning of the District
5o
Board, and the fact that criticism was often construed as sedition
the Vice Chairman had enormous powers in actually deciding the nature
of the District Board resources. Atal Behari Sinhs, a lawyer who
handled government briefs in Pingla and who also had a small zamindari
in Sabang, exploited these powers to his own personal advantage. When
in 1918, the government sanctioned an expenditure of Rs 50,D00 by the
District Board for the excavation of tanks, Sinha used 80^ of the
money on Pingla and Sabang alone. The entire subdivisions of Tamluk
57and Contai received nothing . Such irregularities were not unique 
but the lack of any popular interest in the District Board made it 
easier for lapses to go almost unnoticed.
To add to the political inaptness of the District Board, there were
innumerable bureaucratic obstacles put in its way, as regards 
expenditure. The Bengal Municipal Act of 1844 provided that "If any 
work is estimated to cost above Rs 5,000 the local government may 
require the plans and estimates of such works to be submitted for its 
approval, or for the approval of any officer of government, before 
such work is commenced". This effectively msant the priorities of 
the District Board were mainly tailored to the needs of the imperial 
government, rather than to providing social services for the native 
population. The Bengal government was insistent that District Boards 
should not get grants at random but only for specific and approved
54. Bengal Municipal Progs (LBG), March 1913, No. 5.
55. This demonstrated by the remakrable regularity of his appear -ness 
on the District Board 'commended’ list.
55. For example, Medini Bandhav was prosecutec by the Conte.i Subdivisional 
Officer after the paper had exposed the illegal transfer of funds 
from the local Viriyasagar fund meant for education to the newly
established Bre.rilsy-Burt Dispensary. Mcdini 3-sndh-y, 4th May 1914
Rijp, B~ng. 1 23rd M-.y, 1514.  ^ |s|)HAft 3 - 7
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projects'"^. Though ths Finance Secretary, C. E. A. Oldham,
claimed in 1903, that reasonable facilities existed for a
"progressive District Board" to get any money it was justified 
5 9
in asking for , the Government of Bengal fought against giving
up its control of the organs of local self-government because
of the fears that ths bodies might be taken over by the
nationalists. Then the Hobhouse Committee recommended that
District Boards and Municipalities should have unlimited control
over their budgets without interference from the District
Magistrate and the Commissioner, the Government of Bengal fought
a desperate rearguard action to stall the implementation of this 
SOpolicy . In fact, the Chief Secretary, E. V. Levmge, thought that
the recommendations were irrelevant to the needs of Bengal”^. All in
all, the psriod before 1915 exposed the widening gap between the
advocates of devolution of power in Delhi, and the Government of
Bengal still dominated by hard-line intransigent imperialists. It
was with some justice that influential Bengalis could refer to ths
52
"Sham of local self-government"^
By 1909, the Government of Bengal had recognised that District 3oards 
were not exactly shining proof of the success of local self-government 
in the province. Besides other weaknesses, failure was chiefly
ascribed to the shortage of funds at the disposal of the District
S3Board . Before 1914, the main source of District Board finance 
was a statutory 25'/- of the Public Dorks Cess and grants-in-aid from 
ths government for specified projects. Besides the maintenance of 
District Board roads, most of the money was spent on primary and
secondary education, a head in which the Midnapur District Board
1 54
exceeded the provincial average by la times . The members of the 
District Board often complained of the inadequacy of funds to finance 
projects like rural water supply, which was a pressing local need.'' 
Unfortunately, what really seems to have happened was that inherent 
financial conservatism coupled with any real lack of enthusiasm 
ensured that a significant portion of ths income went unspent.
:u Bengal Municipal Progs (LEG) , P/842C. August .'Jo. 21-2: 
59. DDR Vol IV, para 14925.
5D. 3 ngal Municipal Progs. P/B413, July No. 65-57.
51. B ng.l Political Frogs (police), June 191G, No. 40-1.
52. PGR Vol. IV, para 15940, Evidence of Kalipada Ghosh.
62. PGR Vol IV, para 14926. Evidence of C. E. A. Oldham. 
64. Bengal Municipal Frogs. (LSG) June 1915, No. 29
55. Bengal Municipal Frogs, March 1912 No. 7.
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In 1911 - 12, this sum reached ths stageBring height of Rs 134,530. 
The prcblem proved particularly serious after 1913 - 14 when the
transfer of the entire Public Works Cess to the District Board
66
almost doubled their income overnight . This boost in income was 
also followed by the Government of Bengal, under pressure from Delhi, 
giving up all ths statutory restrictions imposed on expenditure.
If the government version of the failure of local self-government 
in the province is to be believed, the transfer of the Public Works 
Cess to the District Board in 1913 - 14 would have led to an 
automatic improvement in the performance and credibility of the 
District Board in Midnapur. The increased pov/ers of patronage should 
have inevitably led to the much sought after zamindars flocking for 
membership of ths Board. But between 1914 and 1920 there occurred no 
significant change in the style of local politics in Midnapur, as 
conducted within the District Board. The increase in financial 
resources did not immediately lead to a corresponding change in the 
District Board structures. Even without the statutory controls 
from Calcutta, it was ths District Magistrate who continued to 
dominate the proceedings, without any enlarged franchise, the 
membership of the Board in the period 1914 - 1921 continued to be 
as unrepresentative as before, containing as it did a sprinkling of 
second-string loyalist-zamindars and government lawyers. But the 
increase in District Board resources was only the first step in the 
politicisation of that body, which was to make it a more attractive 
institution for intervention. Ths Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 
and Surendranath Bannerjea’s Bengal Village Self-Government Act of 
1920 were to change the structures, and in an atmosphere of growing 
political tension after 1920, were to make the District Board the 
central arena of the politicians of Midnapur.
Municipalities
If District Boards failed really to get off the ground in terms of 
public participation, municipal politics prior to 1921 provided 
the forum where the publicists could stand up and hope to be
SS. Bengal Municipal Frogs (LSG), June 1915, No. 29.
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counted. Lacking any forms of modern industrialisation,
Midnapur was a predominantly rural district, the towns being 
important only as administrative centres, or in the case of 
Kharagpur, as a major railway junction. Urbanisation in India 
was related to economic development and religion. Given the 
virtual stagnation of agriculture in Bengal and the absence of 
any major centres of pilgrimage, the towns in Midnapur declined 
both in size and importance over the years [see Table 2:2). These 
factors would explain why urban municipal politics in Midnapur never
S'
reached the exciting dimensions witnessed in say, Benares or Rajahmundry.
The structure of municipalities provided an environment whereby some 
limited political activity could be carried out. This was because 
unlike the District Board, a defined political arena, albeit 
restricted, existed in the form of the rate-payers (See Table 2:3). 
Moreover, unlike the District Board, the municipality was allowed to 
have a non-official Chairman and an elected majority. This superficial 
freedom from official control ensured that discussions within 
municipalities were intense, passionate and political. The elections 
too, especially in Midnapur tovn, were keenly contested and voter 
turnout often exceeded 60%. But this superficial liberalisation was 
offset by paltry resources at the disposal of the bcdy and statutory 
restrictions on expenditure. The gradual economic decline of most 
of the towns made,local taxation a difficult proposition, thus 
reducing the potential for patronage and nullifying any political 
impact the municipalities might have had (See Table 2:4). The only 
exception to this trend was Midnapur municipality, housing the 
District Headquarters end an European population, which a combination
of financial resources and internal structure gave a position of
6Gpolitical importance before 1921 .
The abundance of lawyers at the District Courts and the presents of 
an active Bar Council in Midnapur town ensured that a large proportion
67. C. Bayly,'Patrons :nd Politics in Northern India'in 
Gallagher, Johnson etc. op. cit. and John Leonard 
op. cit.
6 8 . Kharagpur, although situated in the district, has not been dealt 
with in the thesis. The politics of Kharagpur was fundamentally 
different, embracing an organised working class. It v/culd be 
out of place to tackle the phenomenon of working class politics 
m  a study that is concentrated on rural politics.
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TABLE 2:2
Population of Towns in Midnapur District 1901-1931
1901 1911 1921 1931
Midnapur 33,140 32,740 28,965 32,021
Kharagpur 18,957 25,280 58,134
Ghatal 14,525 12,064 10,770 12,400
Chandrakona 9, .309 8,121 6,470 6,016
Ramjibanpur 10,264 8,481 6,700 6,230
Khirpai 5,045 4,605 3,756 3,593
Kharar 9,508 8,839 6,580 5,736
Tamluk 8,085 8,048 8,348 9,095
Contai 5,259
(Compiled from Census Reports)
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TARI F 2:3
Municipalities in Midnapur in 1911-12
Municipality Population Ratepayers Voters* % of Population
Midnapur 33,138 5,58D 2,366 7.14
Tamluk 7,872 1,906 648 8.23
Ghatal 14,537 2,570 695 4.78
Chandrakona 9,315 2,353 342 3.67
Ramjibanpur 10,265 1,908 371 3.61
Khirpai 4,995 1,083 327 6.55
Kharar 9,493 1,386 556 5.85
(Compiled from Bengal Municipal Proceedings)
+ * figures for 1908-09.
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FABLE 2:4
Financial Position of Municipalities in Midnapur









































































(Compiled from Midnapore District Gazetteers, B. Volume and 
Bengal Municipel Proceedings)
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of the more successful -lawyers took a keen interest in the 
affairs of the municipality and sought election as Commissioners.
In the period under review, Midnapur municipality was dominated by 
ths presence of two very colourful lawyers - Upendra Nath Maity, and 
the young barrister, Birendra Nath Sasmal. Maity was the Chairman 
of the Municipality from 1912 as well as President of the local Bar 
Council. He was broadly sympathetic to the nationalist cause, a 
factor which was responsible for his being implicated in the Midnapur 
Bomb Conspiracy Case, though the charges against him were later 
dropped. His appeal was largely personal rather than political, and 
his sights did not extend beyond the district. Opposed to this was 
the personality of Sasmal, the son of a minor Contai zamindar. From 
a very young age Sasmal had involved himself in Congress activities 
in Contai and Calcutta. He was the first Mahishya to qualify as a 
barrister from England, a feat which me.de him well-known in the 
district. He was an ambitious man who set his sights high, but who 
until 1921 was content to remain in the background of municipal
59
politics , in the face of Maity*s local dominance.
Also influential in the Midnapur municipality was ths extraordinary
figure of Raja Narendra Lai Khan of Narajole, one of the biggest
zamindars of the district. The Raja shot to notoriety during the
Swadeshi agitation when he was implicated in the Midnapur Bomb
Conspiracy Case, and when he later brought a defamation suit against
the Collector, Donald Weston, for supposedly accepting bribes. For
this he was declared persona non grata by the government and omitted
70
from the Midnapur Khas Mulakati list . In fact, the Raja alone 
epitomised the forces of militant nationalism in Midnapur before 
1921. But his influence was not limited to the active nationalists 
in the district or outside: his fame was also dependent on his acts 
of philanthropy. He was reputed to have personally paid for the 
excavation of about 4CC tanks in the district for public use, many 
of which were in Midnapur town. He was closely involved with the 
local Ramakrishna Mission and had donated a house to the Mission
59. P. Fal Deshapran Sasmal Calcutta 1553 3.3. pp. 19-25.
70. GOB H. Poll 330/1918 (V/B3A).
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to enable it to operate in Midnapur. Lastly, he was also known
to have sponsored the .studies of many students from Midnapur,
71
including one who was sent for an art course to Paris
Lastly mention must be made of the presence in the municipality of 
ourya Kumar Agasti, who involved himself in municipal affairs after 
retirement from government service.
The involvement of these personalities with strong nationalist 
backgrounds gave the municipal politics’ of Midnapur town, a strong 
anti-government flavour. In a way this was not unexpected given 
the limited number of forums available to Indians, especially 
nationalists, to make their political points. This was in an 
atmosphere where the educated Hindus all over Bengal had become 
intensely politicised and consciously aware of the alien nature 
of the existing government.
The lack of a proper water supply in Midnapur town brought the 
entire question of government financing into focus. On 23th July 
1916, the District Board decided to contribute a sum of Rs 50,COO 
for the establishment of v/ater works in Midnapur town, the cost 
of which was then estimated at Rs 400,000. The Raja of Narajole was 
persuaded after considerable pressure had been exerted on him by the 
District Magistrate to contribute a sum of Rs 50,000; he was made to 
sign a bond to that effect. Further subscriptions from wealthy 
citizens yielded another Rs 50,000. This last sum could have been 
'higher, but the zamindars deliberately kept their contributions low 
to register their protest against the contemplated partition of the 
district. The District Magistrate, W. A. Marr, suggested to the 
municipality on 28th August 1916 that government would sanction 
Rs 200,000 as a grant and Rs 50,000 as loan for ths completion, of 
the project. For Marr, this was an essential political step as the 
credibility of the government had reached rock-bottom following a 
concerted campaign launched by ths local vernacular press. The 
press had accused the government of unnecessarily spending vast 
sums of money on the construction of a new district headquarters
71. Interview with Mrs. Anjail Khan 29th July 1973
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at Hijli, in the face of local opposition, when basic civic
amenities v/sre lacking in Midnapur town. Earlier, the government's
image had not benefited when the Governor, Lord Carmichael, in
1915, while replying to a local petition asking for a grant for
the water-works, had suggested that they dig an experimental
well instead, for which he would be pleased to sanction Rs 5,000:
For the District Magistrate therefore,this grant was imperative
to restore some of government prestige. But officials in Calcutta
were unwilling to oblige. Secretary, L.S.3. O'Malley wrote back
regretting the government's inability to sanction either a grant
or a loan. Neither could government hold out any "Hope of being
able to assist the municipality at present. When financial
conditions improve, Government trust that they will be in a
position to make a grant and a loan to the municipality, but it
72is not possible to give any promise as to the amount of either"
So the Midnapur water-works project collapsed for the time being for
want of funds. Politically this action of government had important
repercussions insofar as it demonstrated in practice ths utter
insensitivity of the government to the day-to-day material needs of
the people. Moreover, this was at a time when government spokesmen
were going around all districts attempting to raise contributions
to the war effort. Ths utter callousness shown by the government
to a problem that had recently been a cause of a very severe typhoid
and cholera enidemic almost overnight nullified, in Midnapur town
at least, any last illusion people had over the paternalistic nature
of British rule. Far from drawing in new collaborating elements into
closer relationship with British rule, the municipality had raised
73expectations among ths people which imperial rule could not meet
Official interference too led to conflicts between the municipal 
commissioners and the government. In 1913, Maulvi Altaf Ahmed’
72. L.S.3. O'Malley to Secy, Sanitary Board, 21st February 
1917. Bengal Municipal Progs. March 1917 No. 50-62.
73. Bengal Municipal Progs. (Municipal) January 1915. No 25-27 
and March 1917, No. 57-62. Medini Bandhav 29th September 
1913, RNF Bengal 18th October 1913.
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3ub-Deputy Collector, who had revised the assessment of municipal
taxes in Midnapur town, was transferred to Bihar. The transfer
was engineered by the Collector to prevent the Maulvi from hearing
the objections to the assessments, as he suspected his hand in some
corrupt activities. The municipal commissioners however, thought
that the whole assessment ought to be conducted by one officer and
sought his recall. The District Magistrate, without consultation
with the municipal commissioners, wired the Maulvi informing him
74that his services were not wanted in Midnapur . The incident, 
hardly oncommon, and trivial as it was, did not contribute to any 
furtherance of the British desire to make new friends.
The government's interference was sorely resented during the 
elections to the post of Chairman of Midnapur municipality in 1912. 
The Raja of Narajole, fresh from his confrontations vith ths 
authorities in the Bomb Conspiracy Case, declared himself a 
candidate. He also announced that if elected, he would donate 
Rs 1 lakh to the costs of establishing a water-work for the town. 
The decision of the Raja was welcomed by the 'nationalist' group in 
the municipality, and Upendra Nath Maity and Surya Kumar Agasti, 
two contenders for the post, decided to withdraw in favour of the 
Raja. But the decision of a marked political 'agitator' like the 
Raja to contest the post was frownec upon by the government, 
especially as he was certain to win. Mr. Patterson, the 
Additional District MagistrateT who took a personal interest in 
the matter, tried at first to split the Raja's votes. It was 
presumably on his instigation that the Msdinipur Hitaishi took 
the view that the Raja, though generous, was incompetent:
That is why we consider a young and energetic man like
Mr. B. N. Basmal as a fit man for the Chairmanship...
No amount of donation without good administration will
75
improve the condition of the municipality
'Vhen this approach failed, the Additional District Magistrate 
summoned Upendra Nath Maity and informed him that government would 
veto the election of the Raja. Maity walked out and divulged the
74. Bengal Municipal Frogs. Routine 'Matters, July 1913 No. 1.
75. Medinipur Hitaishi 3th July 1912, RNP Bengal 13th July 1912.
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conversation to the press . The revelations of Maity had the
desired effect. The Calcutta press immediately took up the
issue claiming that it was a clear instance of hoy; even
municipal commissioners had not the liberty to elect their own 
77Chairman . "How can", wrote the Daimk Chandnka, "a man who
can make a gift of a lakh to the municipality, be indifferent
78to the question of civic improvement?" The Hitavadi painted
out that it was on political grounds that the election was being
opposed. Banjivani advised the Commissioners to persist in-
electing the Raja in spite of vetoes, claiming that it was a
79question of civic autonomy
But government remained instransigent and the commissioners were 
unwilling to make the matter a test case of autonomy. Thus, the 
Raja was finally advised by his associates to stand down. Upendra 
Nath Maity was instead elected Chairman.
The election episode demonstrated the government's dread of anything 
remotely close to nationalist aspirations. The conduct of the Raja 
was not political but based on his ability to contribute generously 
to the municipal coffers. The government apposed him because of 
his associations with the Swadeshi movement - an overtly political 
act. The method of opposition was crude, and though the district 
administration won the day in 1912 the success left behind a feeling 
of resentment of the sort of which political agitations are made. 
Municipalities were created by the Raj to strengthen the basis of 
its rule in India . In Midnapur, economic decline of the towns 
coupled with paucity of resources made 6  of the 7 municipalities 
mere paper bodies lacking any real power or influence. In Midnapur 
town, where some success in the local self-government game had been 
achieved, the government threw away its chances of expanding the 
network of collaborators by its insensitive handling of issues. In 
a sense, the Bengal Government was naive in hoping for blind loyalty in 
an atmosphere of rising political expectations. In the case of 
Midnapur town, they hoped for a pliant municipality a'la ths District 
Board; and when that did not happen, they resorted to bureaucratic 
heavy-handedness, in the process ruining the very purpose of their
76. -.mrita Bazar Patrika 2nd July 1912, RNP Bengal 3th July 1912.
77. Ibid.
7R. RNP Bengal 13th July 1912






If Midnapur municipality constituted the only island of politicisation, 
the Union Committees were firmly drowned in the sea of apathy 
surrounding institutional politics in Midnapur. Union Committees 
were institutions created by the government in any place which 
"contains a large bazaar, which is not sufficient importance to be
made into a muncipality, but in which the need of sanitation, etc,
80is felt" By 1914, Midnapur had six Union Committees in existence, 
though the Committee at Contai town could easily have qualified for 
the status of a municipality.
Union Committees had little power and even less finance. They were 
dependent on the District Board for nearly all their income. It was 
argued that the District Board grant would be a stimulus for corres­
ponding taxation, but that did not turn out to be true. Only the 
Contai Union Committee raised local taxes. The members of the Committee, 
appointed by the District Magistrate, were unwilling to incur local 
wrath by sanctioning local taxation. Commenting on this phenomenon 
Sital Prasad Ghosh, the then Vice Chairman remarked in 1914:
No question of local taxation has yet been raised, as it
has been found that the mention of this subject extinguishes
all zeal in the formation of Unions. But I believe that
once the people are convinced of the benefits to be derived
from the establishment of a Union, there will be no difficulty
Q1
in persuading them to pay a small local rate
This optimism turned out to be unfounded. The wealthier residents 
of the Unions, paying rent or revenue, the Fublic Works Cess and 
Chaukidari tax, saw no justification in paying tax to maintain a 
body whose mere existence seemed redundant. Not surprisingly, all 
but one of the Committees refused even to consider the prospects 
of further taxation and allowed the Committees to sink into peaceful 
slumber. The Union Committees were one of the biggest fiascos of 
the Raj's local self-government experiment.
80. Bengal Municipal Procs, (L3G) July 1914. No 1 - 1 0 .
81. Bengal Municipal Progs, (L3G) October 1911 No. 22
Table 2:582
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AVERAGE INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF UNION COMMITTEE 1908-1911
Income Expenditure
Contai 1,035 1 , 1 0 0
Pingla 500 Not available
Lowada 470 209
Panskura 350 Not available
Jara 403 137
Village Government
The District Board, Union Committees and all but one of the 
municipalities though inactive, did not provoke any active 
resentment by their mere existence. This was not ths case with 
the system of village government in Bengal, which provided the 
seeds of the agitations that were to sweep Midnapur in the 1320's 
and 1930's and bring politics into the remote interior.
In 1870, the Government of Bengal enacted legislation to strengthen 
government control of the villages and provide the institutional 
framework through which it could intervene mors actively. The 
problem that faced ths Government of Bengal differed substantially 
from that of thos» parts of India, like the United provinces, where 
there existed some village community structure. In Bengal, this no 
longer existed and, in some parts, had never existed. The 1870 
Chaukidari Act sought to institutionalise the system of village 
watch that was in existence and institute Psnchaysts. In the 
latter case, this meant the creation of a new agency, not the 
revival of a dormant one.
By the Act of 1870, the District Magistrate was empowered to 
nominate Panchayats in each village which were to supervise and
82. Bengal Municipal Progs (L5G) Octob-r 1311 No.22
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appoint Chaukidars. Unlike in the past, when Chaukidars were 
given rent-free chakran lands, the new system instituted the 
chaukidari tax levied on every villager according to means.
The government hoped that this would free chaukidars from the 
control of the zamindars and encourage them to serve the village 
as a whole. As Rivers Thompson explained in his speech while 
introducing the Bill:
Ths Bill proceeds upon the recognition of the fact that 
the village chaukidar is purely a village servant employed
for the protection of the lives and property of the 
villager and looking to the village community for the 
regular payment of the remuneration to which he is 
entitled
The government, besides appointing the Penchayat, had very little 
control over the chaukidar. It was the Panchayat who selected the 
chaukidar, had powers to dismiss him and determine his pay. In that
sense, the chaukidar belonged to the village.
In 1892, the Chaukidari Act was amended. The amendment empowered 
the District Magistrate not only to appoint ths Fanchayats, but also 
gave him full control of the chaukidars including the right of 
appointment, dismissal, cunishment or reward. The chaukidars became 
servants of the state but continued to be paid out of the proceeds of 
the chaukidari tax. In addition to their normal watch duties, the 
chaukidars were required to assist the police in their duties, deliver 
summonses on behalf of the courts, attend on touring officers and make
arrangements for their conveyance
The cumulative effect of the 1870 and 1892 legislation was to increase
the pace of discontent against the government in the villages. . 'Vith
ths control of the chaukidars taken out of their hands, the Panchayats
lost their raison d'etre and were transformed into glorified tax-
collectors. This loss of responsibility ensured that the educated ~nd
’respectable' men in the villages '.vers reluctant to take on this 
85unenviable job. The general result was that Panchayats became the
33. Forward 19th December 1925.
84. 3LC Progs XIV/o/1924 p.3.
85. Commissioner Burd-sn Division to GOB 23rd February 19G9
GOB H. Roll 187/1908 No. 19 ('78 5A).
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stooges of ths local daroga and made up of people who were constantly
involved in village factionalism and incessant litigation, in short
PS
the most undesirable people for any responsible job. I he Circle 
Officers, who were appointed following the recommendations of the 
1315 District Administration Committee Report, mads the situation 
worse. The District Magistrate was totally dependent on the Circle 
Officer and the daroga in deciding whom to appoint as Panchayat or 
chaukidar. These officers felt that if important people were appointed 
to Panchayats, their importance would diminish in the eyes of the 
district authorities. By lav/, the Panchayat was a superior body to 
the Circle Officer and daroga. By appointing their own favourites,
37the latter two ensured their own control over the village institution.
In 1918, in Contai, the President's of the Panchayats were made
investigating officers in faujdari cases. But this power was quickly
withdrawn when the courts discovered the amazing unreliability of their 
8 8reports. Ths local press in Midnapur was unanimous in its verdict 
that the effectiveness of Panchayats had been undermined by government 
and police officers.
c\
The behaviour of ths chaukidars also caused oret resentment in ths 
villages. After 1892, chaukidars became government servants under 
the control of government officers. They acted arbitrarily and offended
the sensibilities of the village notables who had no control over them.
As a vernacular paper described the situation:
So far as we can see, the only purpose that the chaukidar 
serves is to supply provisions for Police and Executive 
officers when they are on tour, prepare the hookah for the 
Panchayat, send to the thana statistics of birth and death 
pompously go about the streets with a police constable, 
lcng after any theft or dacoity or riot happens to have 
taken place, converse with ths local daroga perhaps on
theological questions, and above all collect chaukidari
89tax even by attaching people's movable properties.
These allegations were repeated in the Legislative Council by Indian 
members:
8 6 . Nihar 5th August 1924.
87. Hijli Hitaishi 21st July 1927.
8 8 . Nihar 5th August 1924.
89. Dohamnadi 27th February 1914, RNP Bengal 14th Larch 1914.
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The chaukidar is unfortunately the servant of every
person in authority who happens to pass through his
village...he is the most unpopular servant of the
90Crown in the village.
In Contai, there were complaints that increase in crime was due
to chaukidars working in collusion with robber gangs, and detaining 
91people illegally. The daroga of a Bhagawanpur village, Rehayat Bux,
was personally responsible for recruiting notorious thugs like Maqbul
Dafadar, Ishwar Jana, Satish Dafadar to serve as chaukidars with
92predictable results. In short, the behaviour and action oip 
chaukidars source of great unease in the villages, giving
rise to conscious resentment against governmental authority.
A natural consequence was that the payment of chaukidsri tax was greatly
resented by the entire village population. Prior to 1670, the villagers
paid no direct chaukidari tax. The chaukidsris were assigned rent free
chakran lands to cultivate. "Besides this he used to get cash payments
from the bhadrolok class on occasions of marriage ceremonies or other
festivals. Hs also used to get free service from the village
carpenters, the village smith and the village porter, while the
agriculturists used to supply him with a portion of their production
93such as rice, pulse, rye etc. " v/hila this picture was undoubtedly
too idyllic, there is little doubt that the imposition of an additional
cash tax was a source of great irritation, especially as it covered
94-
all classes of people, except the zamindars who were exempt.
Section 15 of the Chaukidari Act provided:
The rate to be levied in any village for the purposes of 
this Act shall be sn assessment according to the circumstances 
and the property to be protected of the person liable to the 
same: Provided that the amount to be assessed shall not be
more than one rupee per mensem, and that all persons who in
in the opinion of the panchayat, are too poor to pay half
95
anna a month shall be altogether exempt from assessment.
90. BLC Progs Vlll/1922 p.139. Speech by Indu Bhusan Dutta.
91. Nihar 3rd October 1915 and 2nd September 1924.
92. Prabodh Chandra Basu Bhagewanpur Thenar Ithibritya Calcutta
1976, p. 127-28.
93. Amrita Bazar Fstrike 12th February 1929.
94. 3LC Progs. Vll/1922, p.137.
95. Ibid IV/1921, p. 25. The assessment was doubled in 1922.
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Given the fact that the assessment was done by the Panchayat without
any rigid guidelines, it was bound to be arbitrary. Government sources
indicated that ths incidence of the tax v/as frequently unfair. The
Panchayat almost invariably under-assessed themselves and their
friends, while over-assessing these unfavourably disposed towards 
96
them. In No. 13 Union of Bhagawanpur thana, two Brahmins,
Panchanand Panda and Ishwar Chandra Panda, were exempt from the tax
while people who worked for them and whose income was lower, had to
pay it. In fact, ths villagers were forced to pay for the Brahmins 
97collectively. In 1914, there were widespread reports that
chaukidars in flood-affected areas in Contai were attaching the
movable property of villagers in spite of a government order for
98remission of chaukidari tax. Nor were these isolated examples.
The Indian Police Commission of 1902-03 observed 'there is a body
99of evidence that the assessment falls too heavily on the poor'
This was again confirmed in a survey done by H. ’//heeler in 1906, 
v/hich noted "the tendency to tax the poor and under-assess the rich"*^^
The irregularities involved in, and the distasteful nature of the 
entire system of village government was not unknown in Calcutta.
District Magistrates were near-unanimous "in thinking that the tax 
is very unpopular and is generally regarded as oppressive and its 
collection is distasteful to the panchayat, its abolition would be 
desirable and would be highly appreciated by the pecple"^^ F. W.
Duke, a member of the Governor's Executive Council also noted: "The
102chaukidari tax is no doubt felt, and no relief would be more welcome"
By 19CB, ths Government of Bengal seriously considered abolition of the 
chaukidari tax, but did not pursue the matter as it would have seemed
to be an admission of failure and regarded as a victory by the
.. .... 103nationalists.
The policy of denying the Swadeshi movement a short-term victory, was 
to have disastrous long-term effects on the political future of the Raj. 
The bureaucratically-inspired imbalances in the village power structure 
and the exploitative nature of the tax assessment were to provide ideal 
ammunition to Congress agitators. The nature of ths resentment against
96. Commissioner to GOB, 23rd February 1909, GOB H. Poll 187/1908 
No. 19 (WBSA).
97. Nihar i June 1920.
98. Nihar 20th January 1914, RNP Bengal 24th January 1914.
99. Sir Charles Allen, Secy GOB to Secy Home, G01 30 September 1909 
GOB H. Poll 187/1908 No 29 (v/BSA) .
100. Ibid.
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ths chaukidari tax gave Congress the cause of a multi-class 
campaign, embracing nearly all sections of the village, against 
British rule.
Conclusion
□n 12th July 1917, in the House of Commons, Edwin Montagu denounced
the Government of India as 'too wooden, too iron, too inelastic,
too ante-diluvian, to be of any use for the modern purposes we have 
104
in mind' What Montagu had 'in mind' was an extension of the 
functions of government in India. Prior to 1917, the government 
of Bengal was preoccupied with considerations of extending government . 
authority but at the crucial cost of government legitimacy. The 
crucial test of the latter project lay in the ability of government 
to incorporate political life into the structures of colonial rule.
In Midnapur, the authority of the government embraced almost all 
walks of life, but its legitimacy was minimal. There was certainly 
political activity in Midnapur before the introduction of dyarchy, 
but, except in one case, it clearly did not revolve around the 
so-called 'self-governing' structures set up under colonial rule. 
Though these structures permeated down to every level of the 
district, their existence was marked by apathy, indifference, and 
often resentment. Except for Midnapur municipality, this was 
ruined by bureaucratic heavy-handedness and insensitivity. But 
their mere existence and their arbitrary and undemocratic 
procedures gave rise to a conscious feeling of deprivation among the 
educated middle stratum in society, in an atmosphere where the entire 
basis of foreign colonial rule was being increasingly brought into 
question. Government intervention in Midnapur produced only a handful 
of insignificant collaborators abiding by the rules of the game. But 
it also produced tensions and imbalances which, coupled with the 
injection of an ideological dimension from outside, was to produce 
a situation which the Raj would find increasingly difficult to 
contain.
101. GOB H. Poll 107/1908 No. 19 (WBoA)
102. Note dated 29th October 1908, GOB H. Poll 187/1908 No. 1 ( vVSoA) .
103. GOB H. Poll 187/19G6 (VSSA)
104. P. Robb op. cit p.16.
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LAND AND CASTE IN MIDNAPUR
Midnapur district was essentially rurali according to the Census 
of 1911, 2.71 million of the total population of 2.82 million lived 
in rural areas. In Midnapur, as in other agrarian societies, it was 
the control of land which was the crucial determinant in locating 
political power. This horizontal differentiation of society was 
compounded by vertical loyalties of caste. It is with these 
twin factors of land and caste, and their political dimensions that 
we shall be primarily concerned in this chapter.
Zamindars
The conventional view of power relations in rural Bengal have tended 
to concentrate on the zamindars, who are considered to be located at 
the apex of rural society. The Permanent Settlement of 1793 which 
conferred the right of private property on the zamindars, is seen as 
the great watershed. More recent studies on the subject have thrown 
doubts on the validity of this contention, and have suggested that, 
barring significant exceptions, real control of rural society did 
not rest in the hands of the zamindars. Political power, it has 
been suggested, was more localised? and zamindars, while having 
control over revenue, had only limited control over lant.^
In 1764, the Collector of Midnapur noted that the whole district was
"in the hands of hereditary Zamindars who derive their right from original
2
sanads granted to their ancestors" This was a result cf Midnapur's 
strategic position as a frontier district providing a battleground for 
the Moghuls and later Alivardi Khan, and the Maratha raiders. As a 
result, in 1793, the East India Company had little or no difficulty in 
identifying the zamindars with whom to make settlement. But a problem 
i‘1 as created by the fact that Midnapur unlike some other Bengal > districts 
had a multiplicity of zamindars. There were ten 1 rge zamindari estates, 
but the bulk of the settlement was mar.a -with more than 300Q petty
• rA 3zamindars. The problem assumed greater dimensions in the first 
three decades of the Permanent Settlement when estates were further
1. Rajat and Ratna Ray 'Zamindars and Jotedars: A Study of Rural 
Politics in Bengal1 MAS IX,1 (1975) For the orthodox view see 
Nn.K . Sinha, Economic History of Bengal, Vol. 2, Calcutta 1362.
2. Quoted in A. K. Jameson, 'The Permanent Settlement in Midnapur1 
Calcutta Review, 291 (1918), p.46
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subdivided and auctioned. This was partly a result of the inability
4
of zamindars to cope with ths problems of over-assessment, and of
manoeuvres by other zamindars to convert estates into benami holdings
5
with the connivance of corrupt amins. Between 1793 and 1GC3, the
Q
total number of estates in the district increased from 1000 to 1900.
The Kassijora estate, once the largest and most flourishing in Midnapur,
7
was split up into no fewer than 303 separate estates by 1800. In fact, 
it was not until 1834, that the Collector could report with some
certainty that the revenue assessment was light in proportion to the
0
resources of the estate.
The zamindari system in Midnapur was therefore deformed from the outset.
Instead of Cornwallis' vision of great and improving landlords, the
reality of Midnapur was a scattering of petty estates, some economically
unviable, all controlled by local magnates with limited influence over
small areas. Not that the large zamindaris favoured by British
administrators did not exist. The Burdwan Raj spilled over into
Midnapur, and the Mahtab family had substantial landed interests in
Ghatal. The Brahmin Garga family of Mahisadal were the largest
zamindars of the district with landed property valued at Rs 4866,943 
g
in 1928-29; Raja Sati Prasad Garga was credited with a personal
income of Rs 3 lakhs in 1909. Ths second largest zamindari belonged
to the Khan family of Narajole. At the turn of the century, the
Narajole zamindari covered an area of 309,613 acres; it embraced 2,916
villages and produced a government revenue of Rs 90,214.^ Devendra
12
L-l Khan also had a personal annual income of Rs 120,000 in 1926.
Then there was the British-owned Midnapur Zamindary Company, managed
3. B.B.Chaudhuri,'Land Market in Eastern India 1783-1940', IE5HR
Xll, 2 (1975), p. 161: E. Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj, Cambridge 
1978 p. 32.
4. Chaudhuri, op. cit, pp. 161-5: C. Palit, Tensions in Bengal Rural 
-Society, Calcutta 1973, p. 12.
5. Jameson, op. cit.
6 . Ibid, p.54.
7. Ibid, p.54.
8 . Ibid, p.56-7.
9. Rev—//ards XVlll, 43/193G (MRR) .
10. Durbar list (non-officials). GOB H. Foil 104/19G9 (WBSA).
11. Mohencro Lai Khan, History of the Midnapoor Raj, Calcutta 1889 
pp. 23-25.
12. GOB. H. Poll 10/1926.
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13by Andrew Yule which had large interests in the Jungle Mahals, But 
the existence of a dozen or so large zamindars does not detract from 
the fact that owing to preponderance of petty zamindars, the class 
basis for British rule was rather hollow. This was . more so because 
as we saw in the last chapter, British policy was formulated with the 
purpose of incorporating the large zamindars into the pclitical 
establishment. In Midnapur, the objective reality of land control made 
this an impossibility. This differentiation within the zamindari class 
also meant that there was a lack of economic solidarity between the 
zamindars. In other words, though they shared a similar relationship to 
the modes of production, based on the exractioo cf rent-surplus, their 
vastly different levels of exploitation ensured differing political 
interests and loyalties. It is not a curious accident that in the 1920's 
and 1920's, ths petty zamindars found themselves in political alliance 
with rich tenants rather than their class counterparts the major 
zamindars.
The zamindari stratum perpetuated by the 1793 settlement did not then
correspond to the dreams of Lord Cornwallis: it was also weakened
politically by tenancy and rent legislation down to the end of the
19th century. , From 1^30 until the passing of the Rent Act in 1859,
the government launched a massive operation aimed at resuming the
lakhiraj~ or rent free tenures from the zamindari estates. From the
landlords* point of view this was unfortunate, since a number cf them
used lakhiraj tenures as a device to accumulate unassessed income.
The Majnumutha estate in Contai held 54,242 bighas as lakhiraj and they
14
were resumed at full rates. The 1859 Rent Act was a minor setback for 
zamindari interests as it defined occupancy ryots as those who had been 
in continuous possession for twelve years and granted them security of 
tenure. It also specified certain conditions under which rent could.be 
raised, and these provisions did not always favour the zamindars.- Though 
the actual implementation of a paper act depended on the political balance 
of class farces in the countryside, the Rent Act did provide the institutional 
and legal framework wher-.by combinations of tenants could challenge the 
zamindar with at least the theoretical backing of the coercive apparatus
13. The political economy of the Jungle Mahals is discussed in more 
detail in a subsequent chapter.
14. Palit, oo. cit. p.45.
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of the state. The 1885 Tenancy Act, which merely streamlined the
one of 1859, further aided this process. The growth of the legal
profession and of an ever-increasing band of briefless lawyers,
encouraged people to initiate litigation at cheap rates. Of course
the importance of legislation must not be exaggerated. It must
be emphasised that the law, in any case, was biased heavily in
favour of the zamindar and any successful confrontation with him
depended on a tilt in ths local balance of forces. Moreover, the
local officials tended, more often than not, to favour the interests
of the large zamindars. For example during the resumption in the
1880's of paikan lands (those given to paiks and chaukidars rent-
free), 1,822 bighas of land in Keshpur, in ths Narajole zamindari,
were resumed but the government expressed no opinion as to the
status of the former paiks. Consequently, most of them were treated
as tsnants-at-will becauss of the particular balance of forces in 
15the locality. In short zamindars who had their house-in order 
and commanded local influence were rarely affected. Legislation 
disadvantaged only those zamindars whose financial or political 
weaknesses made them vulnerable to pressure from below. Thus, by 
1885, an atmosphere had been created whereby the strata of rural 
society immediately below small zamindars could assert themselves 
mare confidently, in both political and legal terms.
In the face of a slowly mounting bureaucratic offensive there was
therefore, a slight loosening of the terms of absolute politico-legal
coercion; but zamindars who were kept on their toes could safeguard
their interests. In East Bengal, one of ths reasons that the
zamindars found themselves on the defensive was their position as
absentee landlords who thrived in an atmosphere of vulgar ostentation
and conspicious consumption. The smaller zamindars gained relative
strength from the fact that few among them were absentee. The
exceptions were the Raja of Burdwan, the Nawab of Murshidabad, and
the Sils of Calcutta* and in a strict sense, the first two could not
really be called absentee, as they were based in neighbouring districts
and had a well-organised estate management. The Raja of Burdwan, for
example, took a personal interest in his Midn-pur possessions from his
16palace in Burdwan. However, absenteeism and lack of experience in
15. A. K. Jameson, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement of Midnapur 
1911-17 p.95.
15. GOB H. Poll 1C5/19G7.
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handling zamindari affairs cost the oils dearly. Torn by internal
family feuds and a staff of corrupt naibs and gomasthas, their
estates was torn by disputes with tenants, often instigated by their 
17own staff. This question of absenteeism was not a moral one.
Given the tradition of paternalism and docility prevalent in peasant 
societies, personal presence was an effective way of ensuring 
control. Thus the Narajole family based at the Gope Palace on the 
outskirts of Midnapur town managed to keep their sprawling estate in 
some semblance of order through personal scrutiny and active involvement 
in local affairs. Dn the other hand, the Midnapur Zamindary Company, 
in spite of having an efficient management, was riddled with disputes 
caused by a combination of ruthless exploitation and impersonal 
ownership. On the whole, then, Midnapur zamindars were able to offset 
some of their objective weaknesses through a policy of personalised 
paternalism.
Thus if there was a certain erosion of powers still the zamindari
system it must be borne in mind, remained based on the extraction
of what Marx called the 'absolute rent' which went hand-in-hand with
the political and ideological subordination of the producers to the 
18non-producers. The extent of this subordination was determined by 
political might locally. By the beginning of the 20th century, the 
zamindars still retained enough political hegemony in the countryside 
to enforce the payment of abwabs or illegal cesses from the smaller 
tenants. Abwabs did not have any degree of uniformity and depended 
strictly on local customs and the ability of each zamindar to enforce 
his claim. For transfer of holdings, the tenant h~d to pay a selami 
which could mount up to a quarter or half the value of a transaction, 
selami would also have to be paid when any issue of inheritance was 
involved or when a new ryot or bargadar was being settled. For merely 
approaching ths zamindari kutchery, -the peasant would have to pay a 
cess called nazar to the gomastha or zamindar or both. Besides 
selami and nazar, there were often the mors esoteric varieties cf 
abwabs depending on local custom. Often 'where the zamindar was strong 
and the oeasant -weak an unfortunate victim could be illegally detained 
far days in the kutchery or even beaten up by the lathial retainers of
17. Final Report 1911-17, p.167-68
18. Barry Hindes and Paul Hirst, Pre-Caoitalist Modes of Production 
London 1977, pp. 183-93.
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the zamindar. Though the sufferers from these cruder forms of
19coercion were invariably the poorer ryots and bhagchasis, in 
fact, the ability of the zamindar to keep effective control over 
his domains did depend in a small way on his ability to threaten 
or make selective use of strong arm tactics. The political, 
legal and ideological subordination of the peasantry was supplemented 
by the use of force.
Jotedars and Ryots
Landed property in itself yields no value independently of definite
relations of production. The mere legal ownership of land by the
non-producers does not in itself guarantee the extraction of surplus
from the producers in the form of ground-rent. Without the operation
of additional factors (provision of loans for seed being an example
in India), the direct producers are under no economic compulsion to
render the payment of rent, since they have effective possession of
the means of their own reproduction. The payment of rent to zamindars
usually implies the existence of an extra economic mechanism for the
2 0subordination of the actual cultivator. The mere existence of the 
state in Bengal, especially Midnapur, was inadequate for this function. 
An extensive bureaucracy of the Raj had not as yet interposed itself 
between the ryot and the zamindar. Neither was there an institution 
which, like the Church in medieval Europe, not only served as a
bureaucracy, but also secured the ideological capitulation of the
21
peasantry to the feudal nobility. Zamindars did not possess private 
armies to enforce the payment of rent. Nor for that matter did they 
keep all their land under direct scrutiny; the Settlement Report of 
1917 estimated that only 10.52(;,3 of the agricultural land was in direct 
possession of the zamindars, and this figure was in fact rather inflated, 
as it took into account all unoccupied land, jungle, roads, embankments 
and waste lsnd.^ Moreover, the holdings of zamindars were not always 
concentrated around a single geographical area, a factor which made
19. Rajat Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal:
1875-190Q, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. of Cambridge 1972.
20. Hindess and Hirst, op. cit. p.190.
21. Parry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State. London 1979
p.47.
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direct supervisicn an sxpensive ar>d difficult proposition. For
example, Jatin-ranath Mullick, an average medium-sized zamindar,
had lands in thanas Kharsgpur, Debra, Moyna, Daspur, Midnapur,
23
Narsingarh, Bhagwanpur, Patashpur, Dantan and Binpur. The
dispersed nature of the zamin-aris meant that zamindars were
compelled to make alliances with influential men at the local
village level to ensure the smooth collection of rent. Harmonious
relations with their tenants, especially the more prosperous ones,
24
was a necessary part of zamindari management.
Thus it was an oversimplification to say the least, to assume that 
rural society in Bengal was divided into two clear categories, with 
a parasitic zamindar at the top, and an impoverished 'peasantry* and 
a body of landless labourers at the bottom. Between these two 
categories existed an intermediate stratum of non-zamindar tenure- 
holders with varying degrees ofiincome and influence. Unlike certain 
test Bengal districts such as Bakarganj, where there often existed 
twenty-two different intermediaries between the zamindar and the 
actual cultivator the land tenure system in Midnapur was relatively
simple. Except in Garbetta, there was rarely more than one, or at
25
most two, intermediaries between the cultivator and the zamindar.
In fact 6 6 $ of the land was held, in 1911, by ryots who had security 
of tenure, who took some personal part in cultivation and who paid 
rent directly to the zamirrdar, or government in the case of the
2 5
Khas Mahals. This figure should not suggest that the Midnapur 
agriculturalists were essentially a body of peasant proprieters 
corresponding to the Leninist category of 'middle peasants'. The 
tenure-holders or jotedars, as they were often called, did : let out 
sections of their holdings to under-ryots or to bhegchasis (share 
croppers) who were tenants-at-will and consequently had no rights 
under the law. Therefore, they often combined the dual roles of 
producer ^nd exploiter.
24. This point is also made in the context of Uttar Pradesh by 
Peter Musgrsve, 'Landlords and Lords of the Land: Estate 
Management and Social Control in Uttar Pradesh 1860-1920'
MAS VI,3,1975. pp. 257-75.
25. Final Report 1911-17, p.37-9.
26. Ibid, p.65. Also V.’.V. Hunter, A Statistical Account of Bengal 
Vol. 3. London 1876 (reprint Delhi 1973) p .83, estimates that 96a 
of the ryots in Midnapur had tenure and only 4m  were tsnsnts-st- 
will. Hunter's high estimates cannot be substantiated oy la.ter 
surveys.
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The use of the term jotedar has recently been brought into question
by certain writers. ,7hile Eric Stokes has dismissed it as a force
27'•of modern political slogan-mongering" Andre Beteille has questioned
it on the basis of local variations - of meaning plus the fact that it
28covers a whole variety o^people with differing economic resources.
To begin with, it has to^recognised that the use of the term
(meaning literally, one who possesses his own jots cr holding) was not
prevalent in all parts pf Midnapur. In Jhargram and the Jungle Mahals
the term mandal was prevalent, while in areas of Contai the term ayamdar
was used. The Settlement Report of 1917 uses the term patnidar to
describe the same catagory of persons. But jotedar could have been
used in all these instances without any loss of meaning.
This leads us to BSteille's second criticism. The Settlement Report of
1917, while acknowledging that 66.08% of the land was held by secure
recognised ryots, also added a further 19.98% under the category
'tenure holders*, though the difference? between the two categories
29was not elaborated. In all probability, the Settlement Report was
attempting to draw a legalistic distinction without taking into account
the relations of production. Such legalism was also apparent in the
pronouncements of early Indian Marxists who saw the central contradiction
as that stemming out of a conflict between a monolithic peasantry and 
30landlordism. Beteille too is obsessed by legal categories which lump
large and small tenants into one category. In this work, legal categories
have been largely ignored. Therefore, the term jotedar is taken not in its
literal, but in its colloquial sense, as applying to people whose standing
was principally due to their combining a position as tenants of the
zamindar or government with sub-landlordism over under-ryots and/or
bhagchasis. The categorisation becomes clearer in Midnapur after the
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 granted franchise to tenants on the
basis of wealth. The term ryot will be used to denote that section of
the tenants who derived their main source of income from actual cultivation
31
rather than sub-landlordism.
27. Stakes, op.cit. p.286.
28. A Beteille, Studies in Agrarian Social Structure, Oxford 1974, 
ch.4.
29. Final Report 1911-17, p.65.
30. Sunil Sen, Agrarian Struggles in Bengal, p.75-6.
31. A similar methodology has been used by Harn^a Alavi to distinguish 
between 'rich peasants' and 'poor peasants'. 'Peasants and Revolution' 
in K. Gcugh and H. Sharma, ed. Imperialism and Revolution in South 
Asia', New York, 1973 pp.291-337.
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The influence of the jotedar in rural society in the 20th century
wes a result of the shifts in the colonial economy and changes in
the property laws of Bengal. For the jotedar rent was an important
source of income. To that extent, he benefited from the rent control
legislation which imposed chocks on the ability of the zamindar to
push rents up arbitrarily but which did not apply to under-tenants.
Wore than other groups, he benefited from price rises? between 1387
and 13 1, the price of rice in Midnapur registered several fluctuations
o- r 52
with sharp and dramtic increases in 19C5-8 and 1919-21 [Bee table 3:1]
The rent collected by the zamindars rose in step with and not out of
proportion to the increased value of the produce. Karunamoy Mukherjee
estimates that in Midnapur, rent as a percentage of the gross value
33
of produce per acre fell from Ufa in 1901, to lOp in 1939. In 1913,
a survey conducted by the government in an area of 176 acres around
Kharagpur revealed that the net profit of the tenant, deducting all
costs [including rent] was an average of Rs. 7-8-0 per acre while the
34
average zamindari rent ranged from Rs. 4 to Rs. 4-3.0 per acre. The 
advantage was even more apparent in the case of Khas Mahal tenants 
who not only had to pay an extremely low rent of Rs. 1-3-5 per acre, 
but also were spared the irritation of the arbitrary abwebs exacted 
by other zamindars.w Therefore, it can be argued that, after the 
turn of the century, rents did not rise and indeed declined in 
comparison with value of produce, for those who had tenure. As 
noted above, the statutory restrictions prevented only zamindars 
from increasing rents beyond a certain point, indeed the law did 
not recognise the existence of the under- ryots or bhagchssis until 
after 1937. Jotedars were thus free (at least in law] to practice 
the most exploitative forms of sub-landlordism.
A related feature that needs to be remarked in this context is the 
growing unwillingness of tenants to pay any rent rat all. Rajat Ray 
has calculated that even estates under the more efficient Courts of 
'.yards, collection of rents between 1887 and 1922 never exceed'd 62.34yi.
32. D : pa rim -nt of Lend Records, 3:ngal, Average Price of 'Staple Food 
Crop [Rico] in 3:ngal, from 18S7 to date. Calcutta 1324. 
o3>— K. Mukherjc-, ' R: nts and Form: of Tenancy in Birbhum since the 
Permanent Settlement' IE3HR, XIV,3,1977 also see B.B.Chnndhury, 
MovTment of R-nt in Eastern India 1793—1833. Indian Historical 
Review III, 2, 1977.
34. Land Acrui ition IV/2(bj/1919-2C: (MRR).
35. BLC Proas XXXVII, July-Aucu^t 1331, pp. 473-81.
51
Table 3:1
A v e r a g e  P r i c e s  o f  R i c e  ( p e r  m a u n d )  i n  M i d n a p u r  M a r k e t s  1 8 8 7 - 1 9 2 1
<r
r
MiDNfcPUR TowkJ M a r k e t .  
C on t a i M a r k e t .
S o u r c e  : D e p a r t m e n t  o f  L a n d  R e c o r d s  , B e n g a l  , A v e r a g e  P r i c e s  o f  
S t a p l e  F o o d  C r o p  ( R i c e )  i n  B e n g a l  F r o m  1 8 8 7  to D a t e  ,C a l c u t t a
1924 .
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□ f the demand. In fact, after 1907, the collections never 
/ 35exceeded 50':;. An exasperated Commissioner wrote to aha Manager
of the Basudevpur Estate in 1925: "The percentage of current
collection on current demand is 25.S which is very unsatisfactory
3°and is far below the prescribed standard of 90%". ' While for the 
poor tenants this phenomenon can be explained by their general 
poverty, in the case of jotedars, it showed a propensity, in the 
face of legal difficulties of eviction, to convert ordinary capital 
into usurious caoital. Of course, it was the efficiency or other­
wise of the individual zaminr.ari and the relative strength of jotedars 
and ryots which either promoted or kept in check this trend.
For the mass of under-ryots and bhagchasis, the situation did not 
lend itself to much hope. Without any statutory protection dr any 
independent organisation to safeguard their interests, they were 
at the mercy of their superior landlord. For the bhagchasis the 
surrender of 50-50'-) of the harvested crop to the tenure-holder 
represented an appropriation of most of the surplus and conseouently 
meant their exclusion from the benefits of any price rise. The 
undor-ryots' position was only marginally betcer. The tendency of 
rent not to rise among tenure-holders did not extend down the rungs 
of rural stratification. In 1940, the Floud Commission calculated
that the average incidence of cash rents per acre was Rs. 3.83 on
3£3
ryoti lands and Rs. S.25 on under-ryoti landsc In Midnapur, where
sanja (produce) rent was cuite prevalent situation was indeed
39
worse. A study of the neighbouring Birbhum district also shows
that price rises did not benefit the peasantry as a 'whole1 but only
the tenure-holders, and especially jotedars who had the maximum
disposable surplus, whether- acquired from their o-n cultivation
40
or acquired as rent.
The jotedar further consolidated his hold on rural society through 
his control over credit and r.arketing operations. On the basis of
35. Rsjat Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal, Ch.2.
37. '.Vards XX, 12/1925 (MRR).
3 8 . K. Mukherjee, op.cit.
39. Sumil Sen, op.cit. p.10.
40. K. Mukherjee, op.cit.
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the 1921 Census, the Bengal Provincial Banking Commission estimated
the number of professional moneylenders or mahajans per lakh of
, .. 41population as:
Burdwsn 40 Midnapur 27
Bankura 25 Hoogly 1Q4
Birbhum 30 Howrah 80
It is evident that this relative paucity of professionals in Midnapur
did not result from any lack of moneylending. Local officers in the
large and populous Sadar thana estimates that in the 19C01s there
42were only 5 mahajans with capital of aver Rs 50,000. Yet in 1917,
Jameson estimated indebtedness at Rs. 2-4-0 per head of the
agricultural population, which amounted to 4.7c/? of the agricultural 
42
production. From all accounts, this estimate was inaccurate and
underplayed rural indebtedness. Evidence before the Banking
Commission put the indebtedness of Tamluk subdivision alone at over
44Rs. 26 lakhs or Rs. 4,132 per head of the population. Whatever
the actual figure of indebtedness may teve been, it is apparent that
the professional mahajans were incapable, by themselves, of meeting
the demand, and that the bulk of the rural credit was provided by the
45jotedars and occasionally the zamindars. In fact, the local press
46often used the terms jotedar and mahajan synonymously.
Most of the credit advanced took the form of unsecured paddy loans at
47interest ranging from 25% to 50%. It was the problems of general
poverty - "an investment in the necessities of life, in the subsistence
48
and reproduction of the agricultural labour force" - which compelled 
some ryots and other cultivators into negotiating paddy loans on clearly 
disadvantageous terms. The All India Rur~l Credit Survey of 195S 
discovered that in the Bengal-Bihar area, 59.4°^ of the cultivators' 
loans were incurred for family expenditure and only 2  Bp for capital
41. Bengal Provincial Banking Enquiry Commission Vol. 1, p.195.
42. Ibid, Vol. 2, p.139.
43. Final Report 1911-17, p.112.
44. Banking Enouirv Commission. Vol. 3, pp. 171-3.
45. Ibid Vol. 2 p.148: Vol 1, p.139: Vol. 2 p.600: Vol 2. p.119
Vol 2. p.135.
46. ’ Nihar 39th June 1921.
47. Banking Enquiry Commission. Vol. 2 p.129.
48. Hajat Hay, 1 I he Crisis or Indian Agriculture '1870-1927, IESHR,X,3,
1973, p.269.
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and current expenditure on farms. Moreover, given that Bengal
agriculture stagnated in the first half of the century, even 29^
was probably too inflated a figure for the latter purposes to
be usefully applied in this study. Earlier in the century, by the
beginning of the cultivating season in May and June, the smaller
cultivators would invariably have run out of cacital to sustain
their households and to pay for the agricultural labour. The paddy
loans were not only used to feed mouths, but part of the paddy was
sold at the high-pre-harvest rates to cover other expenditure. The
loans were generally repaid in December—January with interest,
leaving the cultivator with a reduced saleable surplus and compelling
him to seek a new loan in six months time. And so the cycle of
dependence continued. As a government report explained: "the
conditions are so uncertain that the agriculturalist is often
compelled to discount his future income on any terms to relieve
50present necessity." The jotedar who advanced the loan gained 
overwhelmingly from the transactions. Not only did he exact a 
year's interest on what was in reality a six month loan, but given 
the economic climate of rising prices, he benefited by having at his 
disposal an even greater saleable surplus.
Cash loans accounted for ICF/i or less of the debts incurred for purely
51agricultural purposes. f.-ost of the cash loans were used to meet
expenses incurred on special social ceremonies like marriage and
sradh. Interest rates were high, starting from 12-/a and going up to
5 2
a maximum of l&j* compound interest. ^ Over two-thirds of the cash
52loans were unsecured, ^ which automatically pushed up interest rates
and left the interpretation of the terms of credit solely v/itn the 
54money-lender. Although legislation in the form of the Usurious Loans 
Act of 1918 existed, it was seldom made use of. Privy Council and High 
Court rulings also stood in the way of stOutcry restrictions on 
interest rates. The Courts required proof that the creditor had taken 
undue advantage of his position tc dominate the will of the borrower.
49. Ibid, p .269.
5C. Banking Enquiry Commission, Vol. 1, p.72.
51. Ibid Vol 2, p.118.
52. Ibid Vol 1, p.198.
53.* Ibid Vol 2, p.156.
54. Ibid Vol 2, p.818
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The District Judge of Midnapur, T. B. Jameson, admitted that on
numerous occasions he had to set aside the rulings of Munsifs in
subordinate courts, "as the Munsif concerned has reduced the rate
of interesc merely on the grounds that he thinks it is excessive.
55
This the law does not alloy/"
Co-operative Credit Societies set up by well-meaning individuals 
with the aid of the government, contributed little towards ending 
the overtly exploitative character of the credit system.
Co-operatives flourished mainly in the Khas Mahal areas of Tamluk 
and Contai with the backing of the landlords and jotedars. In fact, 
the jotedars manipulated the societies into extending credit to 
them at relatively low rates of interest. The money was then re-used
55
to extend credit to non-members at much higher rates of interest.
In the ultimate analysis, these institutions did little or nothing 
to break the stranglehold of usury capital in the rural economy 
and in fact contributed somewhat in strengthening the grip of the 
jGtedar - moneylenders.
To what extent peasant indebtedness resulted in changes in the 
landholding pattern cannot be measured in accurate terms. In his 
evidence to the Banking Commission, Jaladhsr Ghoss, a Circle Officer 
in the Sadar region observed:
Those bankers lend out their paddy and money keeping their
eyes upon the landed property of the loanee, generally v.'ith
main object of getting the capital invested swelled by
compound interest, and when it is found by the banker that
che debts have run too high to get cleared by the loanee,
the banker goes to the Civil Court and manages easily to
n?
appropriate lands of the loanee by Civil Court decrees.
The Khas Mahal Manager at Contai estimated that as a rssult of the 
economic depression of the 1930’s, about lOg? of the lands passed
o5. Ibid Vol 3, p.34.
55. Ibid Vol 3, pp. 145-7
57. Ibid Vol 1, p.141
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5S
from the hands of the cultivating ryot. The Floud Commission
too noted a 'rapid increase1 in the number of bargadars, made up
53
of people who were formerly cultivating ryots . Economic logic
argued against the indebted ryot being actually evicted from his
plot and replaced by a new tenant. The interest of the superior
landlord lay not in evicting the cultivator but in exacting the
maximum possible surplus from him. This was done by taking
resources to the law courts and changing the status of the
cultivator from recognised ryot to unprotected bargadar or
bhagchasi. From all indications and from Kisan Sabha reports,
it was the jotedars who gained most from this process of land 
60alienation. Politically, the process did not lead to any 
significant unrest until the Tebhaga movement of 1946-47, but 
this was due to the lack of an independent organisation of the 
bargadars and the neutralising effect of the jotedars' local 
presence.
In addition to credit, the jotedars maintained a tight rein on the
marketing of agricultural produce in Midnapur. Midnapur was a
rice exporting region. The livelihood of the rural population
depended on the ability to command adequate prices for the
produce. But, as we have noted earlier, the smaller cultivators
had to part with a considerable section of their surplus to meet
their liabilities. This left them with inadequate surplus or no
surplus at all. Under such circumstances, it was the pressing need
for cash to survive that determined their selling pattern. Although
prices were at their lowest at the period immediately following
harvesting, the indebted cultivator did not have adequate resources
61to hold out for the six months when prices would rise again. This
only the jotedars could do, having adequate agricultural surplus to
await the most favourable market conditions." The small cultivator
was also hamoered by the lack of means for, or the exoenses •
involved in, transporting the grain to the railway ports from whors
it was despatched to Calcutta. This meant that hs was compelled to 
sell to the middleman at his village, who often happened to be the
58. Ibid, Vol 3, p.175.
59. Sunil Sen, op.cit, p.7-8 
£0. Ibid, p .8
£1. 3anking Enquiry iSommission Vol 2, p. 130.
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Jotedar, or to the-merchant paikars (wholesalers) at the local 
haths. A government report estimated that the difference in
prices between the terminal markets and the village haths was
0 2  " 
often as much as fGur annas per-1 rr.aund. For those cultivators
who could set aside some grain to sell when favourable market
conditions prevailed, storing grain was a major problem. The only
khamars were owned by the jotedars and the cultivator storing his
there had to run the risk of the jotedar expropriating more than
03
what was legitimately his.
British imperialism and its policies played a part in producing the
utter stagnation which characterised the agriculture of the whole of 
64
Bengal, while the raison d'etre of the zamindari system was the 
regular payment of land revenue to the colonial government without 
the benefits of subsequent feedback. But this system of colonial 
exploitation was reinforced and complemented by an indigenous 
exploitation based on the inequalities in land, the monopolies of 
rural credit, and the conditions of marketing. In this latter 
system, the jotedar played a pre-eminent role. But the intricacies 
of the zamindari system and of revenue collection removed the 
jotedar from direct contact with the state machinery. The jotedar 
(except in Khas Mahals) was not responsible to the state in any 
significant way. Being categorised in lav; as tenure-holding ryots, 
the jotedars retained maximum manoeuvreability, which reinforced by 
economic strength, enabled them to be de-facto leaders of rural 
society.
The Mahishya Caste Movement
The economic divisions within rural society established the contours 
of class in Midnapur. But the existence of class divisions does, not 
in itself guarantee political action on independent class lines,
62. Report of the Bengal Paddy and Rice Encuiry Committee, Alipore 
1940, Vol 1, p.55.
53. Hare Krishna Konar, Agrarian Problems of India, Calcutta 1977
pp. 2 0 -1 .
64. Rajst Ray, op.cit IESHR X,2,1973.
65. It was calculated by Anil Seal that after taking into account 
all those heads which v/ere even marginal to agriculture - famine 
relief, irrigation, railways etc - the Government of Bengal's 
exsendi'cure for 19C2-3 farmed only 14.55c,4 of the annual budget 
ibid p .244.
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especially among peasants. In the context of 19th century Francs,
Marx observed:
The small peasants form a vast mass, the members of which
live in similar conditions, but without entering into
manifold relations with one another. Their mode of
production isolates them from one another, instead of
6Gbringing them into mutual intercourse.
This objective isolation serves to make the political organisation
among peasants on a class basis a relatively difficult proposition.
Peasant analysts have consequently noted the prevalence of 1 false
57
consciousness' among the peasantry and the tendency of poor 
peasants to identify 'upwards' with the richer peasant strata,
QQ
rather than 'outwards' . In Midnapur, in spite of the objective 
contradictions that existed between the zamindars, jotedars, raiyats 
and bhagchasis, the district witnessed a massive participation in the 
Gandhian movements which brought together the entire 'peasant community' 
in opposition to the British rule. One of the most significant factors 
which cemented these forces was caste.
A peculiarity of Midnapur was the numerical preponderance of people
belonging to the Mahishya caste. The Mahishyas claimed their origin
59from the union of a Kshatriya male and a Vaishya female. Although
in neighbouring Orissa they were regarded as Kshatriya/? and had once
formed the bulk of the peasant militia, the rigid Kulinism of Bengal
forced them into the category of Sudras. They were considered as an
'unclean' caste and consequently not permitted tc serve water to
70members of higher castes. Predominantly an agricultural casts, they 
constituted the bulk of the landholders and cultivators of Midnapur, 
especially in the southern region of the district. In 1896, the 
President of the college of Nadia pundits pieced th:t Mahishyas into
56. Karl Marx, 'Eighteenth Srumaire of Louis Bonaparte' Selected Works 
Vol 2, p.414.
57. John S. Saul, The Dialectic of Class and Tribe, Race and Class XX.4«1979,
58. Nigel Harris in Nigel Harris and Malcolm Cald-ell 'Debate on the 
Revolutionary Peasants', International Socialism 41 1959-70,p .20.
69. N.K.Dutt, Origin end Growth of Caste in India, Vol. 2 Calcutta '59 p.129
70. Pandit Nilkanta Das, Kaivartas of Bengal. Advance 5th September 1931.
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the category of the local aristocracy of Midnapur: 'In the Tamluk
and Contai sub-divisions of the Midnapur district, where the
number of high caste Brahmins and Kayasthas is very small, the
Kaibartas (Mahishyas) may be said to form the uoper layer of the
population. A great many of them are zamindars and holders of
71
substantial tenures' As such, their social position m  Hindu 
society was not commensurate with their economic position. More­
over, being numsrically^preponderent and economically dominant in 
Midnapur, and in the absence of other strong caste groups, they 
thrived in an atmosphere free of caste antagonism and confrontation.
There "was no solid community either above them exercising power or
72below them nursing resentment" The Mahishya caste embraced a cross- 
section of all classes in Midnapur.
Till the end of the 19th century, there was no formal, regional 
caste association; . The jatis were organised at the village level 
into semajes with a samajpati at the head. Samajpatis tended to come 
from the zamindar or old aristocratic families and mediated in social 
disputes involving members of the caste. The problems of caste were 
considered an internal matter of the local samajes and no need was 
felt for the formation of any supralocal body co-ordinating the -work 
of the sam.-ijes within a caste. When communication became imperative, 
as in the case of arranging marriages, the rola was taken up by 
ghat-.ks who put families in touch with one another in return for a 
commission. All in all, except for the three upper castes (Brahmins, 
Kayasthas and Vaidyas) who were conscious of their sup-.rior position 
in society, there was an absence of any aggressive caste spirit among 
the lower castes, including the Mahishyas.
It was the 1901 Census which triggered off an outbreak of casteism 
among the Hindu population of Bengal. At the time of the Census, the 
government submitted for public discussion Sir Herbert Sisley's elaborate 
list of caste precedence. The result was a proliferation of caste 
associations organised on the lines of modern pressure groups and the





Mahishya Population in Midnapur
Total Population Mahishyes Percentage
Sadar 860,622 145,836 16.94
Jhargram 389,130 7,436 1.91
Ghatal 273,308 96,701 35.38
Tamluk 643,157 353,544 54.97
Contai 632,876 279,848 44.21
Total 2,799,093 883,367 31.56
(Source: Bengal District Gazetteer B. Volume, Midnapur 
District Statistics 1921-22 to 1930, Calcutta 
1933, pp.2-3)
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publication of a mass of caste literature. This should not be
taken to mean that the outbreak of casteism was a totally
artificial phenomenon instigated by the government for mischievous
ends. True, the ides, of casts precedence arose from the particular
conceptions of Indian society held by colonial administrators,
but at least among the Mahishyas of Bengal there was some material
basis to the new-found interest in caste. Not only were the
Mahishyas of Midnapur the leading community of the district, but
their wealth had granted them access to English education. In the
neighbouring 24 Parganas, they comprised the bulk of the lathdar
landholders of the Sunderbans. In Madia, they formed the lower
middle class and some had enriched themselves by serving as sarkars
to the European indigo planters. In Calcutta and Howrah, there was
a large Mahishya population functioning as traders, manufacturers 
74
and lawyers. Their important role in various parts of Bengal in no 
way measured up to the low social status accorded to them by the 
caste rules of Hindu society. It might not be an exaggeration to 
claim that even without Risley's instigation, a form of caste 
'self-respect' movement would have arisen among the Mahishyas. The 
Census of 1901 merely provided the occasion for its expression.
Before 1921, the Mahishyas were not recognised by the government as 
a separate caste, but were lumped together with the Jalia Kaibartss 
as the Kaibarta casts. In 1897-98, a Midnapur zamindar ccnveneri a 
conference of the Chasi Kaibartas (Mahishyas) which determined that 
they were the Mahishya caste mentioned in the shastras. A body 
calling itself the Jati Nirdharani Sabha was established which 
received financial backing from the wealthy landholders in Midnapur 
as well as the other prosperous Mahishyas outside. This grcup, 
which determined that the caste should call itself Mahishyas, came 
into conflict with the orthodox members of the caste, led by 
samajpetis, which was in favour of the Vaishya status for the caste. 
But the samagpatis, comprising in the main of the scions of old and 
declining families, did not command enough influence to win thoir 
orthodox position over the hears of the more energetic and wealthy 
Mahishya camp. The caste members from outside Midnapur seem to have
73. Lucy Carrol Stout, 'Colonial Perceptions of Indian Society 
and the Emergence of Caste(s) Associations' unpublished 
seminar paper. Institute of Common ‘■ealth Studies.
74. Raj at Ray o p .cit, p.242.
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played a leading role in the campaign to advocate Mahishya. stratus.
3eing in a minority and facing professional competition from the 
members of the upper caste groups, they .vers more keen to achieve 
higher ritual status then some of their caste counterparts in 
Midnapur who were conscious of themselves as the dominant caste 
in the district. In 1900, the leading members of the caste from
all over Bengal assembled in Calcutta to form the Bangiya
Mahishya Samiti and requested the government to demarcate them
75from the Jalia Kaibsrtas and recognise them as Mahishyas. Among 
those active in the formation of the Mahishya Samaj were Trailokyanath 
Biswas of the Janbazar family of Rani Rashmoni; Mahendranath Ray,
Prskash Chandra Sarkar, and Ananta Ram Das, lawyers in the Calcutta
High Court: Mahendranath Haider, editor of Sevika, Ishan Chandra
76
Ray, pleasder of GayaJ and Shashi Bhusan Biswas, zamindar? a clear 
majority from outside Midnapur. However, the formation of the 
Bangiya Mahishya Samity provided the impetus for the formation of 
local Mahishya Samities in Midnapur.
As in the central body, the leadership of the local Mahishya Samities 
in Midnapur was firmly in the hands of the more prosperous or educated 
sections of the caste. Of the 19 delegates from Midnapur to the
1910-19 (1325 B.3.) session of the Bangiya Mahishya Samiti, eight
77were lawyers, one a doctor and five zamindars or jotedars. They
included Mahendranath Maity, the leader of the Tamluk bar, Upendra
Nath Maity, President of the Midnapur town bar and Chairman of the
Midnapur municipality, Sarat Chandra Jana, a leading lawyer in the
District Court, and Pratap Chandra Sasmal and Devendrenath Hazra,
zamindars active in public life. B.N.Sasmal was elected the President
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for the 1920-21 session of the Samiti. In fact, nearly all of those 
Mahishyas involved in the secular politics of Midnapur, were also active 
in the Mahishya caste movement.
Though the main function of the Bangiya Mahishya Samiti was to campaign
75. Mahishya S a m a j , X, 7-0, (1327 B.3.), p.55.
76. Pajat Pay, op.cit, p.243.
77. Mahishya Samaj 71II, 3, (1225 B.S.) p.91.
7S. Ibid, X,9, (1-27 3.3.) pp.57-62.
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for the government recognition of Mahishyas as a separate caste,
the movement also devoted its energies towards reinforcing the change
from Kaibartas to Mahishyas. This meant above all, attempts to change
the ritual habits of the caste members - a form of sanskritisation
Previously the Chasi Kaibartas had observed mash ashauch or a month
of mourning for their dead. The Mahishya Samiti determined that as
Mahishyas, they would now observe pakshashauch or a fifteen day
mourning as proof of their higher ritual standing in society.
Brahmin allies v/ere secured who b. eked this change with the aid of
lengthy quotes from the shastras. Caste campaigners like Pratap
. Chandra Sasmal, the zamindar of Kalindi, and Ashutosh Jana, an
agricultural scientist living in Birulia, toured the villages of
Midnapur to explain this change to the Mahishyas. When deviations
occurred, as when one Mahishya changed from mash ashauch to dash
ashauch or ten day mourning prevalent among the upper castes, the
79activitists rapidly convened a meeting to put people right.
But occasionally the Mahisya attempts to change their ritual habits 
met with Brahmin resistance. In 1924, a group of 3rahmins met at 
the Hari temple in Contai and decided that if the Mahishyas persisted 
with pakshashauch, they would cease all social contracts with them.
But when it came to actually signing their 'fatwa' most of the Brahmins 
refused. In an area where the Mahishyas were both numerically and 
economically dominant, Brahmins dared not risk alienating them, even
so
if it meant abandoning the purity of the shastras.
There were other less successful attempts to alter time-worn practices. 
For instance, some of the Jotedars made attempts to outcasts those 
Mahishyas who sold their produce in the market themselves. But the 
poorer caste members declared openly that they could not afford the luxury 
of hiring servants, and if this was the caste rule, they would prefer 
to remain Chasi Kaibartas. In fact, the Census Commissioner of 1911 
seriously discussed the prospects of a split among Mahishyas - into 
Mahishyas and Chasi Kaibartas - along economic lines. ~ The jotedars 
backed down as they could not afford to abandon the leverage of 
common caste with their cultivators.
79. Ibid, X,9, (1322BS), p.322; Ibid v/, 3, (132293) p.71.
80. Nihar, 8 th July 1924.
81. Rajat Ray, op.cit. p.244-5.
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Mors successful were the attempts to institutionalise marriage
rules. In 1916-17 (1323 3.S.), the caste leaders decided that all
those Mahishyas who married out of caste will he socially ostracised
and lose caste. The ostensible reason cited was the attempts by
individuals belonging to other low c astes to cteclare themselvos as
Mahishyas and thus attain social respectibility. For example, in
v\
Dacca district, a Ma jhi claiming to be a Mahishya managed to get 
his three sons married to Mahishya girls. When this was discovered
Q2
the girls and their families were declared outcastes. From the 
pages of the caste journal it becomes clear that efforts to enforce 
these marriage regulations came from Mahishyas living in East Bengal 
and other areas where the caste was in insignificant minority. It 
points to the desire to get away from their past low-caste identity 
and reinforce their new Mahishya 'clean caste* identity. Obviously, 
this could not be done without taking a position of aloofness from 
other low castes.
It was this trend towards maintaining a distinct and separate identity 
that made the caste leaders very anxious to prevent other low castes 
from attaining the status of Mahishyas. During the 1921 Census, the 
Patnis were anxious to register themselves as Mahishyas and offered 
a reward of RS 1000 to anyone who could back their claims by reference 
to the shastras. The result was that the Mahishyas not only launched 
a campaign to prevent government recognising the claims of the Patnis, 
but also launched a bitter polemic against members of that caste. The 
Mahishya Samaj declared that Patnis were just good enough to function 
as doms, i.e. to burn the dead, and were in fact lov:er in ritual status 
than even the Muslims. When certain Brahmin pundits offered to sponsor 
the Patni's case, the Mahishya Samaj wrote bitterly:
The Brahmin pundits might be able to uplift the Patnis on 
paper, but they cannot rewarc them with maids, bearers 
and barbers. If the Patnis manage to get themselves 
recognised as Mahishyas, then arrangements should be made 
to call a Muchi a Brahmin...The mercenary pundits by giving 
sanction to the unjustifiedclaims of the Patnis are paving 
the way for a social revolution.3 3
B2. Mahishya ramaj, V1, 12, (1323 Bo), pp. 250-1.
83. Ibid, X, 5-6 (1327 BS), pp. 38-41; Ibid X, 1-2, (1327 BS) 
pp. 4-5.
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It is again to be noted that most of the vitriol did not originate 
in Midnapur.
It becomes clear that Mahishyas living away from Midnapur looked
up to the caste movement to promote their separate identity as a
'clean caste' in Hindu society and hence placed great importance
on the institutionalisation of marriage regulations. Clearly this
was of secondary importance to Mahishyas living in iMidnapur, where
their dominant position made it difficult for other castes to look
down on them. Therefore the 'clean caste' issue was not the central
thrust of the caste movement in Midnapur. Instead, in a district
where the majority of the Mahishyas lived off the land, the caste
movement sought to develop an aggressive spirit of 'peasant-pride'.
This was necessary as the Kulinism of Bengal had always down-graded
the role of manual labour as a lowly occupation. Being a chasha
(peasant) was not considered respectable. The caste movement sought
to inject a sense of pride among Mahishyas as tillers of the soil.
A poem by Gajendra Nath Biswas, in Mahishya Samaj, described chashas
as true sons of the soil and called upon them not to accept any
84humiliation from the urban upper caste Babus. The annual Mahishya
Samiti conventions passed resolutions calling upon government to set
85
up model farms and agricultural schools. In 1918, the Viceroy was 
urged by Prakesh Chandra Sarkar, on behalf of the existing communal 
electorates:
That in the interests of the agricultural masses in general
to give them a share in the governance of their country is
but meet and just, and that every land-owning proprietor
without limitation and restriction, every tenure holder,
every occupancy ryot, gantidar, actual cultivator of the
soil, each of whom has a stake in the land, may possess a
86 ■right to vote in the election of members in Councils...
vVhat is more significant is the fact that peasant-pride cut across 
caste barriers and extended to occupational solidarity. Thus while
84. Ibid, V, 3, (1322 33] pp. 49-50
35. Ibid, X. 9, (1327 BS) pp. 57-52 
B5. Ibid V111, 6 , (1325 BS) pp. 156-7
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their caste counterparts in parts' of Bengal were engaged in efforts 
to keep aloof from other low castes, and trying to put them down, 
Mahishya leaders in Midnapur like Mahendra Nath Karen and Sarat 
Chandra Jana were holding meetings to promote the cause of another
peasant caste - the Namasudras - for respectable status in Hindu
37
society. So deep did this notion of peasant consciousness seep 
into the Mahishyas that it becomes the acceptsd political jargon 
of Midnapur after 1920. During the 1921 elections to the Legislative 
Council, one candidate far the Tamluk-Cantai seat lost all credibility 
when he referred, in a derogatory way, to Midnapur being a land of 
chashas (peasants).
.Politically£he caste movement was to have important repercussions in 
Midnapur. It was responsible in fostering a definite caste-peasant 
identity among the important Mahishya community. This led to the 
development of the idyllic notion of an all-embracing ’peasant 
community' which served to conceal and undermine the horizontal 
differentiations in rural society. In effect, caste along with the 
harsh realities of the agrarian economy served to reinforce the 
position of the jotedars and some zamindars as 'leaders' of society 
(.n Midnapur.
87. Nihar loth June 1920.
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Political Change In Midnapur 1907-19
Between 1907 and 1919, the politics of Bengal underwent a rapid and 
radical transformation. In 1907, the Moderates lost ground rapidly 
to the forces of militant Hindu nationalism, and in 1919, Bengal was 
to witness the first signs of mass nationalist politics under the 
banner of Gandhi and the Khilafat. Yet, this transformation was by 
no means linear and the period witnessed varying degrees of uneven 
political development. In this chapter, we examine the process of 
political change in Midnapur district and in particular chart the 
development of four different movements that had some impact on the 
political life of the district.
The Terrorist Movement in Midnapur
The partition of Bengal in 1905 had a profound effect on the bulk of
the Bengali Hindus. It was widely held that the partition was a 
Machiavellian device to divide the Bengali nation and its nationalism. 
Almost the entire Bengali bhadrolok united in their resolve to defeat 
this measure. The Maharajas of Bengal and the zamindars, noted for 
their loyalism, now joined hands with the articulate lawyers and other 
professionals to initiate the Swadeshi movement aimed at crippling
British power politically and economically. The movement accuired a
dimension of high religious intensity, and a unique popular culture 
sprang up to complement; a political movement.
The Swadeshi Movement really got off the ground in Calcutta and East
Bengal where the partition threatened the entrenched vested interests
1
of the bhadrolok minority. The movement did not reach such a high 
intensity in Midnapur which, being located in West Bengal was less 
adversely affected by the partition. But emotional solidarity 1 / with 
fellow-Bengalis in the East resulted in a conference on 7th August 1905, 
at the Belley Hall in Midnapur town, which was attended by at least a 
thousand students. The Conference took a vow "that so long as the
1. Gordon Johnson, 'Partition, Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904- 
1908' in Gallagher, Johnson and Seal, ed. Locality Province and 
Nation, Cambridge 1973, pp. 213-30.
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Partition remained they would not participate (in) any public
amusement and would not accept any foreign goods”. A volunteer
organisation led by Satyendra Nath Bose came into existence in the
district to organise picketing operations. On 2nd September 1905, the
day after partition was officially announced, the students organised a
2
day of mourning and paraded barefoot around Midnapur town. On 25th
September 1905, a public meeting was organised in Midnapur town which
attracted a crowd of 10,000 people, and on 1st November 1905 another
meeting was organised at Swan Saheber hath by the Mahant Maharaja of 
3
Chandrakona. But although the entire body of notables in Midnapur were 
united in apposition to the partition, action between 1905 and 1906 remained 
confined to the holding of ritualistic meetings of protest. The boycott 
movement which had proved to be quite effective in East Bengal was not 
taken up in Midnapur in any organised way until 1907.
But by 1907, the political climate of Bengal was changing rapidly. Thanks 
to government intransigence on the partition issue and the apparent 
ineffectiveness of 'mendicancy', the Moderates within the Bengali nationalist 
movement began to lose ground rapidly to the Extremists, who were encouraged 
by the thundering oratory of Bepin Chandra Pal coupled with the emotive 
religio-nationalism propagated by Aurobindo Ghose in the pages of Bande 
Mataram. In Midnapur, this trend was accompanied by attempts by the 
Extremists to revitalise the Congress and take it out of the hands of the 
followers of Surendranath Bannerji, notably the Barrister K. B. Dutt.
Matters came to a head in December 1907 at the Midnapur District Conference 
where the Extremist faction led by the lawyer Trailakyanath Paul and 
egged on by Aurobindo Ghose successfully disrupted K. B. Dutt's Presidential 
address and accused the Moderates of using the presence of the Superintendant
4
of Police at the Conference to prevent the Extremists from speaking out.
This conference was accompanied by a virtual split in the Midnapur nation­
alist movement, with the Moderates more or less opting out of active 
participation.
As a result of the Moderate-Extremist conflict, incidents of picketing 
and boycott became far more widespread in Midnapur in 1907 and 1908. At
2. N. N. Das, History of Midnapur Part II, Calcutta 1962, p.45.
3. Ibid, pp. 50-2.
4. Ibid, pp. 54-6, and G0I H. Poll (B), cfenuary 1908, No.23.
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the Sitalda Mohodudra Mela, a printed notice was circulated that those who
offered Swadeshi articles for sale would be honoured and not taxed while
those that bought or sold foreign goods would be insulted and made to pay
5
a tax of Rs 1 - 4 .  Two Swadeshi shops were opened at Mahisadal and the
lawyers of Tamluk floated a 'Trades Union Company' and attempted to sell
6
shares at Rs 10 each. At Mahisadal a Sebak Samiti was formed whose
members went from house to house to compile a list of all people who used 
7
foreign goods. But even though picketing was stepped up and many Swadeshi 
ventures initiated, the movement did not have any significant impact on 
the political life of the district. In fact, if government reports are 
to be believed, shopkeepers in Midnapur were hostile to the picketers
g
and physical confrontations between' both sides were frequent.
The failure of the Swadeshi movement to attract any audience beyond the
students, nationalist lawyers and some zamindars is not hard to explain.
The Swadeshi movement was essentially a movement to seek the repeal of
the partition of Bengal and it appealed to Bengalis on an emotional level.
In Midnapur, where the overwhelming majority of the population was rural 
with little contact with the metropolis, this form of nationalism was too 
abstract to convert to political reality. Moreover, Midnapur being in 
West Bengal was not affected in any way by the partition, nor was there 
any danger of the district being overweighed by the political emergence 
of the Muslims - the factor that determined the political behaviour of 
the bhadrolok population in East Bengal. It was the failure of the 
Swadeshi movement to find roots in the district that signalled the 
development of 'secret societies' committed to terrorism as the form 
of political action.
Secret societies in Midnapur dated back to 1902 when a society was 
established by Hemchandra Kanungo and Gnanendranath Bose. In that year, 
the group which consisted of 7 to 8  members made links with the Anusilan 
Samity of Calcutta set up by Barin and Aurobindo Ghose. Aurobindo 
despatched Jatindranath Bannerji to Midnapur at the end of the year 
following which Aurobindo and Barin visited the district. There they 
recruited Hemchandra and some others directly into the Anusilan Samity
5. GOI H. Poll (B) May 1908, Wo. 38.
6 . GOI H. Poll (Bj October 1907, No. 41.
7. GOI H. Poll (B) October 1907 No. 57.
8 . GOI H. Poll (B] Gctober 1907 No 8  and No 85.
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by making them swear on the Gita and a sword. In 1903, Sister
Nivedita, a close disciple of Swami Vivekananda, visited Midnapur town
as a guest of Hemchandra and inaugurated the first physical-fitness akhra
in the district. Later that year Bhupendranath Dutta, the brother of
Vivekananda and himself an advocate of militant Hindu nationalism, visited
g
Midnapur to make further contacts with the groups.
But before the groups in Midnapur could begin to operate with any
effectiveness, they were plagued with splits and factionalism. A few
members of Hemchandra1s group broke away after some members fell out with
10one another over a lady. Later, Hemchandra along with Barin broke away
from the parent Anusilan group in Calcutta because of its preoccupation
11with non-political social work. But Barin's arrogance and high­
handedness led to strains between the small Calcutta and Midnapur groups,
12though there is no evidence to suggest any formal severing of links.
In short, the early history of secret societies in Midnapur was "a history
13of party factionalism, poisoned by mutual distrust, bitterness and egoism...'"
The beginnings of the Swadeshi movement led to an increase in the number
of akhras in Midnapur. According to Police reports, four akhras were
started in Midnapur town alone which, as suggested by their names,
(Sakti Samiti, Swadeshi Samiti, Santan Samiti and Basanta Malati Akhra),
clearly had political objectives tempered by the then-fashionable religious 
14
nationalism. In Contai the akhras were given a large measure of financial
support by the zamindars, especially Digambar Nanda of Mugberia who allowed
15them to use an isolated part of his zamindari for arms training. In
1906, the Midnapur Zamindari Society and especially Raja Narendralal Khan
of Narajole helped raise funds to send Hemchandra Kanungo to Paris to
16
learn the art of bomb-making. Moreover, the Anusilan Samiti in Calcutta
used Khudiram Bose, a youth trained in the akhras of Midnapur in the
abortive attempt in Muzaffarpur in 1908 on the life of Mr. Kingsford, the
17Presidency Magistrate. However, the fact remeins that none of the 
Midnapur groups actively organised any acts of political terrorism; their 
activities remained confined to body-building drills and optimistically 
hoping for the formation of what they conceived as the 'revolutionary party.'
9. Benoyjiban Ghose, Aanijuger Astraauru Hemchandra, Calcutta 1952, 
pp. 34-5, 48.
10. Ibid, pp. 43-4.
11. Ibid, p.39 and Samaren Roy, The Restless Brahmin, Calcutta 1970, pp11-12.
12. Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, Delhi, p.480, There is
however little to support Sarkar's claim that Hemchandra was then
repelled by Barin*s obsession with religion. One of the first acts of
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On December 6 th 1907, an attempt was made to blow up the train in which 
Sir Andrew Fraser, the Lieutant-Governor of Bengal, was travelling, 
some miles from Kharagpur. Though no evidence could be found to connect 
any of the Midnapur groups to this act, police surveillance in the district 
increased dramatically. Two police officers - Lalmohan Guha and Mazharul 
Huq - were delegated . the task of unearthing the 'terrorist conspiracy' 
that the government imagined was being organised in Midnapur.
The period also coincided with the appointment of Donald Weston as 
Collector in Midnapur. Weston had previously earned notoriety in the
nationalist circles of Bengal for exonerating some police officers for their
1 0
behaviour in the Calcutta Swadeshi riots. On his arrival in Midnapur, he 
began a personal vendetta with Raja Narendralal Khan, the zamindar of 
Narajole and a Swadeshi sympathiser. In 1907, he excluded the Raja from 
the Khas Mulakati List of Midnapur with the comments:
I find no reason to give him a Khas Mulakat. His manners are
very bad, in fact he seems to me to be deficient in intellect.
He is said to be a ganja eatpr, which may account for his
apparent idiocy. He has mixed himself up with the Swadeshi
party and I have had frequent complaints of boycotting in his
19elaka (area) encouraged by his local officers.
Weston also brought i punitive police into- the district and stationed
them at all those thanas where heavy picketing had been noticed. In the
Sadar region, to spite the Raja particularly, he made arrangements for
20the punitive police to be stationed at the Narajole zamindari. Moreover,
after Khudiram Bose had been apprehended for his part in the Muzaffarpur
incidents, Weston directed the police officers specifically to investigate
21any alleged complicity of the Raja.
1 2 . the Midnapur group in 1905 after receiving some substantial zamindari
donation was to construct a Bhawani Mandir in Midnapur town cf.
Benoyjibon Ghose, op.cit., pp. 56-7. Hemchandra's disillusionment -with
religion must have come at a later date.
13. Benoyjibon Ghose, op.cit, pp. 35-6.
14. GOI H-<- Poll (B), January 1908, No 117.
15. Benoyjibon Ghose, op. cit., p.53.
16. Ibid, pp. 74-5.
17. Samaren Roy, op.cit., p.48.
18, Diary of Mazharul Huq, 25th May 1908, p.87 (iVBSA).
19. GOB H. Poll 126/1912 No.12 (WBSA).
2 0 . Diary of Mazharul Huq, 31st May 1908, p.95.
2 1 . Ibid, 8 th May igos, p.62.
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On 9 th July 1908, a bomb was discovered in the house of Santosh Das,
a discharged probationary Sub-Inspector of Police. On 31st July,
another bomb was discovered in the house of the zamindar Barada Prasad 
22
Dutt. On the basis of these two finds coupled with the reports of
two informers who had been cultivated by the police, the authorities
concluded that they had unearthed a huge 'Bomb Conspiracy' in Midnapur
23
aimed at murdering Donald Weston. The CID identified 179 people whom
24'
they claimed to be members of the Midnapur Secret Society. However,
only 27 persons were actually arrested and charged in the Midnapur Bomb
Conspiracy Case. These included Raja Narendralal Khan, Upendra Nath
Maity and Debdas .Kararvthe editor of Medini Bandhav. The government
indictment listed 2 2  places where the conspirators had allegedly held
secret meetings, which ranged from the Midnapur town house of the Raja of
25Mahisadal to the houses of two prostitutes. Government officials 
seriously believed that they had nipped a potential danger in the bud.
The arrest of the so-called conspirators was accompanied by more 
generalised repression on the population of the district. On the situation 
in Midnapur town, the Bengalee wrote:
There is a general sense of insecurity in the town, and we 
may add throughout the district. People feel that at any 
moment their houses may be searched and they may be arrested 
if only they have incurred the displeasure of the police, flank, 
wealth and stainless reputation are no guarantees against the 
degradation of house search or arrest. The general feeling 
is that the police are masters of the situation and they may
do what they please...police rule has been substituted in
26
place of the reign of law...
K. B. Dutt, the Congress barrister, complained to the Commissioner that
27Midnapur town was living in a state of panic. But these complaints 
did not receive a sympathetic hearing from the officials. The Ch<*£ f 
Secretary, F. W. Duke expressed his total confidence in the "cool and
22. J. C. Ker, Political Troubles in India 1907-1917, Calcutta 1973 
pp. 416-17.
23. G08 H. Poll 51 (3)/l909 (WBSA).
24. Note by R. S. Mukherjee, D.S.P., C.I.D. Bengal 24th August 1908.
GOB H. Poll 1909, STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL (NMML).
25. Benoyjibon Ghose, op . ci . , p.76
26. Bengalee, 1st September 1908, GOB H.Poll 51/1909 ( VBSA) .
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level headed" approach of Weston.
The people of Midnapore are themselves entirely
responsible for whatever inconvenience they now suffer
28
from the consequences of the unrest in the town.
Neither was repression concentrated in Midnapur town. In Bhagawanpur
thana, where the Swadeshi movement had witnessed a relatively high
level of picketing against foreign goods, punitive police stationed,
high taxes of Rs 20 to 25 per month were imposed on all * middle class'
households, and in one instance the tax reached astronomical figures of
29Rs 200 per month on one Jagat Naraysn Ray of Kalabaria village. The 
villagers of Kalabetria were also ordered by the local daroga to provide
30good food to the police and some were even asked to vacate their homes.
The use of intensive, but selective repression by the authorities had
the effect of making the district aware of the realities of the Swadeshi
movement. Whereas previously people had remained indifferent to the
activities of the nationalists, repression forced people to take sides
and heightened their political consciousness. The general repulsion
against state repression increased after Sir S. P. Sinha, the Advocate
General, informed government that the charges against 24 of the 27
implicated in the Midnapur Bomb Conspiracy Case should be dropped for
want of any substantial evidence. The prosecution case seemed remarkably
flimsy as it was based on the evidence of two police informers and two
31men who had criminal records. Nationalist opinion was greatly incensed
at what they saw as Weston's vindictive campaign against some notables of
32
the district and they mounted a campaign to discredit him.
After the charges against him had been dropped, Narendralal Khan 
encouraged Peary Mohan Das, one of those implicated in the Bomb case, 
to initiate proceedings against Weston. K. B. Dutt, was put in charge 
of the case and nationalists toured the district raising public
27. GOB H. Poll 51(4)/1909 (WBSA).
28. Note dated 7th Aucust 1908, GOB H. Poll 51(4)/1909. No. 5 (WSSA).
29. Report from Nihar, R.N.P. Bengal 5th June 1909.
30. Nayak 20th May 1909, R.N.P. Bengal, 29th May 1909.
31. Benoyjibon Ghose, op.cit., pp. 77-80.
32. The matter was even raised in the House of Commons by Kier Hardie 
on 19th November, 1908. GOB H. Poll 7/1909 No. 2 (’VBSA) .
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33subscriptions, especially from zamindars. To add to the growing
public interest in the Damage Suit against Weston and the Police,
Raja Narendralal Khan accused Weston and iwo police officers of
accepting a bribe from him. This accusation clearly embarrassed the
government, and on the 16th January, 1909, a Departmental Enquiry was
set up to investigate the charges. In April 1909, Weston was relieved
from his Midnapur pasting but not before government gave him ample
opportunity to decide what papers should be sent to the enquiry. Nat
surprisingly, the Departmental Enquiry completely exonerated Weston
and concluded that there was sufficient evidence to show that there
34was a revolutionary conspiracy afoot in the district. But the 
government was not so fortunate in the High Court, where Justice 
Fletcher awarded Peary Mohan Das and others Rs 1,000 in damages. His 
judgement contained a strong indictment of police methods and the three 
officers involved in the case.
The High Court victory boosted the morale of the nationalists in 
Midnapur. The Bengalee reflected the popular euphoria:
The case was really a fight between the police aided by the
resources of an omnipotent bureaucracy and the representatives
of the people in one of the most important districts in Bengal.
The latter, with limited resources, had law and justice on their
35side, and they have triumphed.
Along with the judgement the nationalist mounted an effective campaign 
to ostracise Mazharul Huq and Lalmohan Guha, the two police officers 
involved in the case, as well as all others who had aided the government. 
Lalmohan Guha was boycotted by his entire village in Faridpur and no
3 0
one attended his daughter's annaprasan. K. B. Dutt used his position
as Manager of the Jamboni Estate to stop the marriage of the daughter
37of Akshoy Kumar Pal, a prosecution witness in the Bomb Case. Abinash 
Malakar, another prosecution witness was socially excommunicated and a
33. GC8  H. Poll 51(7)/1909 (NMML).
34. Report of the Results of the Departmental Enouiry held by the
Commissioner of the Burdwan Division into the Circumstances of the
Midnapore Conspiracy Case, Parts 1 and 2, Calcutta 1909 and GOB H.
Poll 7/1909 (WBSA).
35. Bengalee 8 th August 1911, R.N.P. Bengal 12th August 1911.
36. GOB H. Poll 51/1909 Mo. 22 (iVBSA) .
37. F. VV. Duke to Daly, 7th October 1909, GOB H. Poll 5l(c)/l909 (NMML).
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case of rape was brought against him by people from his village.
Dr. Bankim Chandra Mukherji of Midnapur town was boycotted by his
Hindu patients after he refused to testify for the defence, so much
38so that his monthly earnings dropped from Rs 500 to Rs 20. The 
government had succeeded in making a non-existent political movement 
into an actual reality.
Undeterred by their failure in the High Court, the government promptly 
appealed. This time Justice Woodroffe overturned the earlier decision 
and cleared Weston and the other two officers. But instead of boosting 
the image of the government, the new verditc' raised new questions regarding 
the 'impartiality* of the courts. According to the Amrita Bazar Patrika:
The sophistry of Justice Woodroffe and his philippic against
Mr. Justice Fletcher will not alter the facts of Midnapore,
especially the fact that a great deal of unnecessary oppression
(Mr. Woodroffe calls it excessive vigour) was exercised against
a harmless and inoffensive and terror-stricken population in
39the name of law and order.
The government followed up their latest victory by honouring both
40
Mazharul Hue and Lalmohan Guha with titles. On the whole, the 
insensitive handling of the situation by the authorities demonstrated 
to the politically aware sections of the population the growing irreconc­
ilability of Indian and British interests.
The government was not satisfied even after its victory in the Appeal 
Court. The district authorities now launched a bitter campaign against
Raja Narendralal Khan, whose accusations of bribery had contributed
significantly to eroding the credibility of the government. Even though
the Raja had been cleared by the courts, the District Magistrate refused
to have any dealings with him and advised the Europeans in Midnapur to
41
boycott him socially. V/hen George V visited India in 1912, the Raja
38. Report by 3. P. Midnapur, 21st September 1909. GOB H. Poll 5i(c)
/1909 (NMML).
39. Amrita Bazar Patrika 2nd August 1912, RNP Bengal 24th August 1912.
40. RNP Bengal 19th August 1911.
41. GOB H. Poll 126/1912 No. 1-2 (’.VBSA).
42was deliberately excluded from all social functions. The 
government made it clear to him that there was no question of the 
government restoring his privileges unless he withdrew all the charges 
he had made against the police. In fact, certain members of the
43
Governor's Executive Council wanted to deprive the Raja of his title.
The Raja whose flirtations with Swadeshi and terrorism had never been 
completely serious, was also more than anxious to make his peace with 
the government. He informed Bradley-Birt, the Collector, that he was
44
willing to sign a statement withdrawing all the charges against Weston.
But this did not satisfy the officials. According to F. '.V. Duke, now 
a member of the Executive Council:
The effect of it is merely to transfer the charge of
corruption from Mr. Weston to the police. It is immaterial
whom the Raja thought he was bribing; he is guilty by his
own admission of offering bribe, and until he makes full
amends for this, and the other misdemeanours which have
been established against him, he is not likely to be
45
recognised by government.
The government wanted the Raja to sign a public apology withdrawing
all charges against all the officers and pay a substantial contribution
to the municipal waterworks scheme, as a precondition of his restoration
46on the Durbar List. The Raja was most reluctant to withdraw charges 
against the police officers but was persuaded to do so by the Commissioner. 
In his apology, the Raja said:
I was induced to make charges against Mr. Weston and two
police officers, of having obtained money from me. I am now
satisfied that these charges are without foundation. I
withdraw them unreservedly end regret that they were ever 
48
brought forward.
The government decided not to publish the text of the apology, but issued
42. Ananda Bazar Patrika 26th December 1912, RNP, Bengal 4th January 1913.
43. GOB H. Poll 126/1912 No 12 (VBSA).
44. Sradley-Birt to Stevenson, 14th April 1912, GOB H. Poll 126/1912 No. 4 
( 2 B S A ) .
45. Note by F. W. Duke 19th April 1912, GOB H. Poll 126/1912 No. 5 (’VBSA) .




a statement to the newspapers that "Raja Narendra Lai Khan of Narajcle 
has submitted a complete apology to government for his participation in 
the disloyal movement in Midnapore, and has withdrawn unreservedly all
the charges which he made against Government officials in that connection
as
which he is now satisfied were unfounded"
The government had hoped that reconciliation with the Raja of Narajole 
would "make a favourable impression locally and do much towards
50
strengthening the better feeling that is beginning to prevail" Instead,
the apology had the effect of "creating a commotion in the minds of the 
51public" The Indian press interpreted it as a deliberate attempt by
the government" to bring discredit on the judgement of Sir Lawrence
Jenkins and Sir Ashutosh Mukherji", the judges who had acquitted the Raja
52
in the Bomb Conspiracy trial. The nationalist Ananda Bazar Patrika 
did not launch into a bitter polemic against the Raja for being a turn-cost; 
instead it fully appreciated the circumstances which had compelled him to 
sign an apology. The blame v/as put on the government for persecuting and 
harrassing the Raja.
The Narajole Raja is at the present in serious trouble, and it
would seem that even by this presenting an apology his anxieties
53would not end. May God bless him.
From the government point of view therefore, the apology did not have
any significant effect in reducing local political tension or enhancing 
the credibility of British rule.
The Swadeshi and early terrorist organisations in Midnapur were classic 
.cases of might-have-beens in Bengali nationalist history. They played 
no direct or significant role in promoting the development of nationalist 
consciousness in the district. Their influence was always small and 
distinctly elitist in character. But their mere existence was construed 
as a danger by the British authorities and hence the crack-down which was
46. H. Poll, 125/1912 No. 5 (/VBSA).
47. GOB H. Poll 125/1912 No 13 ['.VBSA}.
48. Ibid.
49. GfB H. Poll 126/1912 No. 17 [WBSA].
50. Bradley-Birt to Halifax 2nd September 1912, GGB H. Poll 125/1912
No. 1D ('.VBSA).
51. Bengalee 24th December 1912, BNP Bencal.4th January 1913.
52. Ibid.
53. Ananda Bazar Patrika, 7bth December 1912, RNP.Bengal 4th January 1313.
78
out of proportion to the size or the political potential of the
movements. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the
colonial authorities had not attained that level of political
sophistication that would allow them to recognise the phenomenon
of nationalism and attempt to incorporate that within the colonial
situation. Therefore paradoxically, by seeking a headlong confrontation
with dissent they heightened political consciousness of the more articulate
sections of the district population and provoked emotional sympathy for the
cause of nationalism. More signficiantly, for a government that had no
political roots in the district, repression against one of the leading
zamindars of the district only intensified the continuing crisis of
54
legitimacy of British rule in Midnapur.
The Partition of Midnapur
The brief flirtation of some zamindars, lawyers and youth with ’secret 
societies' and terrorism does not seem to have had any significant impact 
on the course of political behaviour in Midnapur. Though the police 
repression that followed the discovery of the so-called 'Midnapur Bomb 
Conspiracy' had the effect of undermining the political credibility of 
the Raj, it was not immediately followed by any break in the old style 
of politics. 'Politics' in the narrow sense in which they were then 
conceived, continued to revolve around the familiar network of the 
bhadrolok upper stratum of Indian society. This social composition of 
the participants in 'politics' effectively determined the shape and 
character of Indian political intervention vis h vis the state.
Following complaints made by District Officers regarding the problems 
of administration in Midnapur, the Government of Bengal, in 1907, mooted 
the idea of a oartition of Midnapur district. The idea had been floated 
earlier in 1852 and 1876 but had been shelved on both occasions for financial 
reasons. In 1907, the Government of India vetoed the idea because of the 
unsettled political climate in the district and instead recommended the
appointment of an Additional District Magistrate to relieve the over-
55
worked Collector. This particular solution did not find favour with 
the administrators in the Government of Bengal who considered the schemE
54. See Chapter 2.
55. Ibid.
56. 3engal Political Prors, Political Dept., December 1911, No. 23-5.
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comparable with the notion of 'two Kings in Brentford' and 'foreign
57to the recognised scheme of Indian administration' Officials in
Bengal were therefore quite pleased when the District Administration
Committee of 1913 explained the outbreak of terrorism in Bengal as
caused by administrative failure and recommended the rapid partition
of large districts such as Mymensingh and Midnapur as an essential
part of the government anti-terrorist strategy. Consequently, on
7th July 1913, the Government of Bengal published its Resolution
for the partition of Midnapur. On 25th January 1915, the government
reviewed the reaction to its scheme and recommended commencement of
5B
work leading up to partition.
The idea of the partition of Midnapur did not find any willing 
acceptance in the district. The zamindars were particularly incensed 
at the idea. The peculiarities of the centralised Tauzi system of 
revenue collection plus the fact that landholdings were freouently 
dispersed would necessitate the maintenance of two establishments if 
a partition was effected. Thus the Nawab of Murshidabad, with large 
landholdings in Midnapur, complained to the government that the location 
of Nayagram thane in the Jhargram subdivision of the new Midnapur 
district would cause him immense problems as most of his other land­
holdings were located in the new Hijli district. Similarly, the 
European-owned Midnapur Zamindari Company complained that partition 
would mean that half of their Bahadurpur estate would be in Midnapur
while all their other estates would be located in the new Hijli 
59district.
The zamindars were backed strongly by the lawyers, especially those 
with established legal practices in the district headquarters. The 
partition of the district would necessarily involve a considerable loss 
of earnings as there would now be two district courts instead of one. 
Thus Upendra Nath Maity, the President of the Midnapur town Bar Council, 
was one of the most vocal opponents of the partition, and devoted more 
than half his speech at the Bengal Provincial Conference session of 192Q 
to criticising the government plan. However, lawyers in Contai were
57. Speech by Sir Henry Wheeler 21st March 1921.
58. Bengal Political Progs, Political Dept., May 1917, No. 22.
59. Political Dept, Resolution 26th January 1915, Bengal Political 
Progs, Political Dept., March 1915 No. 7. Interestingly, the 
boundaries of the proposed districts were re-adjusted to suit 
the MZC convenience. The appeal of the Nawab of Murshidabad 
was however rejected.
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initially less vocal in their condemnation of government when there 
seemed a real possibility of their town being chosen as the head­
quarters of the proposed new district. The barrister B. N. Sasmal 
for example, soon abandoned his generalised opposition to the partition 
in favour of campaigning for the selection of Contai town as the new 
headquarters, '.'/ith considerable local influence, Sasmal was sure of 
benefiting tremendously if government accepted Contai1s claim.^ It 
is not surprising that he received strong backing from the Contai 
Union Committee and especially its chairman, Bepin Behari Sasmal, his 
elder brother. The stance taken by particular lawyers was therefore 
dictated by strong material and sectional interests.
Lastly, there was a small minority of nationalists who based their 
opposition to the government scheme on purely emotive grounds. According 
to this group, which compared the partition of Midnapur to Curzon's division 
of Bengal, "the motive of the Government was more political than administ­
rative. Midnapur could not be trusted in any way as she played a 
prominent role in the Indian freedom struggle. Government's main purpose
was to hamper the political activities of the people at large in the freedom
67struggle and to divert their energies to some other affairs" ~ The main 
exponent of this viewpoint was Debdas Karan, who aired his views through 
the pages of his Bengali weekly, Medini Bancfhav. In colourful prose, he 
issued forth a stream of denunciation:
So let the people of Midnapore come forward and regardless of 
caste and creed, protest against this terrible scheme of 
partition. Let them assemble in different places, and in 
piteous voice make known the anguish of heart they all feel.
Let them unite in their hundreds and their thousands in town 
and in country and set up a terrible agitation in a restrained 
and constitutional way against this heart rending proposal. In 
that case, no doubt before the thunderbolt falls, this accumulated 
mass of black clouds will have dispersed. But in carrying on 
this agitation, an unusual measure of restraint is necessary 
though they may be suffering the a;utest anonies; while weeping
SO. P. Pal, Deshapran Sasmal, Calcutta 1368 BS pp. 30-1.
61. Bengal Political Proceedings, Political Dept. March 1915, No. 6.
62. Sudhir Chandra S~ha 'The Scheme for Partition of Midnapur in Different 
Phases and its Impact', Proceedings of Indian History Congress, 34th 
Session, Chandigarh 1973, Vol II, p.175.
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they must repress their feelings as far as possible.
Unhappy as they are, they have many enemies, blood thirsty
63demons with lolling tongues to drink in their blood.
The Medini Bandhav almost alone rejected all variations of the partition
scheme, and publicly attacked Nihar and its editor Madhusudhan Jana for
dividing the anti-partition movement and arguing the case for Contai as
64a future district headquarters. The paper also counterposed the Rs
150,000 annual recurring costs for maintaining a new district with the
65
inadequate social services in the district. This line of attack found 
a responsive echo in the Calcutta press. According to the Bengalee:
Is the partition more urgent or are the sanitary needs of 
the district more pressing, which would save human lives 
from preventible death and scatter the blessings of happiness
and contentment among the people? Which is to be preferred
66from the humanitarian and even the Imperial point of view?
This view gained some credibility after the government rejected a loan
application from the Midnapur town municipality for the construction
67of a much-needed water-works.
Although the partition scheme was announced by the government at a time 
when Bengal alrpady had the weight of the Swadeshi experience behind her, 
the techniques of mobilisation employed in that period did not influence 
the campaign against the proposed partition. The limited forms of mass 
mobilisation employed in the Swadeshi movement were not pursued by the 
leaders in Midnapur who preferred the conventional strategy of meetings 
and petitions. Large meetings of notables were convened at various 
parts of the district where zamindars like D°vendra Narain Hazra and
Bhubaneshwar Mitra or lawyers such as Jyoti Prasad Chatterji and B. N.
6 8
Sasmal spoke. Most of the meetings decided in favour of petitioning 
the government "after taking signatures of almost all the important 
inhabitants of Midnapore"^ By 1915, the government had received 18 
petitions or memorials from various parts of the district supported
63. Medini Bandhav, 14th July 1913, RNP Bengal 26th July 1913.
64. Ibid, 1st September 1913, RNP Bengal 6th September 1913.
65. Ibid 21st July 1913, RNP Bengal 2nd August 1913.
6 6 . Bengalee, 15th July 1913, RNP Bengal 19th July 1913.
67. See Chapter 2.
68. Bengalee 21st December 1912, RNP Bengal 4th January 1913. Nihar 
20th August and 6th September 1921.
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70by the major zamindars and other men active in public life. The 
tone of the petitions was without exception respectful, and the 
Midnapur politicians made it a special point to appeal directly to 
the Governor, Lord Carmichael, who had a reputation for being 
sympathetic to the aspirations of Indians. Medini Bandhav, the most 
uncompromising critic of the partition plan wrote:
My Lord, Midnapore is an ancient district; do not divide
it. 0 Lord Carmichael, the sea of compassion and friend of
the people, today the 28 lakhs of your subjects inhabiting
Midnapore are seeking your protection. Grant them again
71the assurance of safety.
A special deputation from Midnapur travelled to Calcutta to present a 
personal appeal to Lord Carmichael to stop the partition. But Carmichael 
himself travelled to Midnapur to speak directly to the protestors. In 
his speech he made it clear that:
...the consideration which has weighed with me in making up
my mind more than any other is this: I do not see how, unless
you change the whole system of Indian administration - which no
one proposes to do, and to attempt it would be a waste of many
precious years - I do not see how you can ever get a really
effective system of local self-governm nt introduced into this
country unless you do divide up the larger districts. A real
system of local self-government is, I think, the greatest: need 
72
of Bengal.
With governments refusal to reconsider, the Midnapur anti-partition 
movement collapsed.
Although the government remained formally committed to the partition
scheme, the complications of war forced it to reduce official spending.
Whitehall, keen to curtail government expenditure, did not view the
73scheme as ‘essential' and attempted to apply the brakes. in the
59. Bengalee 21st December 1912, RNP Bengal 4th January 1912.
70. Political Dept Resolution, 26th January 1915, Bengal Political 
Progs. Political Dept. March 1915, No. 7.
71. Medini Bandhav 21st July 1913, RNP Bengal 2nd August 1913.
72. Lady Carmichael, Lord Carmichael of Skirling: A Memoir, London 
1929, p .199.
73. Governor General in Council to Secretary of State, 16th March ^918 
^ P o l i _ b i c a j L_Prgci?,g dings: October "918, No. 44.
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reconstituted 8engal Legislative Council, the Midnapur representatives,
notably Sarat Chandra Jana, Sarat Chandra Mukherjee and H. 5. Suhra-
wardy mobilised the powerful zamindar lobby to stall the grants for
74
the partition scheme. Moreover, the rapid development of the non-
cooperation movement in Midnapur, especially B. N. Sasmal*s successful
campaign against Union Boards, made the government hesitant to go
through with a scheme that did not appear to have any substantial
backing from within Midnapur. Ultimately, on 23rd November 1921, after
more than Rs 9 lakhs had been spent on the venture, the Government of
Bengal took the view that though partition was essential, "for financial
considerations it has been found necessary to suspend work at Hijli
75which for the present, therefore, is in abeyance"
Though the partition of Midnapur was not ultimately effected, the anti­
partition campaign itself was a failure and showed up the limitations 
of the Midnapur politicians. Though the ideology of nationalism had 
by now infected the district, there was no corresponding change in 
the style of institutional politics. The question of partition was 
never a * mass' issue; interest in it remained confined to a small 
section of lawyers and zamindars whose material interests were likely 
to be jeopardised. Neither was any serious attempt made to bring up 
the question before a larger audience. Byed Nasim Ali, one of the 
very few non-official MLC's who supported partition was therefore quite 
accurate when he questioned:
By the 'people* do we mean a set of gentlemen sitting one
fine morning in the house of another gentlemen and passing
certain resolutions and publishing them in the newspapers?
...Is it not a fact that the real people were not represented
76in these proceedings?
For all its impressive rhetoric and verbose denunciations, non-official 
institutioeal politics in Midnapur did not anticipate the radical break 
in political sytle that was to accompany the rise of Gandhi. For all 
its virtues and consciousness-rraising contributions, 'politics' in
74. BLC Progs, Vol I, No. 5, 1921f pp. 321-42.
75. Bengal Political Progs, December 1921, No. 20-5.
76. BLC Progs, Vol III, 1921, p. 519.
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in Midnapur was a closed shop.
Agrarian Discontent 1908-1912
Institutional politics in Midnapur, as we have noted, operated around a 
small and limited circuit. Although power in rural, society depended 
on the control of land, little effort was made to involve rural power- 
holders, especially the jotedars and the prosperous ryots, in the formal 
political life of the district. Yet. this did not necessarily mean that 
these sections of society were apathetic or indifferent to a political 
culture. What it did mean was that the issues taken up by and the 
style of institutional politics did not appeal to them. Thus they 
remained aloof from both the Swadeshi movement and the efforts to fight 
against the proposed partition of Midnapur.
Yet, politics was an essential part of rural life. Besides the under-r 
lying political overtones of village factionalism, rural society was 
unquestionably tied up with its relations to the state in an atmosphere
77of expanding commodity production and commercialisation of agriculture.
This was more so in Bengal where British rule had introduced a complex 
series of laws governing the relations of the agricultural producer and 
landlord. These factors led to an inevitable politicisation, though- it was 
not expressed in the idiom of the bhadrolok elite whose activities were 
the most conspicuous*.
The Salt Parqanas in the south-east corner of Midnapur came to the 
forefront of district politics in the period 1908-12. In terms of land- 
holding, this part of the district displayed one peculiarity: there was 
an abundance of estates directly under the management of the government 
or Khas Mahals (see Table 4.1). Contai subdivision especially, was 
financially very important for tie government because of the high rent 
roll of the government estates.
77. cf. Jairus Banaji, Indian and the Colonial Mode of Production:
Comment, EPVV 6 th December 1975, pp. 1887-92.
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TABLE 4:1
Government Estates in Midnapur District 1912
Subdivision Number Area (Acres) Rent (Rs)
Sadar 15 48,736 42,661
Ghatal 39 282 1,898
Tamluk 25 5,586 20,254
Contai 42 226,589 5,262,401
Source: Bengal Political Progs, Political Dept, October 1912.
The operations of the survey and settlement officers in the Salt 
Pargan.^s or the jalpai lands in 1908 generalised agrarian discontent 
in that part of the district. Two distinct and separate issues were 
involved: the question of status of the tenants, and the increase in 
rents.
The settlement officers of the jalpai lands decided to grant parchas 
to the bhagchasis thereby converting them into protected under-ryots.
This action provoked immediate opposition from the tenants themselves 
who argued that bhagchasis were mere 1tenants-at-will' "who may be turned 
of(f) the lands they cultivate at the will of the landholders when the
78vears crop have been harvested. They are mere agricultural labourers"
Arguing that local custom always held sway over any interpretation of
the Tenancy Act, the tenants demanded that government recognise the
difference between bhagchasis^ryots, and tenure-holders, and prepare
a revised jamabandi. The government officers were variously accused of
"sowing the seeds of future discords between landlords and their tenants"
79and carrying out "irresponsible and illegal acts" Ashutosh Jana, an 
agricultural scientist and a leading activist among the tenants^comolained 
that if the status of bhagchasis were elevated, "they will oust the Brahmin,
78. Nihar, 11th May 1909, RNP Bengal 22nd May 1909.
79. Nihar, 13th July 1909, RNP Bengal 24th July 1909.
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Kayasth and Kshatriya proprietors on whose behalf they cultivate 
80their holdings" Considering that the actual number of upper-
caste landholders was insignificant, this appeal was clearly designed
to win support from urban dwellers in Contai and Tamluk. The tenants,
including both jotedars and ryots, whose interests were directly
threatened ultimately concluded that the "question can be decided only
by Civil Courts and not by Settlement Courts" and decided to act 
81
accordingly.
There is no evidence to suggest that the Settlement officers or the 
Government of Bengal were out to improve the lot of the lowest strata 
of the peasantry. The confusion seems to have arisen out of the over- 
rigid interpretation of the Bengal Tenancy Act and an ecuation of the 
tenants as the landlord. However in coming to their decision, the 
settlement officers did not take into account the additional factor of 
the balance of social forces locally. The disaffected tenants had no 
doubt about their collective strength to resist any undue government 
interference. In 1885 they had combined to sabotage and ultimately 
to throw out the settlement operations of Mr. Price and had made life
82
impossible for various zamindars, compelling some to sell up and quit.
As opposed to this, the bhagchasis were disorganised and insufficiently 
involved in the dispute to be able to take advantage of the settlement 
officers' verdict. They were mere victims of a sudden change from above. 
Thus in the course of an unpopular settlement, later reversed, government 
alienated one of the most influential sections of the rural population 
without generating any countervailing support. But in 1909, this 
hostility had not transformed to bitterness and open conflict.
The second dispute arising from the settlement operations concerned the 
increase in rent. The tenants complained not only at the increase of 
rent but also at the method of assessment. The Nihar wrote:
This enhancement is being made by the government on account 
of the rise in prices of crops. But the prices published 
in the Calcutta Gazette from time to time are too high. The 
reason is that officers usually select a limited area of the 
best field where the crops are best, and cut the crops therefrom:
80. Hitavadi, 1st May 1914, RNP Bengal 9th May 1914.
81. Nihar 10th August 1909, RNP Bengal 21st August 1909.
82. Ramapada Chatarji, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement of the
Government and the Temporarily Settled Estates in the District of
Midnapore 1903-11, Calcutta 1912, pp. 10-20.
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and often immediately threshing the green, undried corn,
weigh it, and thus form their estimates and submit their
. 83reports.
There was therefore a belief among the tenants that the increase in 
rent had been based upon an inaccurate assessment of the yield per 
acre. There were also complaints that rent-free tenures had also 
been assessed for rent.
What added to the discontent of the tenants was the indifference of
the bureaucracy to their complaints. By law, the revenue officers
in the district were supposed to receive any abjections and pass
judgements on them. But the officials, if the local press is to be
believed, disregarded the proper procedures end refused to accept
objections. Nihar, which, acted as the voice of the disgruntled tenants,
publicised the case of one Sivaprasad Mandal who sent 95 objections to
84
the Director of Land Records, by registered post, without result.
□ffical apathy merely spurred on the tenants to greater activity. Petitions
were organised and sent to the Lieutenant-Governor. In the revenue pargana
of Doro, no fewer than 75,000 people contributed to a petition sent to
Calcutta. In Tamluk, the tenants filed a petition to the Munsif's Court
detailing allegations of irregularities. But it should be noted that
the aggrieved tenants were quick to point out to the authorities that
"instead of raising a howl by calling public meetings (they) are seeking
85relief in the proper Quarters" "The tenants", they reminded officials,
0 0
"rely on the mercy of the benign government" . It was a reflection of
the level of sophistication of thc rural leadership. With the matter in
the hands of the courts, the 'prosperous ryots' of the government Khas
Mahals decided "that to voluntarily pay the rents fixed at the recent
settlement would prejudice thsir rights and would damage their’case now
pending before court and they have therefore deferred payment at the
enhanced rates". They took care to assure the government that if the
courts ruled against them, they 'would willingly pay the new rates. But
87
until then, they would continue to pay the old rates.
83. Nihar 2nd February 1909, RNP Bengal, 13th February 1909.
84. Nihar, 22nd December 1908, RNP Bengal 2nd January 1909.
85. Nihar, loth March 1909, RNP Bengal, 27th March 1909.
8 6 . Nihar, 9th March 1909, RNP Bengal, 20th March 1909.
87. Midnanur Hitaishi. 22nd July 1912, RNP Bengal, 4th October 1913.
The examination of the tenant's movement in the Khas Mahals of Contai 
and Tamluk provide us with a glimpse of the high level of organisation 
existing among a section of the peasantry in Midnapur. Adept at 
dealing with complex tenancy legislation and landlordism, they had, 
since the early 19th century, built up effective combinations to 
service their interests. There is no evidence to suggest that these 
combinations had been formalised into bodies on the lines of secular 
political associations or pressure groups, but in terms of effectiveness 
and co-ordinated work, there was no doubt that they were a living reality. 
The stereotyped picture of a helpless and ignorant peasantry groaning 
under the weight of landlordism and colonial rule would not hold true, 
for Midnapur at least.
Moreover, it is also erroneous to suggest that the effectiveness of these
informal combinations grew out of the existing village communal solidarity.
The definite class-conscious apposition to the granting ' of tenures to
bhagchasis would suggest a stratification of rural society based on
landholding and wealth. The peculiarities of tenancy laws in Bengal,
however, united a differentiated body of rural folk under the broad
category of tenants. They were united by common antagonism to the
bhagchasis, and ostensibly common interest stemming from law. This
factor was responsible for obscuring the immediate class differentiation'
in rural society and building up a unity that was separate from the
village as a whole, but united in terms of legal standing. This factor
also aided the development of the leadership of what the Midnapur
89Hitaishi called the 'prosperous ryots' , or what has been referred 
to earlier as the jotedars. This peculiar factor was to play a crucial 
role in Midnapur politics during the Gandhian phase of the nationalist 
movement.
The Midnapur Floods 1913
In the monsoon of 1913 terrible floods affected Midnapur, especially
the Contai and Tamluk subdivisions. The Nihar renorted that as a
result of the floods most of the inhabitants of Contai subdivision
89
had been rendered homeless. The price of rice registered a sharp
8 8 . Ibid.
89. Sanjivani, 25th September 1913, RNP Bengal, 4th October 1913.
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increase to 8 or 9 seers per rupee and coarse rice sold for 5 to
7 seers per rupee, "at a place where people cannot afford to buy at
9010 - 12 seers per rupee," Livestock also suffered because of the
91
flood and the conseouent shortage of fodder. To make matters worse, 
there was a great scarcity of drinking water in Contai town.
The government machinery in the district took its own time in deciding
on the intensity of the damage and suffering. The Subdivisional Officer
accompanied by the Manager of a Khas Mahal visited some of the roadside
92
villages and concluded that the damage was minimal. The Collector
agreed with their assessment and consequently did not recommend any
93pecuniary aid to the victims.
In the absence of any government initiative in the task of flood relief,
the entire operation had to be conducted by interested private individuals.
In this the lead was taken by B. N. Sasmal, a native of Contai who was
practising law in Midnapur town. He quickly set about organising relief
teams and giving extensive press coverage to the floods. He got the
vernacular press in Calcutta on to the scene and tried to impress on the
government the gravity of the situation. As a result of this effort,
teams of youth volunteers, especially members of terrorist organisations,
94came to the district from all over Bengal to aid in the operations.
Thanks to this extensive press coverage, the government finally reacted
in December 1913, and sanctioned remissions of rent, revenue and
chaukidari tax, and the distribution of takavi loans to the tune of Rs 2
lakhs. Percy Lyon, a member of the Governor's Executive Council, also
openly acknowledged the services of the private relief teams and instructed
95the government officials to work in conjunction with them.
But criticism of the government continued. The Rs 2 lakh loan.was held
to be inadecuate and the fairness of its distribution wes called into 
96
cuestion. Led by the Medini Bandhav, the Calcutta press took un a 
demand for the government to suspend all survey and settlement operations
90. Ibid.
91. Nihar, 23rd December 1913, RNP Bengal, 10th January 1914.
92. Nihar, 18th November 1913, RNP Bengal, Sth December 1913.
93. Bangavasi, 25th October 1913, RNP Bengal, 1st November 1913.
94. Samaren Roy, oo.cit., p.55.
95. Indian World, 3rd December 1913, RNP Bengal 13th December 1913.
96. Bangavasi, 25th October 1313, RNP Bengal, 1st November 1912.
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97in Contai, Tamluk and Ghatal for a period of two years, A more
serious cry went out to the government to undertake extensive repairs
on the embankments in Vishnupur v/hose breach had partly contributed
90to the serious nature of the floods. The new year witnessed even
greater criticism of the government and especially the callousness
of local officials. In spite of the government's assurance to the
Bengal Legislative Council that people in the flooded areas would be
exempt from paying the chaukidari tax, it was claimed that efforts
were being made by chaukidars to realise the tax. This was so because
the government had not paid chaukidars their salary. Accusations of
99the coercion of poor ryots were also made: In the Khas Mahals of
Contai ryots were threatened with the issue of certificates for the
non-payment of rents which were to have been s u s p e n d e d . T h e  Sub-
Managers of the Majnamutha and Jalamutha Khas Mahals not only did not
recommend the suspension of rents in their estates, but actually issued
certificates to defaulting ryots.. Parwanas were also issued for the
1 0 1auction of their movable property. The situation did not improve
in 1914. which produced only a four-anna harvest for want of rain. The
demand for leniency came even louder and the government chose to ignore 
102the call. By the end of 1915, the Contai area was faced v/ith a 
serious water shortage and drought. Once again, government reacted with 
utter indifference, local officials not even botherino to raise the 
matter in Calcutta.
The series of 'natural disasters' that affected Midn=pur bet" sen 1913 
and 1915 were not the worst the district experienced. In 1918, for 
example, the influenza epidemic broke out, and the excess death rate 
from July to November per 1,C00 was 6.4 and partly as a result of the 
epidemic, the population fell by 5.5% between 1911 and 1921. '.’/hat
distinguished 1913 from earlier disasters and the situation in 1916 
was the active intervention of politicians. B.N.Sasmal almost single 
handedly raised the issue in the press and organised relief teams. In 
doing so, he broke new ground by actually seeking some form of confron­
tation with the local machinery of government with the support of a 
non-bhadrolok audience. The 1913 floods provided the first occasion in
97. Medini Bandhav, 10th November 1913, Nihar 1 1 th Nov°mber 1913,
RNP Bengal, 1st November 1913.
98. The Mahommadi, 10th October 1913, RNP Bengal 25th October 1913.
99. Nihar 20th January 1 9 1 4 , RNP Bengal 31st January 1914. Bangavasi 
7th February 1914, RNP Bennal 14th February 1914.
100. Hitavadi, 16th January 1914, RNP Bengal 24th January /!9/’£.
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which a politician involved in institutional politics attempted to 
break from his immediate audience in Contai and Midnapur towns, and 
search for larger and wider constituencies. By articulating the demands 
of a rural population with essentially peasant backgrounds, Sasmal made 
an important contribution towards linking, for the first time, two 
widely differing traditions of politics. In a sense, Sasmal and other 
Midnapur politicians anticipated the break from elite politics that 
was to accompany the rise of Gandhi.
Conclusion
The period 1907-19 witnessed a great change in the politics of Midnapur.
The Swadeshi movement and the accompanying bhadrolok nationalist euphoria
resulted in a rapid change in the ideological climate of the district,
indeed the whole of Bengal, so much so that British officials like
Carmichael and Percy Lyon were for the first time compelled to recognise
105that Bengalis had distinctly political aspirations. But these
nationalist political aspirations, shared by most of the Bengali 'liberals’
had not yet developed a dynamism of their own and sustained themselves by
106a naive belief in the essential integrity of the Raj. Thus in
Midnapur, most of the prominent notables were active curing World War I
107in raising government war loans. Sut the high-handedness of the 
Government of India during the war years, especially the Defence of India 
Act of 1915, made it difficult for the nationalists to hold on to such 
illusions. Events in 1919 were to prove a decisive factor in shifting 
the political standing of these gentlemen , closer to their terrorist 
counterparts, who had broken politically with the Raj.
But alongside this middle class or petty bourgeois nationalism there 
also emerged a parallel movement led by ’prosperous ryots' fighting 
against official interference in rural life. This movement was not 
infected by any such liberal constraints and operated outside the orbit
of institutional politics. Thouch these two currents had emerged
autonomously, politicians with high aspirations strove consciously to
101. Nihar 2nd June 1914, RNP Bengal, 20th June 1914.
102. Bengalee, 25th January 1915, RNP oth February 1915.
103. RNP Bengal 13th November 1915.
104. The Census of Indij, 1921, Vol V, Part I, pp. 20-4.
105. Lady Carmichael, op.cit., op. 131-2, J. Broomfield, Elite Conflict 
in a Plural Society, pp. 91-4.
92
build links that would cement such an alliance. In spite of the 
apparent complacency of district officials, politics in Midnapur was 
heading for a decisive break with the past, both in political style 
and content.
105. For an account of the dilemma of Bengali Liberalism see
Ranajit Guha, 'Neel Darpan: The Image of a Peasant Revolt in 
a Liberal Mirror,' Journal of Peasant Studies, II, 1, 1974. 
107. Nihar 20th March, 1917.
Chapter 5 93
The Non—Cooperation Movement
V;ith the conclusion of the war in Europe in November 1918, political 
activity in India reached a feverish pitch. The hopes generated among 
'moderate' politicians by the Secretary of State's August 1917 
announcement, crumbled with the enactment of the Rowlatt Sill. Gandhi, 
who had spent the first half of 1918 on recruitment tours for the 
British war effort declared that he thought the Bill was not merely 
'a stray example of lapse of righteousness and justice^ but, 'evidence 
of a determined policy of repression',. This belief was further 
compounded by the systematic high handedness of Sir Michael O'Dwyer in 
Punjab culminating in the notorious Jallianwala Bagh massacre on 10th 
April, 1919.
The Punjab atrocities aroused a sense of moral indignation in the hearts 
of most of thelndian intelligentsia, whether 'moderate' or 'extremist'. 
Bengal, which Pad experienced its share of the policy of selective 
repression during the war, was particularly shaken by the decision of 
the poet Rabindranath Tagore to renounce his Knighthood in protest 
against the Punjab happenings. But moral indignation did not extend to 
political sympathy. Though individual Bengali politicians like C. R. Das 
and Fazlul Huq accompanied Motilal Nehru and Gandhi in their investigations
2
to the Punjab, the support for Gandhi's Satyagraha Sabha was only lukewarm. 
The Bengal Provincial Conference meeting at Mymensingh in April 1919. 
expressed token support for Gandhi's satyagraha plans, but declined to
3
take any concrete steps to put the resolution into practice. In any 
case, the Bengali Hindu politicians had no audience beyond the usual 
network of lawyers and bhadrolok clerks scattered around Calcutta and the 
mofussil. As such, at this juncture, the Gandhian notion of a mass 
satyagraha did not hold out much attraction for them.
Neither did the hostile Muslim reaction to the Treaty of Sevres and the
1. Judith 3ro',vn ,- Gandhi's Rise to Power, Cambridge 1974, p. 163.
2. Ibid, p.163
3. Ibid, pp. 166-7
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Khilafat issue interest them in the least. Even though the Khilafat 
Day on 17th October 1919, had attracted a 10,000 strong rally of
v(,
mainly illterate Muslims, 3engali Hindu politicians did not see the
A
necessity to forge any links with this wide layer of underprivileged 
people who had been brought into the.political arena via the Khilafat.
The Bengali bhadrolok politicians saw the Khilafat issue as a challenge
a
! to their dominance in provincial politics; and generally they held 
the .Muslims' in contempt.
In 1919 and 1920, Bengali politicians were primarily concerned with the 
institutional changes brought about by the Government of India Act of 
1919. The moderates led by Surendranath Banerjea regarded the reforms as 
a major step in the direction of responsible government and argued for 
Congress co-operation in working the reforms. The*extremists1 led by 
C. R. Das, Byomkesh Chakravarty and Jitendralal Banerjea, relative 
newcomers in the political game, had little or no hesitation in denouncing
5
the reforms as inadequate. But denunciation expressing disappointment
at the limited nature of the reforms, did not resolve the ’extremists1
dilemma over whether or not to participate in the forthcoming elections.
This dilemma came to the fore during the 1920 Bengal Provincial Conference 
convened at Midnapur town. In his Presidential address, Fazlul Huq 
thundered:
t
Gentlemen, we cannot parley on these terms. For us the die 
is cast, the Rubicon is crossed between us and the bureaucrat.
There shall be war, not hidden but open, and we shall not give
up the fight till we have won for our country the full measure
6
of political freedom.
But interestingly, the ’fight’ forecast by Fazlul Huq was to be 
conducted in the electoral arena and in accordance with the terms laid 
' down by the Raj. The resolution moved by Jitendralal Banerjee called 
upon people to vote in the forthcoming elections for those ’patriotic’
a. For a selection of Bengali press response to Khilafat see Ibid 
p. 223 
5. Ibid, p.132
S. R.N.P. Bengal, 10th April 1920
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candidates who supported the views of Congress. In fact most of 
the 'extremist* Hindu politicians of Bengal, such as Byomkesh 
Chakravarty, C. R. Das, B. I\l. Sasmal, Jitendralal Bannerjee, Akhil 
Chandra Dutta, J. M. Sengupta and Nishit Sen, were candidates in 
the elections. B. N. Sasmal, a candidate for Midnapur, wrote lengthy 
articles in the local press explaining to voters the importance of 
exercising their franchise. In July 1920, on the eve of the Congress 
special session in Calcutta, Bejoy Krishna Bose, the Secretary of the 
Reception Committee, complained that Congressmen were too preoccupied 
with the election campaign to devote sufficient attention to the
g
preparations for the Congress session. The General Meeting of the ,
BPCC on 15th August 1920 noted that though non-cooperation "is a 
perfectly constitutional weapon of political struggle between a people 
and its government", boycott of the Legislative Council was unnecessary. 
The strategy demanded "the presence of large number of such members
9
as will be prepared to resort to non-cooperation within the Council"
This apparent contradiction between the extremists' radical rhetoric 
and hankering after Council seats led Nayak to note sarcastically:
We hear that most Extremist leaders are girding up their 
loins from now to become members of the new Legislative 
Council. We fail to understand the reason for all these 
preparations. 'Why do they always decry the Montagu reforms 
and at the same time cannot bear che idea that admirers of 
those reforms will carry away the prize posts.
The Calcutta Special Congress of September 1920 exposed the National
weakness of the Bengali politicians' strategy. Surendranath Banerjee and
his followers did not attend the session, believing it to be packed by 
11Gandhi's men. By the middle of the session, Jitendralal Bannerjee 
joined the host of notables including Motilal N^hru now making a beeline 
for the Gandhi camp. From Bengal, it was left to C. R. Das and the 
veteran Bepin Chandra Pal to make a last attempt to stall Gandhi's 
march. But it was in vain. Not only was Gandhi's
7. Nihar, 18th April 1920. Among those who spoke in favour of 
Bannerjee's resolution were Maulvi Hajid Bux, J. M. Sengupta,
Basanta Kumar Majumdar, Indu Bhusan Sen, Hiralal Gandhi and 
Surya Kumar Shome.
8 . B. K. Bose to Pandit Gokaran Nath Mishra, Secy AICC 18th July 
192D. AICC/13/1920.
9. AICC/13/1920.
10. Nayak, 5th April 1920. RNP Bengal 10th April 1920.
11. Brown, op.cit. p.263.
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resolution carried by 1855 votes to 873, but the 3sngali delegates
1 2supported him 551 to 395. Though there was strong evidence to 
suggest that a significant section of the Bengal delegation had been
purchased by Jamanlal Bajaj and other moneyed Marwari supporters of
13
Gandhi, the fact remained that Gandhi did possess an even measure 
of national support and overwhelming Muslim support. This, coupled 
with the desire not to get isolated from the Congress mainstream, 
compelled Gas to urge his supporters to abide by the Congress mandate 
and withdraw from the Council elections. His words were heeded and
altogether 25 candidates withdrew from the general constituencies in
14
Bengal.
There were other considerations too. Das was perhaps the first among
Bengali politicians to gauge the fact that the franchise revision had
broadened the political constituency beyond the narrow layer of
15zamindars and articulate lawyers. But the Congress had no organisation 
to meet the demands or voice the aspirations of the newly enfranchised. 
Moreover, most Congress politicians were based in Calcutta and did not 
have political roots in the districts. Few could boast like B. N. Sasmal:
...that I had a good chance of getting elected to the Bengal 
Legislative Council must be apparent to many. And i*P people 
don't admit that, I am sure the residents of Contai and Tamluk
1 swill readily verify.
Many of the politicians were, in fact, unsure of their electoral 
prospects. Satyendra Chandra Mitra, who withdrew from the Noakhali 
seat stated quite explicitly in 1922;
We had very little chance to have the majority, e.g. Mr. Das 
was a candidate and he had a rival - a big zamindar. Though 
he had great chance, yet he was not absolutely certain. Mr. 
Chakravarty had also very little chance. I cite the example 
to show you the proof that we were right not to enter the
17Council as we had very little chance to have the majority.
12. Ibid, p.270
13. Interview with Satcowripati Roy, Oral History Transcript 267 (NMML)
14. Nihar 21st September 1920.
15. AlCC/2/1920
16. B. N. Sasmal - proter Trina, Gopinath Bharah 1329 B.S. p.2
17. Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee 1922 Madras
n.d. p .9o
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Thus it was not any lofty considerations of unity and ideology, but 
sheer pragmatism that played the crucial role in some Bengali 
politicians' respect for Congress mandates,
Midnapur Elections 1920
The decision of the Congress to boycott the elections to the Council
left a void in the Midnapur political scene. Though Congress was by
no means a cadre-based mass party, its local leader, B. N. Sasmal, was
widely respected and considered an easy favourite to win the Midnapur
South seat. The local press had thrown in its lot with him and had
advised people to vote for him as one "who always maintained some links
13with the political life of the nation" But in Midnapur North, the 
Congress candidate, Satcowripati Roy, faced an uphill battle against 
the nationalist zamindar, Raja Narendra Lai Khan of Narajole, Satcowripati 
Roy's decision to opt out of the contest follov/ing the Calcutta Special 
Congress enabled the Narajole zamindar to secure his seat in the 
Legislative Council without a contest.
Sasmal's exit from the polls in the two-member southern constituency
did not have a similar result. -Vith the leading light out of the way,
lesser luminaries jumped into the electoral arena. The relative
geographical compactness of the constituency, plus the fact that the
voter could cast two votes, made the South Midnapur seats attractive
to the ambitious. Moreover, although Sasmal abided by the Congress
mandate and withdrew, he did not launch any campaign to dissuade voters
from participating in the elections. He merely issued a single statement
19that he was against voting for any candidate. This passivity ensured 
that no political stigma attached to those participating in the polls.
The attitude of Nihar, the nationalist weekly, was that Sasmal's 
decision to withdraw, though significant, was nevertheless an 
individual decision. The message of non-cooperation had not yet 
filtered down to the district.
The most important consequence of the Congress decision was that
18. Nihar 22nd June 1920
19. Nihar 28th September 1920
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personalities rather than politics became the keynote of the 
campaign. Upendra Nath 3al, a lecturer in Patna College who proudly
i
' announced that he was a ’’double M.A.", arrived in Contai to contest
20
the elections. He hoped to capitalise on the typical bhadrolok
penchant of assessing suitability in public life by looking at
academic degrees. Unfortunatsly for him, his nomination paper was
rejected. Ashok Chandra Dutt, a Barrister in the Calcutta High Court
and a relative of K. B. Dutt, also announced his candidature. Though
in no way connected to Midnapur, Dutt was a relative of J. De, the
Subdivisional Officer of Contai. Using the latter's influence, Dutt
was able to secure the support of zamindars, 8 iraja Charan Nanda and
Devendra Nath Hazra, and some prominent figures of Contai and Tamluk
including Mahendra Nath Maity of the Tamluk Bar, Upendra Narain Majumdar,
21
Devendra Narayan Majumdar, Nagendra Nath 3akshi and Gyanada Charan Bose.
An interesting feature of Dutt's candidature was that he was supported 
essentially, but not exclusively, by the group in Contai who were 
called 'settlers' by virtue of the fact that they hailed from outside the 
district.
Except for Dutt, all the candidates of any significance were local 
people. Shital Prasad Ghose, Public Prosecutor and erstwhile Vice 
Chairman of the District Board, and Manmatha Nath Bose, a government 
lawyer of Midnapur town, contested the seat though they had no real 
links with Contai and Tamluk. From Contai town there was Bepin Behari 
Sasmal elder brother of B. N. Sasmal, who was connected with the Contai 
Local Board and Contai Union Committee, besides being an Honorary 
Magistrate. Also from Contai v/ere Baranashi Bannerjee and Abanti Kumar 
Maity, both lawyers. Maity was a member of the Local Board and had 
close ties with the Hari Sabha temple and the 'settlers'. Sarat Chandra 
Mukhopadhya, lawyer and member of the Tamluk Municipality, was the only 
candidate to hail from the Tamluk half of the constituency.
Zamindars were significantly absent. Raja Sati Prasad Garga of 
Mahisadal entered the contest and then withdrew unexpectedly; Rai 
Mahant Radheshyam Das Adhikari of Gopiballavpur filed his nomination
20. Nihar 28th September 1920
21. Ibid
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but then lost interest to the extent that he failed to submit his
22
election expenses return. The only serious contenders with any
rural connections were Bepin Behari Sasmal, who owned a zamindari
at Birkul, and Sarat Chandra Jana, a lawyer practising in Midnapur
town who was involved with the Mahishya caste movement through his
activist brother Ashutosh Jana. As a trained agricultural scientist,
Ashutosh Jana was widely known and respected by the tenants of the 
23
district. But in spite of his secure local roots and connections,
Sarat Chandra Jana, too, shied away from overt politics. He merely
declared that hs was contesting "for reasons of patriotism and not
2 dfor self-aggrandisement or selfish reasons"
Campaigning was not intense and all candidates without exception 
lacked any sort of organisation. In contacting people in the remote 
interior, they were dependent on their own resources or on the 
resources of their clients, if they happened to be lawyers. Here 
Ashaki Chandra Dutt stole a march over his opponents by being able 
to avail himself of the services of his cousin who, as a Subdivisional 
Officer, may be assumed to have exercised some influence in his favour. 
In addition, Dutt had ample monetary resources which gave him an edge 
over other candidates, but created some resentment especially since 
Dutt was an outsider to the district.
The editor of Nihar, Madhusudhan Jana, while not actively siding with 
any one of the candidates, made it clear that he did not favour the 
intrusion of the Calcutta Barrister:
With the exit of Mr. Sasmal various unknown people have now 
entered the fray. People neither heard of them nor have 
they done any work for the country...There are some candidates
about whom the people of the district know very little or
25
nothing.
Some weeks before the polling, Nihar publicised a chance remark 0f gutt 
in which he had referred to Midnapur in derogatory terms as chashar desh
22. BLC Progs Vol 11,1,1921, pp. 138-9
23. See Chapter 4, for his role in the tenants movements.




(land of peasants) This remark, which would have gene unnoticed 
in the bhadrolok circles of Calcutta, provoked a very hostile reaction 
among the predominantly Mahishya voters of Contai and Tamluk. There it 
was made against the background of an active caste movement that had been 
trying to promote a spirit of peasant-pride among the Mahishyes, and in 
an atmosphere in which other candidates were eager to steal a march over 
Dutt. Within days of this incident, Nihar had published irate letters 
from local voters; one remarked:
We are glad that many educated local people who hail from
this 'land of peasants' have sought election. It is these
people we should vote for, not some outsider who knows
nothing about the life of the province... There are enough
qualified peasants among the candidates, and the people
27should vote for them.
Dutt's indiscreet remark finally gave some focus to the elections. The issue 
before the electorate was presented as that of 'outsider' versus 'locals'. 
Candidates rushed to establish their bona fides. Baranashi Bannerjee 
issued an advertisement in Nihar stating that his grandfather was 
connected with Tamluk and his father with Contai. Abanti Kumar Maity 
who had close connections with the settlers in Contai, the main backers
of Dutt, hastily announced that he was proud to be associated with
29
Midnapur and had no connections with 'arrogant' people like Dutt.
The election campaign of 1920 was conducted without any reference to the 
political crisis that was soon to envelop India and Midnapur. Politics 
in the district still remained confined to personalities. Yet it seems 
that even here there was a growing awareness of the need to expand the 
political horizon beyond the tiny coterie of bhadrolok gentlemen. There 
was a need to articulate the interests of the newly-enfranchised rural 
electorate. In 1920, the controversy between 'locals' and 'outsiders' 
may be interpreted as a crude expression of this need. On one hand 
it reflected the insularity of rural politics, but on another it 
contained the seeds of future rural self-organisation.
26. Nihar 23 November 1920.
27. Letter from 'One Peasant'^ Nihar 23 November 1920.
28. Nihar 30 November 1920.
29. Nihar 23 November 1920.
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TABLE 5:1
Election Results of Midnapur South Constituency 1920
Candidate Occupation
Sarat Chandra Jana Lawyer
Election Expenses 
Bs - as - p





Bepin Behari Sasmal Zamindar
Ashoke Chandra Dutt Barrister
5 4 - 3  - 9
439 - 4 - 6




Manmatha Nath Bose Lawyer 442 - 6  - 3 913
Abanti Kumar Maity Lawyer 8 6 - 9  - 0 704
Narendra Nath Bose Dist. Engineer 65 -10 - 0 286
Radheshyam Das 
Adhikari
Zamindar Not furnished 215
Prabhat Chandra Dube Not known
Mukunda Kishore 
C hakravarti Not known
1 0 - 0  -  0
5 - 4  - 0
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129
Baranashi Bannerjee Lawyer 1 4 - 0  - 0 53
Pulin Behari Sahu Not known 1 - 2  -  0 51
Devendra Nath Adak Not known 0 - 8  -  0 43
Shital Prosad Ghose Lawyer
Hriday Nath Majhi Lawyer




Bidhu Bhusan Huit Not known G - 8 - 0 14
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From Calcutta to Nagpur
Though the bloc of 'extremist* politicians in Bengal had boycotted
the Council elections, they were by no means committed to Gandhi's
full programme of non-cooperation. The Hindu politicians led by
C. R. Das and Byomkesh Chakravarty were apprehensive about Gandhi's
plans to boycott schools and law courts. This was understandable as
few lawyers had alternative sources of income. The Muslims, who by and
large sympathised with Gandhi, were not united. Fazlul Huq, who had
been silently supporting Gandhi during the Calcutta Congress, now
took a stand against the boycott of courts. The efforts of Abul Kalam ,
Azad and the Ali brothers to engineer a strike at the Calcutta Madrassa
did not meet with much success. In fact, by December 1920, the
Government of Bengal was confident that "non-cooperation in practice
31may be said to be dead in Bengal"
The government was however being unduly optimistic. Though none of the 
big names in Bengal politics had come over to the side of open 
confrontation, other lesser luminaries like Jitendralal Bannerjee had 
done so. With deteriorating economic conditions and the rise in 
unemployment, the objective conditions for a political upsurge were 
beginning to te visible.
The sharply alternating cycles of boom and depression following the
world war forced the pace of political discontent in India and Bengal.
The effect on food prices was dramatic and in Calcutta wholesale prices
32more than doubled between 1917 and 1921. Local feeling ran high
on the question end six districts, including Midnapur, reported
33incidents of hath looting. The depression in trade and industry 
led to large scale retrenchment of workers and clerical staff.
According to the Investors Year Book of 1921, "Boundless optimism and
confidence were, in the Autumn of 1920, suddenly changed to gloom and
30. Compiled from Nihar 21st December 1920, BLC Progs, Vol III 1921 pp138-9.
31. Quoted in 9rown, op.cit, p.279
32. Dept, of Land Records, Bengal, Average Prices of Staple Food 
Crop fRice] in Bengal from 1887 to date, Calcutta 1924
33. G0I H. Poll 8 . December 1917, No. 226-7.
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34stagnation" Most significant, the services of a large body of 
educated unemployed ViSXJL made available to the cause of militant 
nationalism. This section was to be the backbone of political 
agitation in the province. In Midnapur, as in the rest of Bengal, 
tne price of foodstuffs registered a sharp increase (see Table 5:2).
In the Santhal-dominated Jhargram subdivision, local shortage of 
rice evoked a hostile reaction against paddy export. Nihar commented:
The rice which is produced in Midnapur would generally
suffice to meet the needs of the whole population of the
district. But the people export rice because of-higher
prices obtainable in foreign countries. High prices of
rice cause acute suffering to the common people. Some
experts say that if prices of rice rise in response to
prices of other daily necessities it benefits instead
of harming the common people of a predominantly agricultural
country. People who sell rice to buy other goods do in fact
benefit from this. But in our district buyers of rice number
more than sellers of rice. In this case a fall in the prices
35of rice stands to the benefit of the people. .
In Contai and Tamluk, floods submerging 100 sruare miles under water
36added to tha^  dislocation. But economic dislocation by itself does 
not necessarily lead automatically to discontent against governmental 
authority. In India, whers famines, droughts and other natural 
disasters were not uncommon, the rural population had developed a 
spirit of passive fatalism which Hinduism had reinforced ideologically. 
Moreover, though governmental intervention was on the increase, 
government still played a relatively low part in rural affairs. Hence
it was not usual for the vast majority of the rural population to ecuate 
economic dislocation with governmental callousness. But economic crisis 
did contribute towards a favourable climate for the harnessing of 
discontent by outside intervention, especially wherr the injection of
34. Quoted in Rajat Ray, Masses in Politics: The Non Cooperation 
Movement in Beng-1 1920-22, IE5HR XI,4,1974.
35. Nihar, 27th Janu=ry 1920, ruoted in Raj=>t Ray, Masses in Politics, 
p .258.
35. N-y=\k 5th August 1920, Bengalee 5th August 1920; RNP Bengal 14th 
August 1920.
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consciousness was linked to a series of. local demands.
It was the political openings created by the deepening economic crisis
in India which contributed to ihe growing support for the overtly
confrantationist political line of Gandhi. Though the bhadrolok leader
ship based in Calcutta was hesitant to join in Gandhi's rebellion against
the Raj, there were others to whom militant non-cooperation seemed the
most suitable political tactic at a moment of government weakness.
Jitendralal Bannerjee, a lawyer with strong connections in Birbhum,
and B. N. Sasmal with a personal base in Midnapur, reflected this trend
among a new group which had no vested interests in the bhadrolok
37politics of Calcutta or East Bengal-based professionals. Along with 
Gandhi's Mar-wari supporters in Calcutta they felt no compunction in 
identifying with a non-liberal,religio-political doctrine that was 
Gandhism; few among the bhadrolok politicians could identify with
Gandhi's particular brand of obscurantism, which according to Subhas
33
Bose, "rationalise(d) a medieval absurdity into a modern panacea"
After Gandhi's victory at Calcutta, Nayak had commented:
Congress has at last become the property of businessmen
shopkeepers, agriculturist and the people at large. It
is they who constitute the present Congress and they are
the guardians and protectors of non-cooperation which v/ill
39be spread and circulated by them.
It was this fundamental shift in the social character of nationalist 
politics which the bhadrolok politicians were unwilling to effect.
The 'part timers' as Das and his supporters were called, were also 
swimming against a national tide. Even in the Central Provinces and 
Berar, where Tilak's followers still retained considerable support, 
Gandhi's line had carried the day. The weakening position of the 
'extremists' must have stared Das in the face when he arrived for the
37. Sasmal, op.cit, pp. 3-5.
38. D. K. Ray, The Subhas I knew, Bombay 1946, pp. 32-3.
39. Quoted in Brown, op.cit, p.280
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TABLE 5:2
Prica of Rice in the Markets of Midnapur District fin Rupees per maurrd)
Year Midnapur Town Ghatal Tamluk Contai
1895 2.14 2.37 2.49 1.03
1905 2.77 2.98. 3.02 2.42
1915 4.89 5.00 5.12 4.44
1916 4.67 4.89 4.78 4.21
1917 3.70 3.90 3.86 3.18
1918 3.27 3.52 3.70 3.12
1919 6.60 6.81 6.46 5.82
1920 7.19 7.35 7.44 6.53
1921 5.27 6.21 6.60 6.15
(Source: Dept of Land Records, Bengal - Average Prices of Staple 
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(Source: Statistic?1 Abstract For British India 1917-18 
to 1926-27, p.628}
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Nagpur session of the Congress in late 1920. Gandhi too was keen
to accommodate his erstwhile critics. Having fundamentally altered
the organisational structure of the Congress to attract new' social
forces, he readily accepted Das* plea to incorporate 'Swaraj* as one
of the aims of non-cooperation. Hence a 'converted* Das was to move
40the main motion reaffirming the Congress belief in non-cooperation. 
Gandhi had neutralised a potential source of opposition to his 
movement. But it must always be borne in mind that Das's was not a 
genuine conversion to Gandhism and all its ramifications; it simply 
reflected the doility of a shrewd politician to compromise so as not to 
be left in the political wilderness.
On his return from Nagpur, C. R. Das abandoned his lucrative law 
practice, donned khadi clothes and threw himself into the non­
cooperation movement. Almost overnight, Das became 'Deshbandhu' and 
a Bengali folk-hero. Das's volte-face in Nagpur prevented a further 
split in the ranks of the bhadrolok. It may be speculated that the 
non-cooperation movement in Bengal would have intensified even had 
Das and his followers abstained. But it is also conceivable that 
without Das and Chakravarty, and their assorted followers, the non­
cooperation movement would have generated in its wake a new brand of 
leaders who were not constrained by the political and cultural 
idiosyncracies of the Bengali Hindu bhadrolok. By joining the Gandhian 
bandwagon, Das ensured that the nationalist movement in Bengal remained 
under the control of the 'extremist* politicians of yesteryear. The 
prospects of a new and more radical leadership were firmly nipped in the 
bud in 1921.
The Beginnings of the Movement
Prior to the Nagpur Congress, the support for non-cooperation in Bengal 
had been largely passive. The Government of India had suggested to all 
provincial governments "that this movement, if left to itself will 
eventually collapse; ...and that any extensive interference with the
40. For a fuller account o~ Das' Volte-face see Richard Gordon,
'Non-cooperation and Council Entry 1919 to 1920* in Gallagher, 
Johnson and Seal, ed. Locality, Province and Nation: Essays 
on Indian Folitics 187D-194Q, Cambridge 1973, pp. 123-53.
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freedom of speech and liberty of the Press is inconsistent with,
41
and would be likely to prejudice the working of the new constitution'.'
The intensification of non-cooperation after Nagpur clearly altered 
the picture, A Government of 3engal spokesman noted correctly:
Non coopieratian is no longer a movement to put pressure on
government to remedy specific grievances; it is an avowed
42attempt to destroy the existing government.
In fact, the slogan of 1 Swaraj in one year’ had won the hearts of many 
an idealistic young person who now rallied behind C. R. Das.
But mere student boycott and activity around Calcutta did not satisfy
Das, himself adept in the art of organising. Success lay in being able
to create sufficient disorder all over the province, not least in the
nofussil and the villages. But Congress lacked any credible organisation
to be able to carry the message of non-cooperation and translate it into
reality. Hence in January 1921, the Congress decided to despatch political
43emissaries to the districts to initiate agitation. B. N. Sasmal and 
Satcowripati Roy, both of whom had abandoned their law practices, were 
despatched to their native district of Midnapur to stir up things.
But enthusiasm for the non-cooperation movement had preceded the despatch
of emissaries. Inspired by the actions of their Calcutta counterparts,
school students started to quit their studies to take part in the
agitation. Though initially the numbers of students responding to the
Congress call was very small, the authorities detected an unusual 'stir'
which led them to close down crrtain schools for a fortnight or more.
Nor was the restiveness confined to the prestige institutions such as
Contai High School, Hamilton School Tamluk and Contai Model Institution;
it also influenced students of the larger villages like Basantia, Mugberia 
44
and Hara. More eldErly sympathisers of the Congress had a difficult 
time impressing upon these idealistic boys that they should not abandon
41. GD3 H.Poll 39/1921 (l).
42. H. L. Ste.'henscn to GOI 19th February 1921, GCB H. Poll 
39/1921 (2].
43. Note by H. '..'heeler, 1Gth February 1921, GOB H. Poll 39/1921 
Demi Official No. 1.
44. Nihar Bth February 1921.
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their schools until alternative National Schools were established.
In the Midnapur College, about 100 first year students quit their
studies temporarily and some of them even opened up shops in the
bazaar. "There is great resentment amongst the students", wrote
Nihar, "about the type of education they leceive which is only
suitable for becoming lawyers and clerks. The charkha is catching
4-5on because of its emphasis on practical constructive activity"
There seems little doubt that what motivated these students to
participate in the nationalist movement, was not considerations of
power or the manipulations of selfish politicians, but a sense of
fierce idealism and some naive belief in the historic destiny of
46youth in an atmosphere of dirinking employment opportunities.
It was to harness this reservoir of enthusiasm permanently for the
Congress that Sasmal first launched the National Schools in Midnapur.
In early 1921, he converted his huge residence in Contai into a
National School and secured the services of some nationalist teachers.
Pramatha Nath Bannerjee, a teacher in the Contai Model Institution
with vary strong nationalist sentiments became the first headmaster,
and others like Iswar Chandra Mai, Surendranath Das and Bijay
Krishna Maity, later to become prominent in the district Congress,
47became teachers in the Contai National School. Thanks to generous
donations from sympathisers, the Contai National School was able to
expand its student enrolment from 9 to 200 in a year. With Bengali
40as the medium of instruction, the school placed heavy emphasis on
the learning of skills such as weaving, carpentry and metal work.
The school aimed at making students less dependent on the usual white-
collar employment and instead encouraged them to sbart independent
49
business enterprises. In Kalagechia, the zamindar Jagadish Chandra 
Maity donated 14 bighas of land and about Rs 40,000 towards setting 
up a National School; other Congressmen - Bankim Chandra Bhowmick, Indra 
Narain Jana and Kshatra Mohan Bera - were also involved in the financing
45. Nihar 1st March 1921.
46. This phenomenon was also noticeable during the Naxalite agitation 
in 7/est Bengal and the 1973-75 'JP* Movement in Bihar.
47. P. Pal, Deshapran Sasmal, Calcutta Publishers 1358 BS, pp. 70-71.
40. At a meeting in 1917, Pramatha Nath Bannerjee claimed that the
study of the English language should be discouraged as it made 
people*s minds warped! Nihar 13th March 1917.
49. Nihar 10th January 1922.
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□f the National Schools. Young graduates from a landed background 
such as Nikunja Behari Maity became teachers in the National School
50
at Kalagechia. At Dora, a third National School was started by
51
Kumar Chandra Jana Though the National Schools were only very 
small in number and did not even remotely threaten the government's 
control of education, their establishment was a very significant step 
in the Congress bid to bypass governmental structures. Their purpose 
was exemplary, -in that they hoped to project some idea of nationalist 
visions of the educational process. But by their mere 'token' existence 
they gave Congress that extra dimension that distinguishes a political 
party from a national movement.
Apart from students and teachers, it was the lawyers who stepped into 
the movement in its initial phases. For a lawyer without alternative 
sources of income, as Sasmal had, abandoning practice was linked with 
severe economic hardship, and many remained sympathetic to the movement 
without actually participating. According to the government's very
conservative estimates, by November 1921, only six lawyers in Midnapur
52had suspended practice and joined the movement. Most prominent among
those who abandoned their practice were Sasmal himself, Kishoripati
Roy, the brother of Satcowripati Roy and vdth alternative income from
53land,and Mahendra Nath Maity, the leader of the Tamluk Bar. With
the intensification of the movement in November 1921, more lawyers left
their profession. Among them, Mohini Mohan Das of Ghatal, B.mkim Chandra
Bhowmick, Srinath Das and Prasanna Kumar Giri of Tamluk were later to
54
become prominent Congress activists. But by and large, participation
of lawyers in the movement remained confined to a very small minority.
Unsuccessful end briefless lawyers such as Sailajananda Sen of Gidni
also joined the movement at particular points, but few among them were
able to ‘withstand the financial strains of unemployment and most
55drifted back into the law courts. Another, reason for the lukewarm 
response of lawyers in Midnapur was the opposition of prominent 
nationalist vakils such es Upendra Nath Maity, Chairman of the Midnapur
50. Pal, op.cit. pp 70-1; Nihar 8 th March 1921,
51. Nihar 15th March 1921.
52. BLC Progs Vol V/5/1921 p.54,. This estimate appears to be on the 
low side. Another confidential report noted that by April 1~-21,
115 lawyers had suspended legal practice GOB H Poll 395/1924 (NMML).
53. Amrita Bazar Fatrika 29th May 1921; Nihar 5th July 1921.
54. Nihar 20th and 27th December 1921.
55. GC3 H Poll 395/1924 (NMML).
55. In the jute mills around Calcutta, the arbitration courts were 
organised by the Sirdars who managed to enforce their decisions 
because of the power they wielded as labour contractors GOB H Poll 
3PR/1Q24 f 1 .
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town Municipality, to the non-cooperation movement.
A natural corollary to the boycott of courts was the nationwide 
decision to set up arbitration courts to reduce litigation, especially 
among the rural population. The success or failure of thsso parallel 
structures depended on their ability to acquire a status of legitimacy. 
In the villages this meant the degree to which arbitration courts were 
backed by prominent landholders and the village mandal which determined 
the ability of the courts to enforce decisions. In the towns success 
was more difficult considering the proximity of official law courts, a 
huge band of under-employed lawyers ready to rush people into cheap 
litigation and the presence of government officials. Above all, it 
depended on the willingness of the two parties in conflict to abide by
the verdict of the court, especially without the backing of the coercive
56
apparatus of the state.
Because of the difficulties inherent in establishing dual power, which
were compounded by the unenthusiastic response-from the lawyers, the
arbitration courts never really got off the ground in Midnapur. The
Contai National Committee, with Satish Chandra Jana as Secretary, set
up an arbitration court in Contai town with five ’judges' including
57
Sasmal and Pramatha Nath Bannerjee Later, Kishoripati Roy set up
50another court at his house in the town. In Tamluk, Mahendra Nath
59Maity took the lead in establishing arbitration courts. There 
is no evidence to suggest that the arbitration courts in Tamluk and 
Contai had anything but a very marginal impact. Government sources 
claimed that although a few stray civil and criminal cases were 
brought before them, their main business was confined to settling 
petty mohulla quarrells which were unlikely to have been taken to the
0 q
official courts in the first place. However, Congress did achieve 
a significant success with arbitration courts among the Banthals of 
Jhargram subdivision, thanks to the backing from the msndals.
By the Summer of 1921 it was clear that non-cooperation was serving
57. Nihar 20th August 1921.
53. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 23th May 1921.
59. Nihar 5th July 1921.
60. R. Craddock to F. VJ. Duke 27th May 1913, GOB H Poll 248/1913.
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as only a minor irritant to the government in Midnapur. It was not 
that any personal commitment or dedication from the individual 
Congressmen was lacking. Having abandoned his practice, Sasmal spent 
the first half of 1921 touring the remote interiors of Tamluk and Contai
Q >j
spreading the gospel of the movement. But the spread of National 
Education, temperance and charkha, while useful as reform or social 
welfare measures, were irrelevant as the means of ousting the British 
Raj in one year. Moreover, the nature of the triple boycott programme 
implied that participation was restricted to the chosen few and therefore 
objectively ineffective. Experiences in other parts of Bengal and India 
had clearly demonstrated that the key to disruption lay in the ability 
of Congress to link up non-cooperation with specific localised grievances.
It was with this in mind that Sasmal and the local Congress launched the 
Contai Union Board movement in the Summer of 1921.
The Contai Union Board Agitation
In 1919, Sir Surendra Nath 3annerjee piloted the Bengal Village Self- 
Government Bill through the Bengal Legislative Council. The inspiration 
for the Bill had corns from the recommendations of the District Administration 
Committee Report of 1913-14. This Committee, which had been set up to 
formulate policy recommendations to defeat terrorism, had laid the blame 
for political unrest on the twin factors of bhadrolok economic deprivation 
and "the relative ’weakness of the administrative machinery in many...
Q2
districts" A feature of this latter phenomenon was the ineffectiveness 
or absence of government administrative structures at the village level.
The Committee had strongly stressed "the desirability of establishing
S3among the people representatives of Government apart from the Police"
Through a network of circle officers and a scheme of village autonomy 
it was hoped to tring remote villages of 3engal under closer scrutiny and 
official supervision.
Surendra Nath Sanerjee, who looked to Lord Ripon's policies as "our
0 /j
Magna Carta in the matter of Local Self-Government" ' was nominated
61. Sasmal, on .cit, pp 8-9: Amrita Bazar Patrike. 5th June 1921.
62. R. Craddock to F. ’V. Duke 27th May 1913, GCB H. Poll 248/1913.
63. Bengal District Administration Committee Report 1913-14,
Calcutta 1915, p.29.
64. Bengal Municipal Progs (Municipal) Jan 1915. No. 3.
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to the government tD give concrete shape to the District Administration
Committee recommendations. The Bengal Village Self-Government Act
(hereafter BVSG Act) stipulated that groups of villages should be mapped
out into convenient village unions. Each union was to have a Union
Board to be elected by people paying Rs 1 or more in Chaukidari tax.
Although the Union Boards were to come under the broad supervision of
Circle Officers who would be of the rank of Sub Deputy Collector, only
one-third of the Union Board would be nominated by the government. The
Union Boards were empowered to deal not only with the chaukidars but also
to supervise village roads, water supply and sanitation. For this
purpose they were to be encouraged to become, self-sufficient in finance,
and given power to raise taxation to a maximum of Rs 84 per annum.
However, village autonomy would not be complete as the District Magistrate
and the Divisional Commissioner had a total say in the appointment and
dismissals of chaukidars and daffadars. They were also given the right
65to supersede, the Union Boards at their discretion.
The establishment of Union Boards, coinciding with the reform of the 
District Board, marked yet another step in the government strategy to 
expand the functions of government and its network of collaborators. 
Through the Union Boards, government attempted to institutionalise 
the informal leadership that had already existed at the village level.
The extensive powers of taxation given to the Union Boards signified 
a further attempt to ease the pressure on central and provincial revenues, 
and yet maintain a facade of development-orientated programmes at the 
lowest level controlled by local people. At one level it meant the 
abdication of direct control but at another a concerted attempt to 
legitimise the political basis for British rule in India.
The establishment of Union Boards in Midnapur district was marked by an 
amazing display of administrative inefficiency. On 22nd July 1919, the 
Contai Local Board recommended the establishment of Union Boards in: the 
Contai thana. The move was seen as a purely experimental measure 
confined to an area that was located close to the subdivisional head­
quarters. In August 1919, a group of three Local Board members led 
by Abanti Kumar Maity requisitioned a special Local Board Meeting to
65. Bengal Municipal Progs (LSG) August 1917, No.2-3.
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demand the establishment of Union Boards throughout the Contai 
subdivision. As a known loyalist lawyer of Contai, Abanti Kumar 
Maity was always keen to win government favours by posing as a 
spokesman for the educated non-Congress bhadrolok, and especially the 
'settler' community of Contai. On 31st August 1919, the Local Board 
met and unanimously recommended establishment of Union Boards in the 
entire subdivision. J. De, the subdivisional officer, was quite aware 
that certain Unions in the Contai and Ramnagctr thanas might not receive 
Union Boards- enthusiastically. But De was too embroiled in the local 
factionalism of Contai to take a detached view* What made matters 
worse was the paucity of Circle Officers required to do the spade work 
of propaganda and education, so essential for the success of this 
ambitious project. Moreover, a number of Circle Officers were involved 
in the relief operations fallowing the serious floods in Contai in the 
Summer of 1920. No serious attempts were made to ascertain the attitude 
of villagers towards the Union Boards. One meeting was convened on Sth 
September 1919 which.was attended by about a couple of thousand people but 
at which Union Boards were discussed as just one itEm along with influenza, 
cattle disease, Bengali regiments and the establishment of a college. The 
result was that few people in the district understood the scope of Union 
Boards and all their ramifications. This ignorance was to be fully
ss
exploited by the non-cooperators.
In spite of inadequate preparations the government decided to go ahead 
with Union Boards in Midnapur. It was decided to establish 22? Union 
Boards in the district, and elections were scheduled for January 1921.
The preparation of the electoral rolls left a large number of potential 
voters dissatisfied. The government notification stated that any person 
who paid Rs 1 or more in chaukidsri tax by 18 Chaitra 1325 (Bd) would 
be entitled to vote. But the fact that many ryots paid their tax at 
the end of Chaitra meant that a considerable section of the voters was 
disenfranchised in the coming elections. Medini Sandhav estimated that 
only 15 to 16 people from chaukidari unions containing 700 to 8 BD 
inhabitants would have the right to vote, though by right the number
56. Report by 3. N. Ray, Joint Magistrate, 1st November 1921 in 
Buddhadeva Bhattacharya, Satyagranhas in Bengal 1921-39, 
Calcutta 1977. Appendix III, pp 29-43.
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67should have been three times higher. Secondly, adequate notice
for the elections was not given. Even though the Presidents of
Panchayats were given notice that 30th November 1920 was to be the
last date for filing nominations, many of them failed to announce
that fact by beat of drum. This was often due to the very simple fact
that the Panchayat President did not have a knowledge of English and
therefore could not understand the District Magistrate's public
notification. But in many cases, the lapse was due to the unwillingness
of the Panchayat President to allow people from rival village factions 
68to contest. Whereas the government had hoped to remove the stigma 
attached to Panchayat members by encouraging more educated people to 
participate in the Union Boards, the reality was that in some Unions
69the old faces continued to m e d i a t e  between the villagers and government. 
Lastly, the elections to the Union Boards followed immediately in the 
wake of the Legislative Council elections, and thus, 'where adequate 
information had not been disseminated, voters were confused as to what 
exactly they were voting for. A government official reported:
If there was any clear idea at all, it was that they were 
electing men who could settle their village disputes. I 
may quote the statement of the President of Union V,
Ramnagar: 'The villagers now say that their disputes solved 
locally and these Boards would be replicas of Legislative 
Councils.'
The reality of the situation was that government, egged on by its 
loyalist supporters, had rushed into this particular political Experiment. 
The result was that administrative bungling and simple confusion prevailed. 
Had the Union Boards been formed in a relatively tranquil period, it is 
conceivable that the bureaucracy might have retreived their position.
But at a moment when the Raj was embarking on one hand on a series of 
major national constitutional reforms, and on the other facing a concerted 
attack on its institutions by Congress and the Khilafatists, little 
attention was paid to the implementation of the BVSG Act. Congress 
was provided with a cause to exploit.
67. Quoted in Daim'k Basumeti 17th May 1920, R'.P Bengal 22nd May 1920,
58. Nihar 23rd Novemoer 'ly^ U.
69. Nihar 1st February 1921.
70. Bhattacharya, op.cit, Appendix II, p.38.
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As far as the government was concerned, the crucial feature of the 
Union Boards was their power to raise resources locally. As early 
as 1920, in the Burdv/an Divisional Conference, J. N. Gupta, the 
Divisional Commissioner, had made this clear when he proposed that:
It appears to be desirable that in order to encourage Union
Boards to undertake taxation for rural improvement, the
District Eoard grant to these bodies should be regulated
71according to the amount of assessment imposed by them.
This was reiterated in September 1921 by L. Birley, the Additional
District Magistrate, when he warned the District Board against
sanctioning excessive sums of money for the Union Boards, even in
72the initial phases. Therefore, as far as government was concerned 
the Union Boards had to raise the bulk of their resources locally with ' 
only a minimum of outside help. The disastrous experience with the 
Union Committees seemed to have mads no impact on the thinking of 
officials
But thanks to the secrecy surrounding the cfecisions of the Government
of Bengal, this policy approach was not made clear until after the
establishment of the Union Boards. In February 1921, the newly-
elected Union Board members found themselves faced with the unenviable
task of having to raise additional local taxes to justify their
existence. This realisation among the Union Eoard members was coupled
with a growing resentment and panic among the people, especially the
better-off sections who faced the prospect of increased taxation. The
discontent was the greatest in Contai town and surrounding villages.
Here the Union Board Chairman, Nagendra Nath Baksni, a prominent
Loyalist, rushed headlong into the task of preparing fresh assessments.
Wild rumours were circulated that the new tax would be 1^ times the old
chaukidari tax and irate voters demanded to know why the Union Board
74members had not v./arned them about this impending tax increase. From
Tamluk came thE alarming news that the District Board would subsidise
each Union Board to the tune of Rs 100 only, and the remainder would
75have to be raised through local taxation. It was at this juncture
71. L.S.S. O'Malley to Commissioner, 23rd May 1921, Jud-Gen VI/5/1921 
(MRR) .
72. L. Birley to Chairman, Midnapur District Board, September 1921 
Jud-Gen VI/5/1S21 (MRR).
73. See Chapter 2. __ . .qr,
74. Letter from resident of Mo. 1 Union Board. Contai Nihar 21 June 1341
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that B. N. Sasmal decided to intervene in the debate, at a moment when 
spontaneous resentment against the Union Board taxes was becoming 
fairly widespread.
The Congress attitude towards Union Boards had hitherto been ambiguous 
and contradictory. The Nagpur Congress had decided that Congressmen 
who were members of Local Boards or Municipalities need notfresign their 
seats as part of non-cooperation. In April 1920, the Bengal Provincial 
Conference had voted to oppose the BVSG Act, but the decision had been
overturned by the Provincial Working Committee who thought it would be
76inadvisable to launch a campaign against the Act. In Midnapur, prior
to 1921, no known Congressmen had publicly voiced opposition to the
principle of Union Boards. In fact, in July 1920, Nikunja Behari Maity
wrote a letter to Nihar complaining that only two thanas in Contai
subdivision had been brought into the purview of the Act. He advised
people to demand from the authorities that Union Boards be established 
77in their areas. Nihar, the Contai weekly sympathetic towards the
Congress, always expressed the hope that the establishment of Union
Boards would see the participation of a greater number of educated
78people in public life. So while there might have been some 
dissatisfaction over the election of a particular candidate, all groups 
in the district were virtually unanimous in their support for the 
principle of Union Boards.
None the less, it was the editor of Nihar, Madhusudhan Jana, who 
initiated a campaign against Union Boards. This dramatic volte-face 
was caused by an outbreak of factionalism within the bhadrolok residents 
of Contai town. During the 1920 elections to the Legislative Council,
Nihar, as we have seen, had been in the forefront of the campaign to 
discredit the canditure of Ashok Dutt, the relative of J. De, the 
Subdivisional Officer. After Dutt's defeat, the 'settlers' in Contai 
who . had supported him, started a parallel weekly called Hijli Hitaishi „ 
In August, the local authorities withheld certificates and sale notices 
from Nihar. and gave them instead to Hi.jli Hitaishi. This, a rash action 
by De, effectively turned Nihar against the group running Hijli Hitaishi,
75. Nihar 5th July 1921..
76. Basmal, op.cit, pp 9-11.
77. Nihar 13th July 1921.
78. Nihar 23rd November 1920.
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who also controlled the Contai Union Board, and the government.
There fallowed a crude policy of slander launched by Nagendra Nath 
Bakshi and Baranashi Bannerjee of the Contai;. Union Board, in the 
pages of Hijli Hitaishi, against those who were opposing them. Nihar 
got an opportunity to cpt its own back on this group after the revised 
tax assessments for Contai Union Board were published. These 
assessments showed amazing discrepancies. B. N. Sasmal was taxed 
Rs. 4-6-0 quarterly on an income of Rs. 300, while Baranashi Banner jee 
got away with a tax of Rs. 4-2-0 on an income of Rs. 1,000; Hiralal-
Laha was taxed Rs. 3-12-0 on Rs. 100, while Naba Kumar Bera paid Rs.
802-4-0 on Rs. 1,000. Such blatant favouritism and corruption produced 
an instant reaction. Nihar veered from its ambigious position to one 
of total hostility to the very establishment of Union Boards. B. N. 
Sasmal took advantage of this disaffection to tie in the non-cooperation 
movement with the Union Boards question.
In early June 1921, irate . traders of Contai town convened a meeting
to discuss Union Boards and taxation. The members of the Contai Union
Board were asked to attend but none did so. In his speech, B. N.
Sasmal told the audience that the Union Board members had duped the
voters, but were now revealing their true selves. A vote taken at the
81end of the meeting which decided unanimously against Union Boards.
The campaign was now under way.
In their propaganda against Union Boards, Sasmal and his associates
concentrated mainly on the question of increased taxation. Sasmal
cleverly pointed to the. clause in the BVSG Act which permitted local
taxation up to a maximum of Rs 84, and gave people the impression that
82this increase was inevitable any day. The revelation produced a 
situation of panic. The President of Union VIII (Alankarpur) of Ramnagar 
thana told government officials that he was personally in favour of 
the Act, but:
79. Bhattacharya, op.cit, Appendix II, p.40.
SO. Nihar 19th July 1921.
81. Nihar 7th June 1921.
82. Amrita Bazar Patrika 2nd October 1921.
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the people do not understand. They have been told that 
their tax will be increased twelve times and they believe 
that evan if no extra tax is imposed this year it will be 
imposed next year, either by the Board itself or by 
Government. If anything is said to contradict it, they 
say we are deceiving them.^
On hearing of the campaign launched by Sasmal, some Union Board
members were themselves convinced that government had tricked them
into accepting an Act whose implications they were not aware of.
Mritunjoy Sasmal the President of Union X, Ramnagar "said
emphatically that they knew nothing about the provisions of the
Act before the Board was constituted. There was an idea that Union
Boards meant settlement of their cases in their villages by village
authorities and this the people were anxious to welcome. They had no
idea whatever that Union Boards would involve the possibility of
84increased taxation11 Sensing the resentment of the people to increased 
taxation, some Union Board members were anxious to abandon a project 
whose efficacy seemed questionable.
The Congress, in its campaign, was especially keen to win over the
landed sections of the rural population. The old Chaukidari Act had
never been fully approved by the zamindars and jotedars because of the
power vested in the hands of government servants for the appointment and
85dismissal of chaukidars and daffadars. The new Union Boards did not 
restore this power to the * village community' or its elected represen­
tatives although they gave Union Boards the right to impose additional 
taxation. There were therefore, no tangible benefits for the propertied 
interests to offset the prospects of a fresh dose of taxation. Moreover, 
there was no uniformity in the taxation and those holding property of any 
sort were assessed, even in more than one union. This was a change from 
the old pattern where only people who had property in the form of houses 
and kutcheries were assessed for chaukidari tax. The new pattern affected 
all big landholders a d v e r s e l y a n d  Sasmal was cuick to capitalise on the 
fact:
83. Bhattacharya, op.cit, Appendix II, p.37.
84. Ibid,.Appendix II, p.36.
85. See Chapter 2.
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...by introducing lands in place of houses and kutcheries
the Permanent Settlement of this province...has at last
indirectly attacked by this self-governing measure...One
thing absolutely clear now is that a new taxation is
being imposed under this Act upon our permanently settled
lands, which must for ever remain immune from fresh taxation
of any kind according to the provisions of Regulation I of
17?3 • It does not matter by what means they are taking the
money from us now, for their demand is based upon the
income from permanently settled lands. And therefore they
are not only directly taxing our agricultural income, but
also indirectly putting a fresh tax upon our lands
permanently settled, in direct violation of the existing
8 6provisions of law on the subject.
In what was seen essentially as a conflict between the government and 
the 'people', Sasmal was unwilling to raise embarrassing questions 
regarding differences within the 'people'. He therefore ended up 
championing the zamindari system and the landed interests in order 
to maintain the perspective of common interest against the government.
In its wake, this strategy was firmly to establish Congress as the 
organisation representing the interests of the rural propertied class.
Sasmal also appealed to even more fundamental drives. Studying the
phenomenon of nationalism, Tom Nairn has noted that it is by nature
'ambivalent' because, "societies try to propel themselves forward to
certain kinds of goal (industrialisation, prosperity, ecuality with
other peoples etc.) by a certain sort of regression - by looking inwards,
drawing more deeply upon their indigenous resources, resurrecting past
87folk heroes and myths about themselves and so on". Thus too Sasmal 
introduced the bogey of the destruction of traditional village life.
He declared that the object of Union Boards was to introduce western 
civilisation into the villages through the back door:
8 6 . 8 . N. Sasmal, 'Beware of Union Boards II1, Amrita Bazar 
Fatrika 23rd October 1921.
87. Tom Nairn, The Modern Janus, New Left Review 94 November - 
December 1975, p.18. Nor was this confined to 'pure' nationalism 
The great Russian chauvinism of Stalin also took recourse to such 
myths,
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If we want Swaraj of the English kind, then these laws will 
come in handy. If we want our religion to be like English 
religions, this law will do that. If the people want it that 
way then they should accept these laws, but I personally will 
not accept this.^
In claiming that Union 8 oards would bring to the villages of Bengal a
'Godless materialist atmosphere', Sasmal deliberately created a confusion
between the 1861 Police Act and the BVSG Act. The former, better known in
the villages as the 'Number 5 Law', was known for the powers it gave to
Panchayats to arrest people urinating or defecating in public places.
The BVSG Act, which was Act V of 1919, was presented as meaning the
same thing - a confusion which was increased when it appeared in Bengali
09translation as the 'Number 5 Law'. L. Birley, the Additional District 
Magistrate, noted that in some villages "people have been wrongly induced
Qf]
to believe that all householders will be compelled to build privies" 
Sasmal concluded, in language reminiscent of Gandhi:
I therefore enter my emphatic protest against this open and 
widespread attempt to modernise our village social life which 
is already in a process of disintegration and which some of 
us are striving hard to build anew, and declare that in the 
present circumstances it is a question of principle with''me to
91have anything to do with the Bengal Village Self-Government Act.
A reactionary line of thought, catering to popular prejudices, clearly 
helped popularise a campaign taken up for other reasons.
Another reason why the campaign against the Union Boards reached such 
popular dimensions was the personality of Sasmal himself. ’.Veil-known 
as the first Mahishya barrister who had forsaken his lucrative practice 
'to work for the country', his personal reputation in the district, and 
especially Contai, was very high. Kshetra Mohan Samanta, a Congress 
worker, claimed that people were willing to believe Sasmal because he
8 B . Nihar 23rd August 1921.
89. Hiteshranjan Sanyal, Dakshin Pashchim Bangley Jatiyatabadi Andalan, 
Chaturnga^Kartick-Poush, 1383 (BS) pp. 194-5.
90. Bhattacharya, op.cit. Appendix III, p.48
91. Quoted in ibid, p.1C.
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could understand their needs and did not want to deceive anyone.
Perhaps closer to the truth was 5. N. Ray, a government official who 
observed:
The subtlety of the whole campaign lay in the fact that
Sasmal as a lawyer was interpreting the sections of the 
93
Act to them.
As a lawyer, he interpreted sections of the Act in a manner which, 
though dishonest was politically effective. He played up certain 
genuine fears that existed in the rdnds of rural people and maintained 
them with the skilful use of : rumours and misrepresentations. But 
in the ultimate analysis, the campaign succeeded because it touched the 
pockets of the people, especially the rich, at a period of economic 
dislocation.
Although Union Boards were spread all over the district, the movement 
against it was concentrated around the thanas of Contai and Ramnagar.
This geographical compactness made organisation a relatively easier task 
and it was also possible to bring in volunteers from Contai town 
regularly. But it should bs borne in mind that the Union 3oard movement 
was essentially a passive movement. Once villagers had decided to pay 
or not to pay the Union Board rates, there was little else they could do 
but await government moves to attach their belongings. But to prevent 
those who had refused to pay the new taxes from succumbing- to government 
pressure, Congress kept the spirit of the movement alive by organising 
mammoth public meetings where speakers from Calcutta would also 
participate. Congress branches were also started and people encouraged 
to become members of the party. Social pressures were exerted on the 
Union Board members to resign, and many yielded to this pressure and gave 
up their seats.
On the whole, the campaign for the non-payment of the Union 3oard taxes 
proved quite popular as a majority of the people refused to pay. By
92. Sanyal, op.cit, p.195.
93. Bhattacharya, op.cit, Appendix II, p.34.
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October 1921, the government abandoned attempts to persuade people to
pay their rates, and initiated attachments. But far from breaking up
the movement, attachments only hardened the spirit of resistance. When
tehsildars arrived at the village accompanied by armed guards, women
came outdoors blowing conch sells and willingly submitted their
utensils for attachment. "There is competition", wrote Basmal, "to
94
deliver moveables first". After the attachments, government officials 
found themselves in a dilemma as to what to do with the utensils, as 
porters and cartmen refused to handle them in fear of reprisals. The 
auction of the attached goods also turned out to be a mockery. A 
reporter for the Amrita Bazar Patrika described one of these:
The goods of Krishna Bhuia were the first to be put to the
auction. It was quite a lot of costly valuables but the price which
was to set the bidding in motion was Rs 10 only, which however
soon came down to Rs 4, this again to Rs 1 only. But there
was nobody to bid for the things. So the auction had to be 
95postponed.
This overwhelming display of village solidarity took the government quite 
by surprise. They had hoped that the movement would inevitably collapse 
once there was a show of force by the government. In fact, the attachment 
operations had quite the reverse effect. S. N. Ray, the Joint Magistrate
sent to tour the Contai region reported that "opposition has stiffened as
96
a result of the attachment proceedings" There was little government
could do beside recommend the use of greater force, and this would seem
rather ironical since the issue at stake was village * self-government’.
J. Younie, the Bubdivisional Officer of Contai, set the ball rolling by
97recommending to government the abolition of the Union Boards.
Nor was Younie alone in his belief. By October 1921, local officers in 
Tamluk reported that tehsildars were facing growing opposition in their 
bid to collect Union Board dues. In Ghatal, local resentment against 
Union Board taxes led to Circle Officers being abused and insulted in
94. Amrita Bazar Patrika 2nd October 1921.
95. Ibid, 7th October 1921.
96. Bhattacharya, op.cit. Appendix II, p.29
97. Ibid, Appendix III, pp. 43-47.
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the village of Khukurda. Demoralisation in the ranks of government
98servants set in after opposition was coupled with social boycott.
The nev/s of the Contai happenings had given people the inspiration
to protest against the increased rates and this was transformed into
actual non-payment when backed by the influential men of the village.
In more normal circumstances, Union Boards would probably have led to
some ineffective disgruntlement, but the happenings at Contai, which
Congress took care to publicise widely in the district, and the general
atmosphere of non-cooperation offered people an alternative to passive
acceptance of government decress. An official survey conducted in late
1921, showed an overwhelming majority of the Union Boards recommending
99their own dissolution.
It was true that the resentment against the Union Boards was not 
universal. Except in the two thanas of Contai where the particularities 
of local factionalism compelled Sasmal to encourage and build up a mass 
movement, opposition in other areas was the result of the Union Board 
members themselves fearing the loss of their local influence. Congress 
was therefore able to rope them into the movement instead of having to 
confront them on the issue. This made the task of building the movement 
relatively easier. But where the local dominant faction was powerful 
enough to resist Congress pressure, it continued to support the idea of 
Union Boards. Thus the Union Board at Gopalnagar in Tamluk petitioned 
the District Magistrate to thwart "the conspiracy of the non-cooperators" 
However, the advocates of Union Boards never really stood a chance. Bine 
the issue was posed as one of increased taxation rather than village 
self-government, they could not realistically hope to carry their 
constituents with them for long, especially when Sasmal*s alternative 
strategy was succeeding all around. By November 1921, government came 
to the conclusion that enough support for Union Boards did not exist 
in Midnapur and consequently ’withdrew the operations of the BVSG Act 
from the district.
98. Sanyal, op.cit, p.201
99. Of the 37 Union Boards consulted, 27 favoured dissolution. Letter 
6489 Judicial, Jud-Gen Vl/24/1321-2 (MRR)
10Q. Jud-Gen Vi/24/1921-2 (MRR).




An anti-Union Board campaign had never figured in the Bengal Congress'
programme of non-cooperation, and in order to attract the widest possible
layer of support and to evade government prosecution, Sasmal insisted that
the local movement against Union Boards had nothing to do with the larger
102
non-cooperation movement. The nationalist press too went along with
'103Sasmal and called it "an economic movement rather than a political one" ’
So as to distinguish the movement from a civil disobedience campaign,
Sasmal advised the people not to pay the increased Union Board rates, but
104
to pay the old chaukidari tax and to obtain receipts for it. But this
separation of non-cooperation from the Union Board movement was merely a
convenient facade, and locally the two movements were considered synonymous.
The resentment against Union Boards was consciously generalised into
opposition to British rule and support for the Congress. At the most
important public meeting on Union Boards, in August 1921, at Sarasv/ati
tala in Contai town, which was attended by at least 12,000 people, Paresh
Chandra Maity and Nikunje Behari Maity started the proceedings by first
105explaining the principles of non-cooperation to the audience.
Satcov/ripati Roy, one of the Congress ’emissaries' despatched to Midnapur, 
also made it clear that he thought the Union Board agitation to be linked
10Q
to non-cooperation. At the Contai public meeting, Sasmal told the
audience that he hoped India would attain Swarej by December and the whole
107chaukidari system would be revised fundamentally. In various places 
Congress volunteers went a step further and told people that the four anna
Congress membership or a contribution to the Tilak Swaraj Fund would entitle
108them to exemption from the payment of the chaukidari tax. And nor did 
the Congress organisation come down heavily on these local ihdiscretions.
So great was the enthusiasm and optimism that all non-violent methods were 
condoned in the race for Swaraj. -Then seven villagers from Ramnagar were 
sentenced to a month's imprisonment for not paying Union Board, dues and 
urinating on the door of the granary of the local Union Board President, 
the Congress organisation promptly turned them into martyrs. After their 
release a huge public meeting was convened in Contai towh,where Sasmal 
spake and the seven were paraded as heores.^S fQr government,
102. Sasmal op.cit, p .11.
103. Amrita. 5azar Patrika, 4th October 1921.
104. Nihar 20th September 1921.
105. Nihar 20th August 1921.
106. Oral History Transcript No 267, (NNML),
107. Nihar 20th August 1921.
108. GC3 H. Poll 395/1924 fNM.UL]
1-09. Nihar 30th August 1921..
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they had no illusions of the Union Board movement being anything but
a local variation of the non-cooperation movement. In fact, under
government instigation, the members of the Contai Union Board decided
to revoke the licenses of all liquor shops in the area, as a concession
to non-cooperation, and in order to detract Congress from the
1 1 0Union Board movement. By seizing on Union Boards as the focal 
point of the non-cooperation movement, Sasmal and Congress able to
draw in a-wide layer of people. This was particularly/so irr the case of 
minor zamindars and the jotedars who would have been adversely affected by
the new taxes. Zamindars such as Srimati Kirenamani Dasi, Naranarayan
Hazra, Devendra Narayan Hazra., Kishoripati Roy, Jagedish Chandra Maity
and Shiv Prasad Jana were particularly useful in making Congress -
sponsored hartals successful. Their role was crucial in the haths such
as Durmuth, Gopalpur, Satmile, Mukundapur, Balishai and Barbaria, since
1 1 1Congress was still lacking in a cadre-based organisation. However,
in the towns, the Congress did not have to rely on' influential brokers
to establish its roots. The youth and students served as Congress
volunteers helped by the lawyers. In Tamluk town for instance,, the
Congress under Kumar Chandra Jana was able to rope in 800 volunteers to
112spread the message of the movement. A sizeable volunteer force also
existed in Contai town and Mahisadal. These volunteers were regularly
113despatched to Calcutta to assist in the picketing there. Moreover,
the work among the Banthals in the Jungle Mahals (discussed in the next
section) by Satcowripati Roy, Bailajananda Ben and Murari Mohan Roy had
a profound impact on the Banthals of south Midnapur. When Charu Chandra
Mohanti, the Secretary of the Potashpur Congress Committee was arrested,
about 700 Sa nthals demonstrated in protest chanting ’Gandhi Ma.jaraj !<1
114Jai* and 'Bande Mataram’ . .
But unlike parts of the United Frovinces, where a militant kise.n movement 
outlived the non-cooperation movement, there was no corresponding 
radicalism in Midnapur. Although Congress was able ' to reach an audience 
far beyond the dwellers of small towns, this audience consisted in the 
main of various layers of peasant proprietors whose strong attachment
110. Nihar 15th March 1921.
111. Nihar 19th April, 22nd November and 27th December 1921.
112. Nihar 27th December 1921.
113. Nihar 10th January 1922,
114. Nihar 10th January 1922,
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to property and land kept the movement v;ithin conservative, albeit
militant, parameters. By making increased taxation the keynote of
the movement, Congress was able to direct mass energies against the
government without necessarily questioning the structures of indigenous
society. Unlike the United Provinces where political mobilisation had
been carried out on the basis of the land question and had consequently
115led to a degree of radicalism, the mechanics of mobilisation in 
Midnepur negated this possibility. The Union Board movement enabled 
Congress to carve out a constituency for itself among that section of 
the rural population who had been enfranchised by the Government of 
India Act of 1919, on the basis of property. It is to this extent, 
that the non-cooperation movement broadened the political constituency 
in Midnapur.
The Santhal Movement in Midnapur 1918-1923
The non-cooperation movement was initiated by Gandhi at a time when
Congress was far from being a streamlined political organisation capable
of leading a mass campaign for Swaraj. There was od consciously thought
out strategy employed by the Congress leadership and much was left tG
local initiative. The Congress central office was blissfully unaware of
the shape of local movements, and was largely dependent on newspaper
115reports for information. In Bengal however, the situation was not 
so chaotic. This was the result partially of the emergence of C. R. Das 
as the undisputed leader of the Bengal Congress, and of the policy of 
despatching trusted emmissariss to the districts to stir up things.
This latter factor helped to ensure that the movement remained well 
within the control of the leadership and •irresponsible' and 'anarchic' 
elements did not take over. The Contai Union Board movement, for 
example, was led by B.N.Sasmal and his followers who hailed from the 
small zamindars and jotedar section of . rural property. But the 
form the non-cooperation movement assumed in the largely Santhal - 
populated regions of west Midnapur was a significant departure from 
the forms it took among the Bengali population.
115. D. N. Bhanagare, 'Congress and Agrarian Agitation in Oudh 
1920-22 and 1930-32' South Asia 5, 1975.
116. AICC 5/1920.
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Economic Condition of the Jungle Mahals
The Jungle Mahals, around which the Santhal upsurge was concentrated,
were an area on the western and northern portions oT the district. It
encompassed the thanas of Binpur, Garbetta, Gopiballavpur, Jhargram and
Salboni. The Jungle Mahals were divided among several large landowners,
among whom were the Midnapur Zamindari Company, managed by Andrew Yule,
whose holdings were scattered around Garbetta, Salboni and Silda pargana;
the Ramgarh and Lalgarh Rajas west of the river Kasai; the Raja of
Jhargram over the major portion of Jhargram thana; and the Rajas of
117Mayurbhanj and Murshidabad in extensive tracts in Gopiballavpur.
Being essentially forest lands, they had been leased at very low rents in
the 19th century. This wqy the zamindars hoped to attract settlers who
would in time gradually reclaim the land. The terms of the lease
generally included unhindered use of all the jungles including the right
to cut down any trees for the purpose of timber or house construction.
The jungles were then considered to have very little profit potential and
the zamindars took only a cursory interest in them. The authorities too,
did not see any future for the Jungle Mahals and the large pargana of
Silda, covering 240 square miles, was assessed at only Rs 793-12-0 land
118revenue.
A peculiarity of the Jungle Mahals, which stemmed out of the tribal 
community of the Santhals, Mahatos, Bhumijs and other tribes, was the 
mandali system. The 1883 Report of the Rent Law Commission defined 
mandals in the following terms:
In parts of Midnapore bordering on the Jungle Mahals there
is a class of persons termed mandals who cams into existence
in the fallowing manner: the zamindar granted a tract of
waste land to a substantial raiyat, termed as abadkar, who 
undertook to bring it into cultivation, paying the zamindar
117. Bengal District Gazetteers, Midnapore, Calcutta 1911, p.195.
118, A. K. Jameson, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement of 
Midnapore 1911-17, Calcutta 1918, p.57.
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a stipulated lump sum as rent. This abadkart partly by
the labour of his own family and dependents, and partly
inducing other raiyats to settle under him, gradually
reclaimed the greater part of the grant and established
a village upon it, to which he usually gave his name and
as the head of the settlement he was called mandel or
headman. The zamindar and the mandal from time to time
re-adjusted the terms of their bargain, but the zamindar
never interfered between the mandal and his under-tenants.
In settlement proceedings of 1839 these mandals were
declared to have only the rights of sthani and khudkasht
raiyats and not to be entitled to any munafa or profit;
but though not exactly recognised as talukdars they gradually
acquired rights superior to those of ordinary khudkasht
raiyats; and as they were left to make their own terms with
the raiyats settled by them, they must have had a very
considerable profit besides what they obtained from any
land cultivated by themselves. Their mandali right became
119transferable by custom.
The status of the mandal within the village community was subject to 
local variations. A. K. Jameson wrote that "The mandal was in no way 
different from the other members except in so far as his superior
1 2 0social position allowed him to retain a larger area in his possession" 
This was more or less the position in the Ramgarh estate where the 
mandal had the privilege of holding a small plot of land rent-free. 
Similarly, in the Jambani Estate, the mandal was allowed a deduction 
of Rs. 1 from his ovyn rent as profit, but was forbidden from realising
- *121
more than the fixed assessment from the other members of the community.
However, by the beginning of the 20th century, the mandali system < 
started to break down in various parts of the district. Since the 
position' of mandalH was hereditary, many a mandal ceased to divide the 
rent equitably among other members of the community and started to make 
profits. This became more rampant after improvements in transport made
119. Ibid, pp. 40-1.
120. Ibid, p.41.




| timber a lucrative commercial proposition. At this point the
zamindars who had been generous with their settlements clamped
down on the Santhals. The mandals in turn became increasingly profit
conscious and extracted as much as possible from the members of the
community, thus weakening the old forms of relationship* In the
zamindaris of the Midnapur Zamindari Company, there was also the
phenomenon of the replacement of the traditional mandal by the Bengali
mahajan. The latter, as the new mandal, was "concerned only to make the
maximum of profit and caring little or nothing for the ancient rights 
122of the community"
The Zamindari Offensive
With the introduction of the railways the jungles of Midnapur acquired 
a new commercial value. Timber merchants, and especially the Midnapur 
Zamindari Company (hereafter referred to as the MZC), rushed in to lease 
or purchase large tracts of the jungles* The commercial value of the 
timber and the desire to make huge profits compelled the timber merchants 
to impose restrictions on the Banthals' use of the jungles. In 1923-24, 
the Jhargram Estate was richer by Rs 72,803-15-9 from the sale of jungle
>123 q
lands. Under such circumstances the landlords felt the need sever!y 
to curtail the traditional right of the Santhals to have free access 
to the jungles, including the right to cut down any trees either for 
the purposes of clearing the land or for domestic use. Indeed fronr the 1890S 
the timber merchants began their offensive to regain control of the 
jungle lands.
In 1895, the MZC made a determined bid to curtail the jungle rights of 
the Banthals in pargana Bagri. The Company attempted to break down 
the pastoral rights of the Banthals and prevent them from grazing 
cattle in the jungles and waste lands. Led by enterprising mandals, 
the Santhals attempted to resist encroachment by filing suits in the 
Munsif's Court in Garbetta. The Munsif , and later ths Sub-Judge in 
Midnapur ruled in favour of the Santhals. The MZC then decided to take 
the dispute to the High Court which overturned the earlier decisions.
122. Ibid, p.43.
123. Wards XX/10'/1925 (MRR)
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With amazing tenacity and some wealthy backing, the Santhals
appealed to the Privy Council in England, which in 1903, reaffirmed
124
their rights of pasturage.
This temporary setback did not break the determination of the landlords
to regain full control of the jungles. The Privy Council decision had
after all been confined to pargana Bagri and the Santhals did not have
the resources to conduct protracted litigation especially against such
formidable opponents a s -  the Managing Agency of Andrew Yule. Moreover,
the local officials, especially of the Settlement Department, tended by
and large to favour the landlords against the Santhals. A. K. Jameson
while noting that ’’there is definite evidence in old mandali agreements
that all land of every description was made over in absolute right to the
community subject only to the yearly payment of rentfixed" also insisted
that the extent of the right was ’’dependent on the circumstances in which 
125
it was granted” It was therefore legitimate, in his view, for the 
landlords to attempt to change the terms of agreement with the Santhals. 
Jameson dismissed the Santhals* complaints and grievances with some 
degree of paternalistic arrogance:
it is useless to expect ignorant cultivators to look to
the good of the community as a whole (sic) when it conflicts
126with their immediate needs.
Gurusaday Dutt, the District Magistrate of neighbouring Bankura district
also insisted that the encroachments of the landlords were justified by
127’unavoidable economic circumstances' Thus it was with the active
connivance and supervision of government officials that the encroachments 
on the jungle rights of the Santhals were carried out.
In the Silda pargana, owned by the MZC, the Settlement Department laid 
down the terms of the restrictions based on what they called 'reasonable 
precedents'. Under these terms, all trees with the exception of the 
Sal tree were classed as valuable and the Santhals were forbidden to 
cut these down. They were allowed to cut trees which were "less than
124. Final Report, p.59.
125. Ibid, pp. 56-7
126. Ibid, p.58.
127. GGB H. Poll 181/1923 No. 34-5 (NMML).
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1^ cubits in girth at a height of 3 feet from the ground and...
only when required for construction of houses or agricultural implements
or carts” Plus they were allcv7ed to collect free all fallen leaves,
128
brushwood, broken timber and fruits from the trees. The same 
restrictions applied to the jungles in Garbetta.
Such relatively generous terms were absent in other parts of the 
district. In the Ramgarh and Lalgarh estates which were under the 
control of the two branches of the Sahasray family, only relatives and 
Brahmins were permitted to take wood for fuel and other uses without 
permission and payment. The Santhals and other tenants were compelled 
to pay between 4 and 6  annas per year per house for the right to oollect 
brushwood alone. Even this right could be exercised only two days a
week.
The situation was worse in all the other areas of the Jungle Mahals
where tenants had to make payments for everything collected from the
jungles including fallen leaves and brushwood. Only fruits from the
trees and the mahua flower were given free; and even here the MZC
129charged a cess in their holdings in Salboni and Midnapur. In the 
Jhargram Estate, which was under the Court of Wards, severe restrictions 
were imposed on all tenants holding temporary tenures. Their tenures 
were made non-heritable or transferable and they were forbidden from
130
cutting trees, excavating tanks, wells, bunds and even building huts.
Nor were the encroachments confined to the lucrative jungle area. In 
the Jungle Mahals there existed considerable areas of laterite soils 
on which nothing but coarse grass grew; these were called dahi lands.
These lands were included in the original settlements with the mandals 
but were not taken into account while determining rent. The Santhals 
through their own perseverence did manage to cultivate patches of 
dahi lands through a method of shifting cultivation. Gradually they 
built small bunds around plots of dahi land to retain water, and converted 
these former waste lands into proper, but inferior paddy-growing
128. Final Report p.57.
129. Ibid, pp. 57-8.
130. R. K. Mandal, Manager Jhargram Estate, to Collector, 28th 
January 1918, '.Vards XX/14/1924-5 (MRR).
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lands. The more enterprising tenants even cultivated indigo on these 
plots.
The landlords, and especially the MZC who had large interests in indigo,
were quick to realise the rent potential of the dahi lands and began
assessing the indigo plots for rent. After 1898 when indigo cultivation
was stopped, the zamindars began assessing even those lands used for
131paddy cultivation. In this way, every last ounce of surplus was 
extracted out of the Santhal tenants of the Jungle Mahals.
The connection of the Jungle Mahals by rail to the cities had therefore
a profound impact on the lives of the Santhals. The zamindars who
previously had paid scant attention to these isolated regions now
swooped down in their bid for greater rent and profit. From a primitive
patriarchal society, they were now exposed to the vagaries of the colonial
market economy with little or no means to resist the change and erosion
of their tradional ways. Their plight was not dissimilar to that of
similar tribal societies facing the gradual onslaught of 'formal*
132capitalism and its revolutionary consequence. Change brings in its
wake reaction, and faced with this massive onslaught the Santhals reacted 
with a great degree of hostility. It only required the presence of an 
outside agency to harness the discontent for agitational ends.
Agitators and Local Rivals
By 1918, the economic dislocation among the tenants of the Jungle Mahals
assumed serious proportions. Mot only were their traditional jungle
rights being threatened or taken away, but the soaring prices of paddy
and every day items like cloth and kerosene hit them hard. Being constantly
indebted to the mahajan, even those Santhals who had plots of land to
cultivate, rarely had enough paddy in store to last until the next
harvest or to sell their surplus at those moments when market conditions
were most favourable to the seller. The sharp and dramatic price-rise
133
of paddy after 1917 made this a rather difficult proposition. The 
government tax programme did not help matters either. The collection
131. Final Report, pp. 59-60.
132. Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, London 
1979, p . 25.
133. Report of the Bengal Provincial 3 anking Encuiry Committee 1929 
- 20, Calcutta 1930, Vol. 2, pp. 118-28.
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of the much hated chaukidari tax was lsft totally in the hands of the 
local Collecting Panchayats without supervision from superior officers.
In the more remote areas of the Jungle Mahals, the Collecting Panchayats 
were a law unto themselves and usually in league with the local daroga. 
They assessed the Santhals at illegal and higher rates and even District
Magistrates admitted that there had been wholesale ch3ating of the
. ., 134t il-Lbclls i
These factors produced an explosive situation by early 1918. As in the
other parts of Bengal, the protest movements took the form of hath 
135looting. The lobtings which occurred in January 1918 seemt to have
been the result of spontaneous action on the part-of the Santhals and
a few mandals, and conducted entirely without the help of the bhadrolok
nationalists. The Santhals concentrated their attacks on the cloth
merchants rather than the dhangolas (granaries} of the paikars (wholesale
buyers). The cloth merchants, who generally hailed-;'from up-country also
carried on a substantial moneylending business among the Santhals, at
136very high rates of interest. As such, they were the subject of
certain resentment. Moreover, unlike the paikars, they were less
protected and consequently more vulnerable. Secondly, though the
lootings were mainly carried out by the Santhals, they were supported
in many places by the Lodhas, Muslims and low caste Hindus, suggesting
137a generalised move by the underprivileged in society. Lastly, though
the participants were always Santhals, the hath lootings were not
confined to the Jungle Mahals but fairly widespread in the district,
136a pointer to the important mobilising role of the tribe.
139Haths Looted in Midnapur in January 1918
Lalpur Hath, Binpur 
Mukundapur Hath, Debra 
Salboni Hath, Kharagpur 
Protapdighi Hath, Potashpur
134. Report by G. S. Dutt, 29th May 1923, GCB H. Poll 181/1923 
No. 34-35 (NMML)
135. Nihar 25th December 1917.
13S. Banking Enquiry Domnittee Vol 2, p.119.
137. Nihar 15th January 1918.
138. For a graphic description of tribal mobilisation see Report by
G. S. Dutt, GOB H. Poll 181/1923 (NMML)








2 Haths in Gopiballavpur thana.
Although the hath lootings were stopped by adequate policing, the
economic distress and the grievances of the Santhals remained. In
fact the government .displayed utter callousness towards the tribal
population. The District Magistrate came to the myopic conclusion
that lootings occurred in places where the "illiterate and the
uncivilised people reside" He advised people in economic distress
to join the Labour Corps in Mesopotamia where they could earn up to 
140Rs 20 a month.
In the face of such insensitivity, the task of stirring up the 
Santhals towards organised agitational politics became relatively easy. 
In 1921 when the Congress launched the non-cooperation movement, there 
was no Congress organisation in the Jhargram subdivision. Not unexpec­
tedly, no attempt had been rhade to organise among the Santhals or other 
oppressed peoples. In early 1921, C. R. Das despatched Satcowripati
f
Roy to Midnapur to organise political agitation in the district. After
spending a brief period in Midnapur town, Roy went to Gidni. There he
met a previous acquaintance Sailsjananda Sen, whose father was a
doctor in Midnapur town. Sen was an unsuccessful lawyer and spent his
time smoking opium. Roy was successful in converting Sen into a
nationalist, and the latter gave up drugs and de\Zcted himself full-time
to Congress work. Roy also got a relative of his - Murari Mohan Roy -
to devote himself to the Congress movement. Together they set about
141the task of involving the Santhals in the non-cooperation movement.
The genius of Roy end Sen as Congress organisers lay in their ability 
to utilise the specific economic grievances of the Santhals and harness 
it to the advantage of a national movement for freedom. Realising
140. Ibid 15th January 1918.
141. Satcowripati Roy *Deshbandhur Sauge Ranch Bathshar* Pranab 
XXXIX, 1.
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that the crucial issue that faced the Santhals was the question of 
the erosion of their jungle rights, the Congressmen avoided any 
lofty preaching of abstract nations such as Swaraj and instead 
concentrated on 'bread and butter issues'* They were helped by the 
fact that the MZC owned most of the jungle tracts around Silda and 
Binpur. This enabled them to tie up the entire question of imperial 
subjugation with the specific problems faced by the Santhals. Thus at 
a large meeting of Santhals, Sailajananda Sen told his audience:
their zamindars were English and Government helped them and
did not punish them if they committed any offence, but
punished natives for petty offences. Government were
142oppressive and their enemy and sucked their blood.
Always emphasising the need for organised non-violent collective action,
the Congress agitators, in the words of a report of the European-owned
Midnapur Mining Syndicate, delivered many speeches "exciting the people
to effect a strong combination against the European zamindars, and in
infusing in them a f^lse hope that if they stand combined these zamindars
143will not be allowed to exercise any act of possession in the jungles"
But though Congressmen concentrated essentially on the local problems
facing the Santhals, they did not totally ignore the wider political
dimensions of the movement. The boycott of foreign goods, especially
cloth, was constantly advocated by Sailajananda Sen and Murari Mohan
144Roy in their speeches. Nor was Gandhian puritanism lacking in their
appeals. In May 1921, the Congress was successful in organising a meeting
145of 700 Santhals at Gidni where it was resolved to abstain from drinking.
Gandhi too was projected as almost a messianic figure combatting the
British oppression, so much so that in all their demonstrations the
146Santhals shouted the slogan of * Gandhi Maharaji ki Jai'. But on the
whole, it is clear that the more politically overt aspects of the
147movement were assigned a secondary role. In fact, in their flexibility
142. Case of Emperor vs Sailajananda Sen and Murari Mohan Roy, GOB H.
Poll 101/1923 no. 36-7.
143. Petition of Midnapur Mining Syndicate, GOB H. Poll 101/1923 (NMML).
144. GOB H. Poll 101/1923 no. 36-7.
145. Amrita Bazar Patrika 29th May 1921.
14a. Disturbances in Binpur thana by L. Birley, 20th January 1922, GOB
H. Poll 07/1922 no. 3.
147, Here I am accepting Lenin's distinction between 'political' and 
' economistic'.
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occasionally extending to opportunism, the Congress organisers were 
perfecting Lenin's advice of constantly 'bending the stick' while 
keeping the central project intact.
The initial attempts by Congress to organise among the Santhals were 
confined to the areas where the MZC held property. The non-ccoperation 
movement was essentially nationalist, seeing its role as the attainment 
of political independence from the British. As such, it was quite 
permissable for Congress to challenge the might of an European Managing 
Agency. An agitation for economic gain was compatible with a nationalist 
movement because the enemy was European. But since the issue of Swaraj 
was not linked to a social revolution within indigenous society, the 
Congress leaders were reluctant to convert the movement for political 
independence into a class struggle. Hence in the Jungle Mahals, the 
Congress was less desirous of fanning the flames of agitation among the 
Santhal tenants of Indian zamindars, because of the implications of 
offending 'patriotic* landlords who had always been a significant force 
in the Bengal Congress, especially in East Bengal. The Congress attempted 
to localise and conceal under a nationalist veneer what was in essence a 
class struggle. Generalising the struggle ran the risk of offending
allies, and unleashing a social force which they might not have succeeded
. . . .  148in containing.
However, it was the local factional alignments rather than the subjective 
desires of the Congress leadership that helped to shape the course of the 
Santhal agitation. The Congress agitators were outsiders and Bengalis 
with only a superficial knowledge of the Santhal way of life. They 
attempted to inject consciousness from the outside and found some ready 
response from a primitive people looking for some lead. But in a 
community where traditional loyalties were a significant factor to be 
reckoned with, they needed to create alliances with the indigenous 
leadership of the Santhals. This came from a rather unexpected quarter.
Besides the MZC, another major landholder in the area was Jagadish 
Chandra Dhabal Dev of the Jamboni Raj. Like all zamindars, he left the
143. For the experience in U.P. see D. M. Ohanagare, op.cit and 
M. H. Siddicui, Agrarian Unrest in North India, Delhi 1973.
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management of his estate in the hands of his Manager. The Manager 
through over-zealousness and .corrupt practices, succeeded in making 
himself highly unpopular among the tenants. In particular, he 
succeeded in alienating the Satpatis (Brahmins) and the influential 
low caste Mahatos by imposing restrictions on their traditional jungle 
rights. Alongside this internal tension within the Jamboni Raj, the 
zamindar met with harassment from the neighbouring DalbhoomRaj. The 
immediate cause was the defeat of the zamindar Pratap Dal of Dalbhoom 
in a succession case against Jambani Raj. Pratap Dal appealed to the 
High Court, and went around the area an a fund raising drive. He was 
assisted in this venture by the Mohunt of Ghatshila and the rival 
faction from within the Jamboni Raj.
If raising funds for his law suit was the sole reason for the feverish
activities of Prqtap Dal, it was certainly not the motive force of his
many and varied supporters. The tenants of Jamboni Raj who had 
declaratory suits filed against them by the zamindar, Jagadish Chandra 
were keen to harass him in every possible way, in order to gain a 
bargaining lever against him. It was they who pressurised Pratap Dal to 
take up a more militant stance against the Jamboni Raj. According to 
reports received by James Pedie, the Additional District Magistrate:
Pratap himself at a meeting -/here he was collecting money
from the raiyats to fight his civil case, actually told
them that if their jungles were being destroyed by the
lessees to whom the jungle was let, it was their fault as
they had merely to refuse work for those lessees in order
to' save their jungles. Again he promised them all sorts of
rights in the jungles if they backed him by damaging the
rival landlord and causing him trouble. The last was not
said openly but indirectly, though perfectly clear to those 
149who were present.
J. E. Scott, the Deputy Commissioner of neighbouring Singbhum, also 
reported that tenants in the disputed area were assured by Pratap Qal 
that they would have their forest rights restored if he won the litigation.
149. Pedie's Tour Diary, GC3 H. Poll 181/1923 (NMML).
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Pratap Dal also made it clear that he had no objections to their
obstructing contractors, cutting wood from the jungles, and fishing
150
in the tanks of the area. This declaration of Pratap Dal was 
interpreted by the Santhals as permission to plunder forests and 
tanks indiscriminately, coming as it did from a person they considered 
to be the owner.
Lastly, in their campaign to harass the Jamboni Raj, Pratap Dal and his
supporters did not seek to keep the campaign confined to the area in
dispute. The aid of Santhals from neighbouring Singbhum and Bankura
districts was actively sought. Pratap Dal was also successful in
enlisting the support of some maliks of bunds like Ananda Maity of
Murathakura and Pitambar Singh of Raspal. Due to factional considerations,
they supported the Santhal*s movement for forest rights and addressed some
meetings of Santhals. They contemplated limiting the movement to Midnapur
151so that it would not affect their interests in Bankura.
The Santhal Agitation
The agitation in the Jungle Mahals began in Silda, owned by the MZC.
The Santhal labour working for the Company in the jungles were paid 
dismal sums as wages. They received 4 pice for carting wood up to a 
distance of 14 miles and 8  pice for 35 miles. Satcov/ripati Roy, who 
was then personally supervising the movement, induced the Santhal labour 
to strike. The MZC responded in a heavy handed manner and attempted to 
force the Santhals back to work. A scuffle took place between the
152
strikers and employees of the MZC, in which one employee was killed.
The Congress too responded militantly and directed the Santhals to
plunder the forests in large combinations of a thousand people or more.
The Santhals told the Company that they had full rights over the jungles
and therefore could not be stopped. The MZC responded by going to
Court demanding an injunction stating that the tenants had no rights 
153in the jungles. But before this injunction could be decided, the
District Magistrate, Birley'p intervened to try and settle the issue.
150. J. Graham to Cook, 9th May 1923, GOB H. Poll 161/1923 (NMML).
151. G. S. Dutt to Commissioner, 7th-0th May 1923, GOB H. Poll 
101/1923 (NMML).
152. Satcowripati Roy, cp.cit.
153. Petition of Midnapur Mining Syndicate, GOB H. Poll 101/1923 
(NMML).
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Realising that the MZC exacted a large number of illegal cases 
from the tenants, 3irley attempted to effect a compromise and nip 
the non-cooperation movement in the bud. It was a recognition, 
for the first time, from the government that there was some material 
basis to the Santhal agitation.
But Birley, by his own admission, failed to reach a settlement though
154he laid down the terms of what the MZC thought was a 1 compromise1.
The Santhals refused to have anything to do with Birley's proposals,
155mainly on the insistence of Satcowripati Roy # In fact, so popular
was the appeal of the Congress that the MZC had to come to terms with
it. The latter agreed to have a Congress worker inspecting the conditions
of work in the jungles. Satcowripati Roy's own account of what happened
is instructive. He even claimed that the Manager of the MZC took off
156his hat while passing the Congress office at Gidni. In another 
description he suggested:
the people did not cultivate lands. They asked why they
should join hands with the government and cooperate with it.
It so happened that even the Sub-Registrars office was empty.
The people came to the Congress Office with cfeeds for the sale
and transfer of lands. Those deeds were registered in the
Congress Office. The Congress Office put its seal on those
deeds and they were registered. The people did not go to
the Registrars office for registering these deeds. IVe
establish dhanagolas...The people put their surplus paddy in
dhanagolas. Those people who had less paddy took paddy on loan
from the dhanagolas and they used to return it...Even the Post
157Office work was stopped. Congress had its own Post Office...
Some of this account is no doubt exaggerated - the organiser would be
likely to succumb to the temptation of playing up his own success. But
the account makes clear that Roy wished to suggest that he had effectively 
established a kind of 'dual power' to the British. Thus the local 
agitation was accommodated to the aims of the national movement. And
154. Report by L. Birley 2Bth January 1922, GOB H. Poll 87/1922 No. 3.
155. Graham to Cook, 9th May 1923, GCB H. Poll 181/1923 (NMML).
156. Satcowripati Roy, op.cit.
157. Oral History Transcript No 267, p.22 (NMML).
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indeed the Congress did more than merely fight against the oppression
of the MZC. In one incident in July 1921, Sailajanada Sen led a
demonstration of 200 Santhal women and blocked the path of paddy carts
belonging to a local zamindar. They were protesting against the export
158of paddy in the face of local shortage.
Inspired by this success at Silda and excited by the growing momentum 
of the non-cooperation movement nationally, the Congress turned its 
attention towards more politically overt forms of activity. Having 
won the allegiance of the Santhals as champions of their rights, it 
was relatively easier to mobilise them for other activities. In January 
1922, the Congress mounted a campaign against foreign cloth. In one 
month, the Congress - inspired demonstrators raided four haths and 
des^oyed all stocks of foreign cloth being sold. The assemblages were 
not very organised, and while raiding the Dahijuri hath, the Santhals 
desi^oyed all cloth indiscriminately. S. N. Gupta, the Joint Magistrate 
at Jhargram pointed out:
It appears that what has happened is that the non-coaperators
taking advantage of the occasion of these annual assemblages
of large crowds of Santhals here, incited them to continue and
to commit excesses; ...anonymous written messages have been
159circulated inciting the Santhals to loot haths.
Similarly, a crowd of 1,000 people assembled outside a court where four 
non-cooperators were being charged and tried. The sub-divisional officer 
adjourned the case, but set the bail at Rs 700 on each of the accuse.ct . 
This infuriated the crowd who demanded their immediate release. With only 
three constables at his disposal, the officer was reluctantly compelled 
to release the - prisoners. ’’These people',' he wrote to his superiors,
"are completely out of hand and require to be shown that there is still 
a government"
Unfortunately for the local organisers, just at the point when the 
particular agitation among the Santhal tenants the MZC was being 
generalised along more political lines, Gandhi called oflpthe movement.
15S. Amrita Bazar Patrika 8 th July 1921.
159. GCB H. Poll 87/1922.
160. GOB H. Poll 87/1922 No. 6 .
If the events in Midnapur are any indicator, the growing militancy
of the movement and the fear that it would slip out of the hands of
the Congress leadership was one of the factors for Gandhi's sudden
decision. This would also be confirmed by the Gardoli resolution
of the Congress calling on the peesants to cease all movements
161against their landlords or no-rent campaigns.
But the organisation of the Congress provided for a great deal of 
local initiative. Though the non-cooperation movement for the 
achievement of Swaraj was terminated in 1922, the local Congress 
leadership did not abide by the terms of the Bardoli resolution.
The Santhal movement was temporarily thrown out of gear following 
the arrest of some of its prominent leaders, but resumed in full 
vigour in August 1922. The effect of the abandonment of the non- 
cooperation movement was that the struggle of the Santhals reverted 
to its original 1economistic1 form and was divorced from the mainstrea 
of nationalist politics. In political terms, this was a real setback.
With the Jamboni-Dalbhum feud coming into the open in late 1922, the
Santhal unrest now covered the entire area from Jamboni to Silda and
Ghatsila paragana in Singhbum; later it spilled over to a couple of
thanas in Bankura district. Acting on the instigation of the Dalbhum
faction, Santhals from Jamboni, Bankura, Singhbhum and Mayurbhanj
began to loot fish from the tanks owned by Jagadish Chandra - the
zamindar of Jamboni. The Santhals believed that they had a legitimate
right to the fish since their actions were sanctioned by Pratap Dal.
The arowds often numbered 6,000, and as in 1910, the Santhals were
joined by Bengali small peasants and landless labourers such as Satgop
162Tamils, Baishnavas, and, in one instance, even Muslims. Although 
the Santhals were in the vanguard of the movement, they could count 
on the support of other economically depressed communities, suggesting 
the class aspect of the movement. But the mobilisation of the crowds 
coming from such remote areas as Singhbhum and Mayurbhanj was effected 
under the aegis of the tribe. Gurusaday Dutt, the District Magistrate
161. R. P. Dutt, India Today, Calcutta 1970, pp. 351-2, and J. H. 
Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth 
Century B-ngal, Serkely 1968, pp. 224-22.
162. G. S. Dutt to Commissioner, 7th-8th May 1923, GOB H. Poll 
181/1923 (NMML).
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of Bankura, gave a fascinating account of the process of mobilisation:
The Santhals explained to us the interesting system by which
they summon large crowds within a short time to any particular
spot by sending out a 'gira* (knot). It appears that when the
headman decide that a meeting is to take place for any purpose
such as tank raids or the discussion of any grievances, the
date of the meeting is communicated to each village by means
of the withe of a plant or tree (generally from the bark of the
Sal tree) tied into knots. This knotted withe is called the
gira and the number of knots in the gira indicate the day on
which the meeting will take place. Whenever a meeting is
decided upon any particular date for any object a gira is
served out to the headman of neighbouring villages with the
intimation of the abject and the place of the meeting and it
is considered the duty of the headman thus $rved with the gira
to pass it on to the headman of the next village and then to
communicate the information to all the Santhals of his own
village. Tribal custom places an obligation on the Santhals
of every village served with a gira to respond ta it. Failure
to respond to the gira is regarded as an offence against the
163tribe and is attended with severe tribal penalties.
Along with the tribal nature of the mobilisation, there was also the 
economic motive too. In one particular instance, ihs crowd actually waited 
for the armed police to arrive, and then looted the tank aying:
You' can fire your last shot, ,7e shall come and loot the tank.
Many of us have come three days journey to get the fish and
164we are not going away without them.
The lucrative nature of their haul, estimated by government at Rs 360
per tank, made it also worth bheir- while to travel great distances
165and also explains why many non-Santfrils joined in.
163. GOB H. Poll 161/1923 (.NMML) • , ,
164. Pedie's Tour Diary GOB H. Poll 181/1923 (NMML).
165. GOB H. Poll 181/1923 (NMML).
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In the Silda pargana, where the movement was greatly controlled by the
Congress rather than tribal leaders, the Santhals concentrated on
looting the jungles of timber merchants. In the village of Raghunathpur,
the police discovered that every household had stacks of newly cut wood.
The wood was confiscated, but when the chaukidars attempted to cart it
away, the Santhals forcibly prevented them. At another place, when
Pedie and his armed police attempted to apprehend some of the Santhals
his car was smashed up and he was given a beating: 'It Is the first
time I have had to run eway and I did not like doing so; but there
166was nothing else possible.'
7,'hen confronted by a large body of armed police, the Santhals merely 
retreated beyond the range of the guns and fired arrows into the police 
party if they advanced. In fact, so serious was the unrest that British 
officers in the area asked for a total of 450 armed policemen- to be 
despatched.
The authorities were absolutely unable to explain the turbulence among
the Santhals. Lok Khepa geche (the people have gone mad) seemed to be
167the commonest explanation. Neither did the Congress or the Delbhum
faction quite control the actions of the crowd. From looting tanks or
jungles belonging to the MZC or the Jamboni Raj, the Santhals began to
loot indiscriminately. Some of the maliks in Bankura who had supported
the movement had their tanks looted by the Santhals who had few illusions
about private property. As the upsurge continued, the Santhals saw little
difference in the nature of exploitation carried on by the Europeans
and the Indian landlords. Where the Congress v/as in a stranger position
this tendency v/as sought to be curbed by exacting protection money from
the Indian owners. Jogendra Nath Ghos.e, the owner of jungle Chitamati
was allowed to carry on his work unhampered after he paid Rs. 1000 to
163
the Congress funds. In fact, the Congress leadership did have some
genuine grassroots support to keep the movement under check. This was
displayed when after the arrest of the local Congress workers, not a
single Santhal came forward to serve as witnesses for the prosecution,
and instead some, of them destroyed the MZC office at Kankrajora,
killing one man and maiming another, after the arrest of Sailajananda.
169Sen.
1S6 . Pedie1s Tour Diary GOB H. Poll 181/1923 (NMML)
167. Ibid
168. Petition of Midnapur Mining Syndicate, GOB H. Poll 181/1923 (NM’.’L) .
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The movement was finally curbed by a combination of brute force, 
heavy punitive taxation, the appointment of almost all mandals as 
Special Constables responsible for law and order, and the Forcing 
of Pratap Dal to pacify the Santhals. But besides official action, 
the Santhal movement suffered from political and national isolation.
After the withdrawal of the non-cooperation movement and the release 
of Congressmen from jail, the leadership of the Bengal Congress 
eschewed mass mobilisation and militant struggles in favour of a 
parliamentary programme. To the Congress leadership, the Santhals 
were merely a pawn in the power game involving them and the British 
rulers. The Midnapur District Congress under B. N. Sasmal offered 
little or no solidarity with the Santhals, though some protests were 
made against the imposition of punitive taxes after the movement had 
been crushed. It is to the credit of local leaders such as Sailajananda 
Sen and others that they continued the struggle which they had initiated, 
right to the bitter end. But on the other had, as initiators of the 
movement, they maintained a rigid demarcation between 'leader' and 'led', 
and consequently failed to establish an indigenous political leadership 
from among the Santhal community. This political failure would result 
in the total demoralisation of Santhal militancy following the suppre­
ssion of the movement.
Conclusion
The success of the nationalist leadership in its Gandhian phase lay in
its ability to forge and cement together a host of local and regional
expressions of dissidence. The primitivist - populist Gandhian ideology
that lay behind the expression 'Swaraj' was used to serve the interests
of various autonomous movements in India. These ranged from the struggles
of the national bourgeoisie for a greater share of the home market, the
Islamic fanaticism of Abdul Bari, the peasant movement of Baba Ramachandra,
the exodus of coolie labour from Assam, and the struggle of thp Santhals
for jungle rights. Yet, while th§ Gandhian ideology ranged across class
divisions in society, the precise organisational forms it took in
various instances was determined by the objective class position of that 
170social group. Hence, while the Union Board movement grew out of the
strife between competing factions, its organisation and its rigid
170. N. Mouzelis, 'Ideology and Class Politics, a Critirue of Ernesto 
Laclau, New Left Review, 1 112, pp.45-61,
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adherence to non-violence was determined by the class position of its
leadership and participants. Of particular importance was its *pure'
nationalism stemming from the relatively privileged position of the
participants vis-&-vis land. No such conservative pulls existed in
the case of the Santhals and their absolute alienation from the
concept of private property, as postulated by western law, enabled
the particular direction of the movement to take a more radical and 
171militant course. This militancy was to be fatal for its success 
in a rural society where the ultimate peasant ambition was to own a 
patch of land. It was this which alienated them from the nationalist 
Bengalis in other parts of the district. It was a tragic end to a brave 
but strategically suicidal movement.
171. In fact it is no accident that some of the most radical rural 
movements, e.g. Naxalbari, Srikakuiam, Bhojpur, Debra- 
Gopiballavpur etc, have emerged from among the tribal community.
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CONGRESS AND MIDNAPUR POLITICS 1922 - 1930
When Congress called off the non-cooperation movement following the
outbreak of violence at Chauri Chaura, it was compelled to re-think
its political strategy. While a small number of Gandhian die-hards
remained intransigent, the majority of the Bengal Congress followed
1
the lead of C. R. Das and set up the Swaraj Party within Congress.
The Swaraj Party had as its objective, active intervention in the
reconstituted Bengal Legislative Council. B. N. Sasmal, having made
quite a name for himself during the Contai Union Board agitation,
2
was appointed a Provincial Organiser, of the Swaraj Party and a
3
Director of its daily paper Forward; Satcawripati Roy was also duly
4
honoured and co-opted on to the Party General Council.
The far reaching implications of the 1919 Government of India Act 
made a change in strategy imperative. Swarajists argued that the 
Congress decision to boycott Councils had not paralysed the operations 
of Dyarchy. "It has enabled the bureaucracy more than ever to further 
and consolidate its power through the help and active co-operation of a
5
small albiet influential group of our countrymen" This made it 
necessary to mount a campaign inside the Councils to isolate the 
government and make the reforms unworkable. At least on paper, the 
Swarajists had no intentions of being sucked into routine parliament- 
arianism. The hope was expressed "that the obstruction offered to the 
bureaucracy inside the legislatures would create a responsive echo 
outside and help prepare the necessary atmosphere for civil
Q
disobedience" And as a sop to the Gandhians who would have nothing
to do with Counci1-entry, Congressmen were called upon "to double their
efforts to carry out the constructive programme of our great leader
Mahatma Gandhi, by united endeavour to achieve Swaraj at the earliest 
7possible moment."
1. Das did not have a majority within the Bengal Congress initially, 
but did so by the beginning of 1923, J. H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict 
in a Plural Society, Berkeley 196B, p.235.
2. AICC 13/1923.
3. Forward 25th October 1923.
4. AICC 14/1923.
5. Forward 27th October 1923.




The franchise revisions of the 1919 Act had helped force this decision
to enter the Councils. The new Act provided that payment of Rs. 1 or
more as Public Works Cess, or Rs 2 as Chaukidari tax would qualify
a person to vote in the elections to the Legislative Council. As
a result, approximately 50,000 voters were registered in Midnapur
district alone. By the governments own admission, the great mass
of the rural electorate consisted of 'well to-do cultivators' with
average holdings of more than 1 0 acres and paying a minimum total
8
rent of Rs 32 at the rate of about Rs 3 an acre. Similarly in 
1919, the Government of Bengal in fallowing through some of the 
recommendations of the Hobhouse Commission on Decentralisation, 
instituted the system of majority non-official control of District 
Boards and Local Boards. For Local Board elections, the property 
franchise qualifications was further reduced to the payment of Rs
9
1 Chaukidari tax. The Bengal Village Self-Government Act stipulated
that two-thirds of the members of District and Local Boards would be
elected, and the rest nominated by the District Magistrate and the
Divisional Commissioner. Moreover it was decreed that only non-
officials could contest the posts of Chairman and Vice-Chairman. As
a result of this new constitution, implemented in 1920, the Midnapur
District Board had 22 members elected from the five subdivisional
10Local Boards and 11 nominated members.
The franchise revisions and the changes in structure of the organs 
of local self-government meant that politicians aspiring to reach 
Calcutta had to possess a district base and some support among the 
considerably expanded electorate. To this end, work in and around 
the District Board was a useful qualification, especially as, since 
1916, the resources at the disposal of the Board had been considerably 
enlarged. Hence the Congress declaration of 1922 that:
8 . Indian Statutory Commission, Oral Evidence, Bengal Vol 
pp. 2-3.
9. Ibid, p.6 .
10. Jud-Gen X/51/1921-2 (MRR).
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...it is desirable for Non-Cooperators to seek election
to Municipalities and District Boards or Local Boards
with a view to facilitate the working of the Constructive 
11Programme,,.
This must a l s o  be seen in the context of the Swarajists Council 
offensive and C. R. Das* pipedream of controlling the vast resources 
of the Calcutta Corporation.
Congress and the District Board
Though Midnapur, along with Calcutta, Dacca and Mymensingh, were 
regarded as strong Congress districts, the Congress organisation in
12
1922 was still inadequate to cope with the rigours of electoral politics.
Sasmal, who had built up the Congress organisation in the district during
the non-cooperation movement, had consciously avoided linking up the
Congress with the established local notables such^as Upendra Nath
Maity, the Chairman of the Midnapur town municipality, or the Nanda
family of Mugberia. Instead, the Midnapur District Congress Committee
(DCC) was reconstituted in 1921 by inducting the new recruits from the
non-cooperation movement - Sailajananda Sen, Nikunja Behari Maity,
Kumar Jana, Ishwar Chandra Mai, Pramatha Nath Bannerjee, Satish
13Chandra Samanta and Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee. It was an attempt to 
create not only a new leadership, but a leadership that would remain 
personally loyal to Sasmal. The significant exceptions to this trend 
were Mahendra Nath Maity, the leader of the Tamluk Bar, and Satcowripati 
Roy, who after 1923 drifted away to provincial Congress politics in 
Calcutta.
As a result of this weakness in Congress organisation, the party was 
compelled to make local adjustments for the ,1922 Local Board and District 
Board elections. In the elections to the Tamluk Local Board, the 
Congress candidate, Mahendra Nath Maity, was defeated by Ishan
11. Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee 1922, p.104.
•12. In 1924, the quota of Congress members for Midnapur was put at 
52,234. Forward, 3rd February 1924.
13. N. N. Das, History of Midnapur. Part II, Calcutta 1962, p.85.
150
Chandra Mahapatra, a relatively unknown candidate, in the Nandigram 
constituency. Anxious to neutralise a potential source of opposition 
the Congress, which had a majority on the Local Board, offered the
14victor a place on the District Board in return for his cooperation.
In the Contai Local Board, in return for their votes in defeating the
government lawyer, Devendra Narayan Mazumdar, in the election for
Chairman, the Congress rewarded Barrister Rebati Nath Maity,
Chittaranjan Ray and Girish Chandra Das, by having them elected to the 
15District Board. Similarly, in the Sadar Local Board, the Congress
members helped to get Devendralal Khan, the zemindar of Narajole, on 
to the District Board. All in all, as a result of these electoral 
understandings, in the 1922 District Board, the Congress could 
reasonably claim the support of 14 elected members, of whom 5 were 
mere sympathisers.
An interesting feature of the 1922 Midnapur District Board was the 
fact that only three of the elected members - Devendralal Khan, Rebati 
Maity, and Mohini Mohan Das - had been members of the outgoing District 
Board. This augured well for the Congress, as it was possible for
them to argue for a decisive break with the traditions of the old
ISDistrict Board. It was for this reason that the Congress put up
B. N. Sasmal for the post of Chairman against the veteran nominated
member and government lawyer, Shital Prasad Ghose, who had served as
Vice-Chairman in the past. The government officials were particularly
upset over Sasmal's candidature, especially considering his past record .
of destroying Union Boards in the district . The District Magistrate
H. Graham, and the Additional District Magistrate, James Pedie,
personally put pressure on all non-Congress elected members, such as
17Devendralal Khan, to vote against Sasmal. When Sasmal was ultimately 
elected on the casting vote of the Chairman, government officials did not 
hide their displeasure. A senior Civil Servant from Calcutta informed 
him:
14. Nihar, 29th July 1924.
15. Nihar, 12th December 1922, 1st July 1924, 29th July 1924.
Hijli Hitaishi 4th July 1924.
16. See Chapter 2.
17. Das, op.cit. p.99.
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To be honest I can not say that I welcome your appointment
18as Chairman of the D.Bd Midnapore.
The government could have used its discretionary powers to disapprove 
Sasmal's election, but with the Council elections coming up, they 
had no intention of jeopardising the future of the new constitution. 
But government hostility to Sasmal remained, and was to be a 
permanent feature during the Congress control of the District Board.
Official high-handedness was met by Congress populism. In 1928, the 
Swarajist daily, Forward, outlined the party's strategy towards 
institutions of local self-government:
The foundations of Swaraj, what Deshbandhu called Swaraj for 
the masses will be firmly and securely laid if the Congress 
successfully carry out the work of capturing local bodies 
and administering them on nationalist lines. Indeed the 
capture of the (Calcutta) Corporation and promulgation of 
Daridra Narayan programme were never conceived as isolated 
actions. Deshbandhu had in mind the farsighted and inspiring 
idea of reconstructing our decadent village life, of tackling 
the urgent problems of rural health, sanitation and primary 
education and of broadcasting the Congress ideals of national 
freedom and self-reliance among the rural population, through
19the administration of the local bodies by the Congress party.
Shorn of its rhetoric, this was a statement of intent that the Boards
would be used for overtly political ends and the propagation of
nationalist politics. Yet this is precisely what the Conaress-
20controlled Boards in most districts did not do. An official report 
published in 1927, noted with some satisfaction that wherever, 
Swarajists controlled the Local or District Boards they worked just 
as their non-party predecessors had done, and "practically nowhere 
was there in consequence any marked change in the methods or spirit
18. P. Pal, Deshapran Sasmal, Calcutta 1368 B.S., p.95.
19. Forward, 23rd June 1928.
20. For a defence of the Congress performance, particularly in the
Calcutta Corporation, see Rajat Ray, 'Historical Roots of the 
Crisis of Calcutta, 1876-1939' E.P.W ., 21st July 1979, pp. 1206 
- 11.
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of administration, or any attempts to injure the local institutions
of which they were members" The only exception to this trend, the
21
report noted, was the Midnapur District Board. This District
Board, according to the government, "has been used for some time as
22
an instrument of Congress propaganda"
The uniqueness of the Midnapur strategy, perfected by Sasmal, lay in 
using the District and Local Boards for purely and overtly political 
objectives i.e. building the Congress party and farcing occasional 
and tactical confrontations with the government. The attainment of 
power within the Boards by the Congress was not seen as an end in 
itself, but as a means to further the cause of the nationalist
23movement through mass mobilisation and development of a class base.
Confrontations with the government, some real and others forced were 
an essential element of Congress strategy, especially in the period 
1922-25 when Congress did not have an overall majority in the District 
Board. In 1923, the Governor, Lord Lytton, came on an official visit 
to Midnapur. At a District Board Meeting, Devendralal Khan suggested 
that the District Board should present an address to him. But Sasmal, 
as Chairman, had other ideas. In a ruling he declared:
l.Ve can discuss only those matters which are within the 
province of this Board. It is really common sense but it 
has also been laid down in Rule 6  of the Model Rules. The
presenting of an address to His Excellency has not been
24
provided in the Local Self-Government Act...
He therefore ruled the request out of order. Upon this 10 of the 31 
members present walked out in protest and a nominated member, Dwijadas 
Bhaduri, Manager of the Raja of Mayurbhanj's estate, gave notice of a 
no-confidence motion against Sasmal.
21. Report of the Working of the Reformed Constitution 1927, Calcutta 
1926, pp. 163-4.
22. F. R. June (l) 1930, GOI H. Poll 18/VII/1930.
23. There is an apparent similarity between the Midnapur Congress 
strategy and the current C.P.I-M. strategy in W. Bengal, as 
regards Panchayats. Promode Dasgupta, ’Interview1, Perspective, 
I,12,July 1978, p.13.
24. D. B. Progs, 30th November 1923.
25. Ibid, 29th April 1924.
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Although from a strictly legal point of view, Sasmal was clearly
in the wrong,^ the no-confidence.motion allowed him scope to turn
the tables on his opponents. The Congress machinery in the district
was quickly mobilised. At least 78 public meetings were held in the
27
district to pledge support for Sasmal. These meetings did not
discuss the rights or wrongs of Sasmal's ruling, but the right of
unrepresentative nominated members to exist at all, let alone their
28
right to challenge an elected Chairman. Also significant was the
fact that Congress members in the Ghatal and Sadar Local Board
succeeded in winning motions mandating their representatives to 
29
support Sasmal. This was intended to serve as a direct challenge 
to Devendralal Khan, who although an elected member, was opposed to 
Sasmal on this point, more so since he had hosted a reception in 
honour of Lord Lytton at his Gope Palace. In an obvious reference 
to Devendralal, Forward declared:
It remains to be seen if sTter this, the Sadar Local Board 
delegates to the District Board go against the wishes of
their constituency and court a well merited vote of no-
30confidence on them.
By appealing to the electorate directly, the Congress was achieving 
two results. Firstly, they were breaking new ground, by taking the 
affairs of the District Board out to the voters and thereby creating 
and consolidating a political base that would serve them in future 
elections. Secondly, by generating an outcry against nominated 
members, they were linking up the local affairs of Midnapur to the 
energetic campaign then being waged by C. R. Das inside the Legislative 
Council, against Dyarchy. In this, Sasmal was also pandering to the 
sentiments of the rank-and-file Congress members who needed a focus 
of activity in the absence of agitational politics.
The Congress campaign clearly took the government by some surprise.
26. GOB H. Poll 419/1923 (WBSA).
27. P. Pal, op.cit, pp. 101-5.
28. Forward, 23rd-30th April 1924.
29. D. B. Progs, 29th April 1924.
30. Forward, 29th April 1924.
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Seeing the growing public interest in the matter, the officers at
Calcutta issued instructions that though Sasmal was clearly in the
31wrong, it was ‘inadvisable* to take any further action. Consequently
Dwijadas Bhaduri moved in the .District Board that he wished to withdraw
his motion. Congress members, adding insult to injury, permitted
Bhaduri to withdraw his motion only on an assurance that he would
32
not introduce similar motions in future.
As Chairman of the District Board at a period when Congress was in a 
clear minority, Sasmal*s main preoccupation was to be able sufficiently 
to utilise the full resources of the Board with a view to improving 
the electoral prospects for the party in 1925. Whereas past chairmen 
or Vice-Chairmen of the Board, such as Atal Behari Sinha and Dr.
i
Abdullah Suhrawardy, had distinguished themselves by crude nepotism 
and utter indifference respectively, Sasmal threw himself energetically
r
into the job.
The pre-Congress District Boards had been singularly lax in their
implementation of such essential works as rural water supply. This
was in a district where most villages did not have proper drinking
water and where malaria was rampant. Between 1919 and 1921, the
District Board excavated a total of only 11 new tanks on their own 
33initiative. Within months of the Congress capturing the District
Board, the sanctioned expenditure on drinking water was raised from
34
Rs 4S,000 to Rs 100,000, and between 1923 and 1925, 282 tanks were
35
excavated by the District Board. Moreover, in a public statement, 
Sasmal warned all the District Board members that the Board would not 
help in the excavation of tanks for them or their relatives. The site
3Q
of the new tank would be decided after consulting local opinion.
Whether such lofty sentiments were actually translated into practice 
or not, Sasmal consciously strove to give the District Board a new and 
dynamic image. In another move, clearly linked to the Congress bid to 
wrest the Midnapur town Municipality from the hands of Upendra Nath
31. GOB H. Poll 419/1923 (WBSA).
32. D. B. Progs, 29th April 1924.
33. BLC Progs, VII, 1, 1922, p.6 .
34. Nihar 13th November 1923.
35. P. Pal, op.cit, pp. 97-101.
36. Nihar, 2nd December 1924.
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Maity, Sasmal sanctioned a sum of Rs. 50,000 tov/ards the building
37
of water works for the town.
Rural health and sanitation^ was the other major area of Congress *
initiatve. In 1922, before Sasmal took over, the District Board
A  *
expenditure on health was Rs. 53, 282 and there were 7 dispensaries
run by the Board; by 1925, the sanctioned expenditure had risen by
30
about 100% to Rs 105,985 and the number of dispensaries to 21. The 
setting up of dispensaries in rural areas was an essential element 
of the Congress strategy. Besides enabling modern medicine to reach a 
relatively wider layer of people, the establishment of dispensaries 
was accompanied by the formation of dispensary committees who 
collectively ran the establishments. The members of the local 
committees were nominated by the District Board, and Congress members 
ensured that local notables, mainly the smaller zamindars and jotedars 
were coopted into the committees alongside some government functionaries 
and local Congress members. This move enabled Congress to establish 
direct liason with important sections of the landholders, involve 
them in the District Board network and therefore secure them as 
potential allies for Congress election campaigns*
Since the growth and expansion of the Congress party was the central
element of their strategy, Congress members jealously guarded against
all government inspired initiatives in the rural areas. Sasmal made
it clear that Congress was opposed to societies like irrigation societies
or anti-malarial societies being set up under government supervision,
as he was apprehensive of their being turned into centres of opposition
39to what he described as the 'independent exertions of the people*
Instead, health committees staffed almost exclusively by enthusiastic
young Congress volunteers were set up with the aid of funds from the 
40
District Board. In Contai, an anti-malarial society was established 
by Ishwar Chandra Mai, the secretary of the Contai Congress Committee, 
with a grant of Rs 5,000 from the District Board. The society and its 
volunteers went out to remote areas to destroy overgrown jungles and 
take steps to stop the breeding of mosquitoes in stagnant water. While 
there, they organised political meetings and often helped to set up
37. Forward, 18th December 1924.
38. P. Pal, op.cit, pp. 97-101.
39. Forward, 27th May 1924.
40. Hijli Hitaishi, 22nd August 1924.
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41
a local Congress branch. This strategy of social work was an 
integral part of the Midnapur Congress* 'constructive programme' 
and attracted villagers towards the Congress as an organisation 
that was responsive to their needs.
Faced with a strategy that was dedicated to the building of the Congress 
party, opponents naturally attempted to mount a campaign to discredit 
the party and its leaders. In Midnapur, ammunition for this was not 
lacking. Though an energetic Chairman, Sasmal was not above corruption 
and nepotism. It is difficult to ascertain how many of these cases were 
the result of Sasmal's own arbitrary action or the result of a collective 
Congress decision, since the attacks of the opposition were concentrated 
on Sasmal in person.
In December 1924, Rai Shital Prasad Ghose Bahadur, a nominated member,
raised the issue of nepotism in the contracts for the purchase of
medicines for District Board dispensaries. In July 1924, Sasmal had
passed an order terminating the contract of Messrs. B. K. Paul and
Company and had instead given the order to one Nagendra Mohan Bose, a
local lawyer with Congress sympathies. This was in spite of the fact
that the tender submitted by Bose would cost the District Board at
least Rs 2,000 more than two other quotations. Moreover, Bose had no
42previous experience in distributing medicines. It was also revealed
subsequently that Bose, using the name of the District Health Officer
had successfully managed to get medicines at a cheap price from the
Alipore Juvenile Jail in Calcutta and had sold them to the District
43Board at a small profit. It should be noted, however, that the
opposing members of the Board were themselves acting at the behest
44
of the ousted contractor.
There was also evidence to suggest that Sasmal was guilty of nepbtism
by distributing key contracts to friends and relatives. There was the
case of one Nilkanta Maity, a road contractor whose bills were handled
45
personally by Sasmal and whose road repairs left much to be desired.
41. Nihar, 2nd December 1924 and 16th June 1925.
42. D. B. Progs, 23rd December 1924, 14th February 1925, 30th July 1925.
43. Hijli Hitaishi, 21st August 1925.
£4. D. B. Progs, 14th February 1925 (later expunged from the minutes).
45. Hijli Hitaishi, 23rd October 1925.
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Further, at the key Petuaghat ferry crossing where fifty people were
drowned in 1925 as a result of the overloading of boats, it was
discovered that two of the responsible contractors, Gyanendra Nath
46Sasmal and Nabakumar Manna, were close associates of Sasmal, A
report prepared by the Inspector of Local Works, W. J. Carr, noted
that personnel in charge of the roads in four of the Local Boards
47did not possess the requisite qualifications. In the Contai
Local Board, the Chairman, Bepin Behari Sasmal, the elder brother of
B. N. Sasmal, was accused of "spending money recklessly without any
48regard to the fact that he is answerable to the Board" But the
most serious allegation which prompted government action was in the
case of the appointment of the District Engineer. In 1924, the
District Board sanctioned the appointment of B..B. Dutt, the son of
Barrister K.B.Dutt, as District Engineer in spite of the fact that
49he was not qualified for this important job. However, Sasmal 
justified the appointment of this unqualified person on the grounds 
that he would be receiving Rs 100 less than the stipulated salary.
He saw government objections as another example of how the system of 
Dyarchy patronised 'white elephants' by paying them high salaries which 
could otherwise be utilised on 'public benefits'. "It is really strange" 
it was said in Congress circles, "that under the present system of local 
self-government the District Board cannot even appoint an officer at its 
own discretion"
Accusations of corruption and nepotism formed the major plank of the
campaign by the opposition, but did not carry much weight with the
electorate. This had less to do with the validity of the charges than
with the credibility of the accusers. Within the District Board, the
main opposition to the Congress was led by two nominated members, Rai
Shital Prasad Ghose Bahadur and Rai Manmatha Nath Bose Bahadur, both
government lawyers. Besides the fact that they were too closely linked
51to the District Magistrates, their handling of District Boahd affairs 
before 1922 had not won them any universal praise.
46. Ibid, 23rd December 1926.
47. Ibid, 2nd June 1927,
48. Ibid, 6 th June 1924.
49. Ibid, 1st July 1926.
50. Forward 18th December 1924.
51. The Khas Mulakati List noted that they were always "at the 
service of the Magistrate". GOB H. Poll 10/1926 (WBSA).
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A second opposition bloc operated from Contai town and published a
weekly paper, Hijli Hitaishi. This was led by two local pleaders,
Abanti Charan Maity and Nagendra Nath Bakshi, both of whom were active
52in opposing the anti-Union Board agitation of 1921. The group also 
had the support of Sruti Nath Chakravarty, the Headmaster of Hamilton
School, Tamluk, and Gyanada Charen Base, a retired government servant
53
residing at Contai. As the Congress consolidated their hold on the
District Board this group was joined by disaffected Congressmen.
Barrister Rebati Nath Maity and Chittaranjan Ray joined after Sasmal
threw them out of the Congress group in the District Board for
54
disobeying a mandate. Jagadish Chandra Maity, the Headmaster of
Kalagechia National School joined after the Contai Congress Committee
opposed his arbitrary decision to convert the National School into a
55Government English-medium school. The main financial backing of the
group came from the Hari Sabha temple which they ran in Contai town,
and from the Nanda family, the zamindars of Mugberia. The Nandas, who
were previously associated with the zamindar nationalist grouping around
Raja Narendra Lai Khan of Narajole, broke away from the Congress after
the District Board decided to levy a road tax on bus operators; the
56
Nandas ran a major bus company in Midnapur.
The weakness of the opposition groupings, besides the obvious disadvan­
tage of being too closely linked with the government, lay in their lack 
of a party organisation. They comprised a motley mob of Loyalists, 
responsivists, disgruntled Congressmen and plain opportunists who 
lacked any common political perspective besides a mutual hatred of 
Sasmal and the Midnapur Congress. As a result, during the Local 
Board elections of 1925, they concentrated their propaganda against 
Congress misrule, when they offered any alternative, it was normally
a call to voters to elect candidates "absolutely on the basis of their
57
individual affiliations" But they clearly made a tactical blunder 
by attempting to project Congress as a sort of Bolshevik organisation
52. See Chapter 5.
53. GOB H. Poll 80/1921 (WBSA).
54. Hijli Hitaishi, 4th July 1924.
55. Nihar, 6 th October 1925.
56. Nihar, 7th, April 1925, 16th June 1925.
57. Hijli Hitaishi, 7th August 1925.
159
determined to end the influence of men of wealth in politics:
But a s e c t i o n . on seeing these well-to-do people in the 
Congress are saying to the masses: 'The Congress is about 
to be ruined; the poor man's Congress has become the rich 
man's Congress; the Congress flag is lying at the feet of 
rich men • We as|< whether the National Congress is only 
the poor man's party and not the rich man's too? The richi 
poor, educated, uneducated, zamindar, peasant, Hindu,
Muslim, Jain, Christian, all embrace under the Congress 
flag to fight together for the freedom of the motherland.
Those who wish to exclude the rich do not realise that
without the blessings of Lakshmi the Congress movement
. . 58cannot survive.
The opposition was clearly unaware of the implications of the 
franchise revisions which had broadened the electorate substantially 
to include more than just the zemindars and the mofussil professionals.
The Congress propaganda in the Local Board elections was more 
coordinated. The main thrust of the campaign was to point to the 
tangible benefits received by the people since they took over the 
District Board. Thus the voters at Contai were reminded of the huge 
grants given for the establishment of charitable dispensaries, anti­
malaria programmes, drinking water and the construction of a burning- 
59ghat. But these were also linked to the overall Congress movement 
and the struggle for independence. Nikunja Behari Maity, in an 
article to the local paper wrote:
The time has come in our district to take over the 
responsibility of the Local Board. But who is fit to 
undertake this task? Who will our countrymen give this 
responsibility to? Those cowards who pander to the whims
58. Ibid, 1 1 th November 1926.
59. Nihar, 2nd December 1924.
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of the foreign bureaucracy, or those courageous, patriotic 
Congress workers? Those who are slothful and lethargic, or 
those who half-starved and hungry have gone from field to
field, from village to village, working for the good of the
. „60 country?
The Congress campaign was also helped by the fact that Devendralal 
Khan had for the moment patched up his differences with the local 
Congress leadership and had agreed to support their election. Lastly, 
Sasmal himself left nothing to chance and personally travelled a 
distance of 2 , 0 0 0  miles, speaking at about a hundred election
4 .4 6 1meetings.
The results justified his efforts, as the Congress won a landslide 
victory. Congress candidates won all the elected seats in the Jhargram, 
Contai, Tamluk and Ghatal Lbcal Boards; in the Sadar Local Board, they 
won 19 of the 20 seats. Prominent opposition members such as Upendra 
Nath Maity, Kailash Chandra Bhunia, Dwijadas Bhaduri, Mahmood Suhrawardy^ 
Chittaranjan Ray and Abanti Kumar Maity were humbled in the polls. The 
scale of the Congress victory can be gauged by the fact that in Contai 
town, of the 1,200 votes cast, 1,100 were in favour of the Congress 
candidate; in Keshpur thana, Bijoy Krishna Khan, the brother of
Devendralal Khan, polled 679 votes against his sole opponent who got
62
47 ( also see Table 6 :1 ). With a clear majority in the Local Boards^ 
Congress candidates were elected to all the 22 elected seats in the 
District Board.
Sasmal and Congress re-entered the District Board in 1926 in a jubilant 
and aggressive mood. Whereas the government consistently held the view 
that "his administration was extravagent, autocratic and unconstitutional"* 
Sasmal was clearly of the view that the elections had vindicated his 
approach and was in no mood to succumb to governmental pressure. The 
government was particularly anxious to enlist the support of Sasmal 
in their renewed bid to introduce Union Boards into Midnapur. But the 
Congress in Midnapur made their views clear to the government in
early April, 1926:
60. Ibid, 21st July 1925.
61. Forward, 28th October 1925
62. Ibid, 28th October 1925.
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A Village Self-Government Act does not by itself impart 
self-government to a village; the deception in the present 
instance is so thin and transparent that even ignorant and 
illiterate village masses in their placid and pathetic 
contentment may be credited with intelligence enough to 
discover it. The Midnapore rout should have imparted its 
lesson to the Bengal bureaucracy. The latter should have 
been convinced that its peaceful penetration into the hitherto 
unconquered or uncontrolled village life is not to be welcomed 
there...The advertised 'democratisation' of village life is 
in reality a sinister attempt at its bureaucratisation...
The poor villager cannot have time or inclination to bother 
much about your cumbrous dissertations on ‘Self-Government' 
or other government, specially about that particular type of
village Self-Government which is patented by the District
64-
Magistrate and administered by the village chaukidar.
Indeed, the tone of the-reply made it quite clear that the Midnapur 
Congress was not prepared even to negotiate with the government.
The government too had limited options. The overwhelming Congress
victory at the polls had clearly shattered any hopes the government
might have had of replacing the party 'democratically'. On 28th
April 1926, the new District Board met and re-elected Sasmal as
Chairman. But government still held the trump card. The Local
Self-Government Act stipulated that the election of the Chairman
had to be approved by the Minister in charge of that department, and
government threatened to use this as a lever against Sasmsl in a bid to
get him to change his ways, especially on the question of the appoint-
65
ment of the 'unqualified' District Engineer. The Divisional 
Commissioner wrote to Sasmal on the 28th May asking for a meeting • The 
latter overwhelmed by his electoral success wrote back that he was a
ss
busy man and, in any case, preferred to settle the matter in writing.
The government was not alone in wanting to rid Midnapur of Sasmal. They 
found unexpected allies in the Congress circles in Calcutta, led by the
64. Forward, 1st April 1926.
65. Indian Statutory Commission, Oral Evidence, Bengal Val I,
Evidence of J. G. Drummond, Secy L.S.G. Dept. p.43
6 6 . Forward. 14th July 1926.
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ex-terrorist Karmi Sangh who were angry over Sasmal*s speech at the
Krishnanagar Provincial Conference, wherB he had strongly criticised
the methods of the terrorists. The Karmi Sangh was also strongly
egged on by Or. B. C. Roy who wanted his friend Devendralal Khan to
contest the Midnapur North seat for the Legislative Council, instead 
67
of Sasmal. Apparently having noticed these striking developments 
outside Midnapur, the government issued a notification on 12th July 
1926, declaring without reason that they had not approved B. N.
Sasmal*s election and that they nominated Devendralal Khan as 
Chairman.^®
The appointment of Devendralal Khan as Chairman was received with 
howls of protest from the local Congress. At a meeting of all Congress 
members of Local Boards and the District Board, a motion was passed 
condemning the action of government and calling upon Devendralal to 
resign his post. But Devendralal was in no mood to oblige. He 
first denied that he was ever involved with the Congress in any way
70and questioned the right of the Midnapur DCC to speak for the district.
In the face of overwhelming Congress hostility, Devendralal attempted
to regroup all the old opposition forces in the district. When he
visited Contai town in September 1926, he was accompanied by Upendra
Nath Maity, Rebati Nath Maity and Chittaranjan Ray; the local Congress
71attempted to call a hartal against his visit. Events took a more
bizarre turn when thanks to the intervention of senior Congress leaders
in Calcutta, Devendralal Khan, along with Rebati Nath Maity and
Gangadhar Nanda of Mugberia, was given the Congress nomination for the
ensuing elections to the Legislative Council. The Midnapur Congress
72had no option but to set up their own *rebel* candidates.
Within the District Board, Devendralal faced surprisingly little
apposition. He allowed the Congress majority to record the District
Board’s disapproval of the government’s conduct and therefore neutralised
73the immediate discontent. His position wqs strengthened by the 
government’s adamant refusal to re-consider its decision on Sasmal.
67. This is discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section.
6 8 . Forward, 29th July 1926.
69. Ibid, 7th August 1926.
70. Hijli Hitaishi, 29th July 1926.
71. Ibid, 30th September 1926.
72. This is discussed in greater detail below.
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Moreover, Devendralal's acceptance as a Congress candidate 
legitimised his own position and also split the Midnapur Congress, 
at least in the Sadar region. The pro-Sasmal lobby had to reconcile 
itself to the bitter fact; that the government was not going to 
concede their case, and that they were powerless to do anything else 
especially after Sasmal's defeat in the Legislative Council elections.
As Chairman of the District Board, Devendralal attempted to reverse
some of the steps taken by Sasmal. He dismissed from District Board
employment various staff members known to have been appointed by Sasmal 
74
personally. More significant, he made life difficult for those Local
Boards who were known for their opposition to him. By January 1927,
the Contai Local Board claimed they had received a mere Rs 8,500 grant
75from the District Board as opposed to Rs 61,500 in the previous year.
Moreover, in spite of the fact that there was an epidemic of smallpox
and cholera waging in Contai, Devendralal reversed the previous
District Board decision to appoint vaccinators locally and decided to
send them down from Midnapur town, the district headquarters, where his
76
supporters were concentrated. In fact, four months after the epidemic
outbreak vaccinators still had hot been sent and it required the local
M.L.C., Pramatha Nath Bannerjee, to bring the Director of the Health
77Department to Contai, before 20 vaccinators were actually sent. But
by and large, Devendralal, after winning his election to the Legislative
Council, lost interest in his job at the District Board. Whereas, in
1924-25, Sasmal had spent 74 days in the year touring the district,
78Devendralal spent a mere 8 . In fact, by the beginning of the summer
79season of 1927, Devendralal was off on leave, holidaying in Europe.
80In 1928, he resigned his seat on the District Board. With Devendralal 
Khan fading away from district politics, and there being no other elected 
member who would willingly accept the mantle of 'nominated' Chairman, 
the government had no option than to restore to the Midnapur District 
Board, in July 1927, the right to have an elected Chairman. In the 
event, Sasmal too withdrew from the mainstream of Midnapur politics,
73. D.B. Progs, 7th August 1926.
74. Hijli Hitaishi, 16th December 1926.
75. Nihar, 21st December 1926. 4th January 1927.
76. Ibid, 21st December 1926.
77. Ibid, 29th March 1927, 5th April 1927.
78. Jud-Gen XX/57/1926 (MRR).
79. Nihar, 17th April 1927.
80. Ibid, 1st May 1928.
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and Kishoripati Roy was elected.
Though Kishoripati Roy was formally the Chairman, real power in the
81District Board was exercised by Atul Chandra Bose, the Vice-Chairman. 
Under him the pattern of District Board activity initiated by Sasmal 
was resumed, now with an overwhelmingly Congress majority. More than 
ever before, the Congress members in the Boards showed scant respect 
for statutory rules and regulations. By transferring the entire 
proceeds of the Roads and Public Works Cess to 1he District Board, the 
government had hoped to transfer also the onus for the upkeep and 
expansion of the Imperial Works. Moreover, they gave the District 
Board almost unlimited powers of taxation in the belief that taxes 
imposed by local elected members would be less lifc£ly to provoke 
political unrest than those imposed by an alien; government, but the 
Congress members in Midnapur refused to play this game.
The Midnapur District Board continued to spend the greater proportion
of its income on social services such as health and education, much to
the displeasure of the officials who were more concerned with such
82'essential* items as communications. Moreov^v., the local rates 
imposed by the District Board remained more or less constant during 
the 1920 s (see Table 6:2). What irked the officials even more was 
that the most elementary rules of accountancy were disregarded by the
83
District Board, so much so that budget headings were rarely observed.
When the District Engineer, who was a confidant the District
Magistrate, complained about the irregularities, Congress members
84
immediately had him suspended for insubordination. So recklessly 
had Congress members overspent that at the end of 1929-30, the District 
Board had liabilities in arrears amounting to Rs 115,000, which seemed 
too great a sum to officials familiar with very conservative budgeting.1 
The start of the Civil Disobedience movement therefore must have come 
as a relief to the government authorities, In 1920, correctly 
gauging that the District Board could be used as a centre for anti­
government activities, the authorities superseded “the Board and
8.1. Interview with S. K. Gupta, 30th July 1978.
82. Jud-Gen XIV/50/1930 (MRR).
83. Ibid and Jud-Gen XVl/50/1931 (MRR).
84. D.B. Progs 2nd March 1930 and Interview with S.K.Gupta 
30th July 1970.
85. Jud-Gen XIV/50/1931 (MRR).
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appointed James Pedie, the District Magistrate, as Chairman.
The Congress performance in the District Board and Local Boards raises
certain important questions that have considerable significance in the
study of political mobilisation. To what extent was the Congress success
in Midnapur dependent on their ability to dispense patronage through the
organs of local self-government? To begin with, it must be noted, that
certain historians have used ’patronage' in an all-embracing pejorative
sense and have confused corrupt dealings with the normal practice of
87
catering to the needs of the constituents. Also underlying their 
research is a rather naive belief in the ideal of a selfless, 
altruistic politician who would do nothing to build up his personal 
following or that of his political party; the model of this politician 
is almost akin to the caricature of the impartial (sic) nameless and 
faceless bureaucrat. Moreover, this belief is compounded with the 
assumption that doling out favours in the shape of contracts, grants 
or jobs to a few people is adequate to win the votes of the electorate,. 
Had this been the pattern of political behaviour in India, then neither 
the Justice Party in pre—independent Madras Presidency nor the Congress 
party in past-independent West Bengal could have been removed from 
governmental office. ’Patronage politics’ in itself is not an adequate 
criterion for the retention and perpetuation of political support, even 
under the conditions of the 1919 property franchise.
At the hearings of the Indian Statutory Commission, which the Congress 
boycotted, Khan Bahadur Azizul Huque, giving evidence on behalf of the 
’Representatives of Rural Interests from West Bengal', said:
...today you will find that society has become much more
complex and much more advanced, with the result that every
District Board in Bengal is in chronic financial poverty, .both
88constitutionally as well as in regard to financial powers.
These sentiments were reiterated by Maulvi Abul Kasem, who while agreeing
86. GOI H. Poll 248/1980 (NAl).
87. See especially C. J. Baker, The Politics of South India 1920-37
Delhi 1976, pp. 118-31.







that District Boards had enlarged their powers, noted:
but unless they get financial aid, how are they going to
89
exercise these powers or improve what they do?
What emerges from these statements is the fact that District Boards
although endowed with adequate, formal, constitutional powers, did not
possess the necessary financial resources to cope with the magnitude
pf their task. Thus, though the number of dispensaries in the district
rose ffom 14 in 1910-11 to 40 in 1930-31, and the number of out-patients
rose by 183% to 271,998 in the corresponding period, health facilities
in Midnapur were pitifully inadequate; the number of hospital beds in
the district actually fell from 140 to 138, i.e. one hospital bed per
73,660 of the population in 1931. Lavish spending in education
resulted in a 34.4% increase in the number of pupils in District
Board/government-aided institutions between 1921-22 and 1930-31,
but there were only 2 colleges, 43 high schools and 109 middle schools
in the district. In the absence of a self-financing private sector,
grants from government and/or the District Board were essential for
90
the development of education and the social services. Yet, in more 
than a hundred years of direct, paternalistic rule, the British Raj 
had failed to provide the necessary resources for the development of 
those institutions that were essential to the needs of the people of 
Midnapur. Therefore, having to start almost from scratch and with 
limited resources, Congressmen in the District Board were faced with 
the uphill task of attempting to provide a minimum of basic amenities 
for the people of the district. This they did, perhaps not in the 
most efficient manner and not without some corrupt practices; but it 
was on the basis of those limited measures that they managed to 
acquire some credibility for themselves.
But the extent to which the Congress record in the District Board 
helped to build up a political base must not be exaggerated. If 
political success depended on the ability to build more schools, 
hospitals, dispensaries and water-works, then Congress did achieve 
very little. In 1930, Midnapur was still lacking and continues to
89. Ibid, p.23.
90. Figures compiled from Midnapore District Gazetteer, B.
Volumes 1900-1 to 1910— 11 and 1920-21 to 1930-31,
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lack, those civic and service facilities that characterise a modern 
society. Had Congress pinned its hopes of political success on 
creating these, it would have raised false expectations among the 
people and would consequently have fallen victim to an inevitable 
political backlash based on the frustration of rising expectations. 
Congress used its control of the District Board to cater to some very 
basic and elementary needs of the people, but above all, it used 
the Board to provide the necessary atmosphere conducive to the 
spread of nationalist politics. This meant essentially freedom 
from some petty bureaucratic constraints, and preventing the 
emergence of a rival political force capable of challenging its 
hegemony. In a rural society where social status and power emanated 
from the control of the land, political success or failure depended 
on a party's politics and strategies on the crucial land question.
Congress and the Land Question
The emergence of Gandhi as the leader of the Indian National Congress
coincided with the entry of the middle classes and the peasantry into
the nationalist movement. Describing the 1920 Special session of the
Congress in Calcutta, Nehru wrote: "A new class of delegate drawn
from the lower middle classes, became the type of Congressman...
Now the peasants rolled in, and in its new garb Congress began to
91assume the look of a vast agrarian organisation" The non-cooperation
movement saw the massive participation of middle and poor peasants in
various parts of the country.^ In Bengal, with the mergingjof the
Khilafat and the Congress movements, poor Muslim peasants in East Bengal
played some part in the non-cooperation to the extent that some Hindu
93
political commentators warned of an impending 'social revolution' 
However, with the end of the movement in 1922 and the adoption of the 
Council-entry programme by C.R.Das, Congress abandoned systematic work 
among these underprivileged participants and concentrated its energies 
in securing a majority within the Council to thwart the progress of 
Dyarchy. In an obvious attempt to woo the zemindars and members of
91. Quoted in Jairus Banaji ' The Comintern and Indian Nationalism' 
International, III, 4, 1977, p.27.
92. Gyanendra Pandey, The Ascendancy of the Congress in Utter Pradesh 
1926-34, OUP 1978, Ch. 3 and 7.
93. See J. H. Broomfield, op.cit. p.225.
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of the Nationalist grouping in Bengal, the Swaraj Party manifesto 
of 1923 stated:
True it is that the Party stands for justice to the tenant
but poor indeed will be the quality of that justice if it
involves any injustice to the landlord. The party believes
that it is only by serving the true interests of both that
94
it can find a solid base for Swarajya...
After certain zamindar Council members had co-operated with the Swaraj 
Party to defeat government motions on Ministers', salaries, the Swarajist 
leadership went out of its way to involve more and more zamindars into 
the organisation. . An article in Forward summed up the current 
thinking:
Their independence and courage have been phenomenal and the
country owes them a deep debt of gratitude that they have
made such a bold stand in spite of the known difficulties
and delicacy of their position. Their sympathy for the poor
of the province, their efforts to ameliorate^ the hopeless
condition of the masses augurs well for the improvement of
the village, and directly contradicts the mischievous lie
that the nationalist movement is a middle class movement for
the purpose of safeguarding middle class rights...By associating
with the progressive movement they have proved themselves,natural
leaders of the people and have shown conclusively that the
Zamindars are determined to occupy their proper place in
95
the province. All honour and glory to them.
In pursuance of this policy of attracting zamindars to the .nationalist
cause, the Swaraj Party supported the candidature of Raja Pramethanath
Roy of Dighapatia, Priyanath Roy of Bhagyakul, the Raja of Natore and
96Devendralal Khan of Narajole in the 1926 elections. Moreover, Tulshi
94. Quoted in Gyanendra Pandey, ’A Rural Base for Congress: The 
United Provinces 1920-1940' in D. A. Low (ed), Congress end the 
Raj, London 1977, p.213.
95. Whip, 'Bengal Council: Its Work', Forward 13th April 1924.
96. Santosh Papers, Clippings (NMML) and Forward 1st December 1925.
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Charan Goswami, a major zamindar became a leading member of the
inner coterie of the Swaraj Party. In fact, one Congress member
claimed that about three-fourths of the Swaraj Party members in the
97
Legislative Council were zamindars.
There v/ere three basic reasons for the Swaraj Party's overwhelming 
dependence on zamindars. Firstly, it arose from the Congress leader­
ship's particular understanding of the national movement as an all- 
class alliance against British imperialism. Nehru expressed this
most succinctly: "Our activity should be such as to appeal or inspire
98the largest number or clashes of our countrymen..." For the Bengal 
Congress, Kumar Shankar Roy expressed this tendency by appealing to 
zamindars to make some minor concessions to the tenants.
This will not only earn their goodwill but will give you 
good value for your holdings and thereby giving (sic) you 
greater yields in the shape of higher rents and premiums.
99It will then only be possible for you to act as their leaders.
Secondly, there was the fact of the real weakness of the national
bourgeoisie in Bengal. Unlike Bombay, where the control of the cotton
textile industries was vested in the hands of an Indian capitalist
class sympathetic to the aspirations of Indian nationalism, there
was no corresponding pattern of indigenous entrepreneurship in
Calcutta. In 1914, 81.26% of total European rupee investment in India
was concentrated in Calcutta and at the end of the period in 1947 this
proportion was still 7 2 . 2 8 % . This meant that the financial support
for Congress available to the organisation from the national bourgeoisie
was severely limited. As a result, the leadership of the Bengal Congress
had to look to 'patriotic* zamindars to support the Congress financially.
The rise in the Congress organisation of a zamindar like Devendralal Khan
of Narajole was in no small measure the result of his ability to contribute 
1Q1generously. Lastly, the rapid increase in communalism following the
97. Article by Pramatha Nath Bannerjee, Nihar, 13th September 1928.
98. Quoted in Pandey, ’A Rural Base for Congress',p.214.
99. Kumar Shankar Roy, 'An Appeal' Forward, 28th December 1924.
100. Rejat K. Ray Industrialisation in India: Growth and Conflict in 
the Private Corporate Sector 1914-47, OUP 1979 p.51.
101. Interview with Mrs. Anjali Khan.
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riots of 1926 and the breakdown of the Bengal Pact led to a shift
away from nascent class politics in Bengal. Since electoral battles
preoccupied the Bengal Congress in the 1920"s and communalism had
infected the entire political climate of the province, Hindus as
a body were almost bound to vote for any Congress candidate nominated
by the leadership. This led to a disproportionate increase in the
influence of zamindar Congressmen, while at the same time further
alienating the Muslims, especially in East Bengal. In fact,
concessions to tenants and reducing the powers of the zamindars
were equated with a fear of the political rise of the Muslims, more
so since the greatest advocates of tenancy legislation were invariably
102the Muslim politicians. This would also explain why in 1938, almost 
all the Congress and Hindu Legislators opposed the Education Cess on 
zamindars imposed by the Fazlul Huq ministry. All these factors 
together contributed towards a situation whereby Congress in Bengal 
became, to use a phrase of John Gallagher 'so radical in style, so 
conservative in practice'
s
On the 7th July 1921, the Bengal Legislative Council passed a 
resolution recommending the appointment of a Committee to consider 
and report on the amendments needed in the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1805.
The Committee presented its report along with a preliminary draft of 
a Bill, in December 1922. The draft was circulated and modified, and 
a Bill was introduced in the Legislative Council on 3rd December 1925.
The Council then referred the Bill to a Select Committee of 1B members. 
The Select Committee submitted its report which suggested certain 
alterations to the draft bill. But the members of the Select Committee 
were far from unanimous in their views, and 13 members wrote notes of 
dissent. The government was therefore unable to accept the views of 
the Select Committee and so referred the matter to an informal sub­
committee. The advice given by this body was accepted by the government
with minor modifications and was presented as a Bill to the Council and
104
became the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1928.
Thus, from the end of 1922 till the Bill became law in 1929, Bengal
102. Article by Pramatha Nath Bannerjee, Nihar, 13th September 1928.
103. John Gallagher, 'Congress in Decline: Bengal 1930-39' in Gallagher, 
Johnson and Seal (ed), op.cit, p.324
104. The Bengal Tenancy Act [Act VIII of 1885) as Modified up to the
22nd February 1929, Annotated by Sir P.C.Mitter and M-nmatha 
Nath Mukher.ii. Calcutta 1929, p.XXV.
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witnessed a continuous debate at all levels on the question of land 
reforms. The examination of this debate in Midnapur, and the political 
initiatives arising from it enable us to get some picture of the 
political orientation of the local Congress.
One of the main recommendations of the Committee formed in 1921 and
headed by Sir John Kerr, was a proposal to give occupancy rights to
105a certain class of bargadars« This was a radical proposal as it
sought to eliminate the various layers of tenant intermediaries who
were not actually involved in the actual cultivation of the land.
In practical terms, this proposal, if implemented, would have resulted
in the erosion of powers of the jotedars as well as large sections of
cultivating tenure-holders who let out some section of their holdings
to bargadars . The peculiarities of the pattern of landholding in
Midnapur such that bargadars comprised a small minority of the
peasant population. According to the 1931 Census, only 30,158 males
and 1881 females earned their principal livelihood by cultivating as
tenants without security of tenure; this was opposed to 357,143 people
whose principal livelihood came from their position as cultivators 
106
with tenure. This numerical weakness, coupled with the fact that
the bargadars did not have the franchise, meant that they could not 
find any political backing for their cause, at least not in Midnapur. 
Neither did they possess any independent organisations of their own 
representing their interests. Thus it was hardly surprising that 
the Kerr Committee’s proposal could not muster any support in the 
district.
The news of the Kerr Committee's recommendations created a minor
panic in Midnapur. Apprehensive of the fact that government might
grant security of tenure to the bargadars t many ryots and jotedars
107refused to hand over their plots for cultivation. The tenure- 
holders made common cause with the zamindars against the government.
At a meeting in Tamluk, presided over by Raja Surendranath Roy of 
Tamluk, and attended by 800 people, a resolution was passed:
"Having heard that the present Tenancy Act will be changed, this 
meeting protests on the ground that the changes will be of a
105. Report of the Bengal Land Revenue Commission, 1940, Vol 1, p.29.
105. Census of India, 1931, Vol V, Part II, pp. 82-3, These figures 
do not include the number of dependents.
107. Letter from Ashutosh Jana, Nihar, 10th April 1923.
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revolutionary character."1 0 8  A note from the 'Inhabitants of Midnapur' was
109sent to the government opposing the government's moves. Rai
Manmatha Nath Bose Bahadur, Government Pleader, Rajendra Chandra
Sengupta, Munsif Qhatal, and Atul Chandra De, Pleader, gave
evidence to the government that "under-ryots should not be given
the status of an occupancy ryot. This may be left to custom and 
110usage" A petition against the measure was circulated in Contai
111subdivision and was signed by at least 153,100 people. Ashutosh
Jana, a veteran tenant activist, summed up the basic sentiments of
the opposition: "No one is willing to recognise bhagchasis or
1 1 2bargadars as tenants. They are mere agricultural labourers"
113In the face of such overwhelming pressure from 'loyalist' supporters,
zamindars, Congressmen and tenants, the goverment was compelled to
abandon its schemes for the extension of occupancy rights to 
114
bargadars. However, it should be borne in mind that although the
ryots and the jotedars made common cause with the zamindars to oppose
this particular aspect of the Bill, a distinction was always made of the
separate interests of the two groups, i.e. between tenants and landlords.
Nihar, which at that point in time was an uncritical supporter of the
Midnapur Congress and Sasmal, while urging tenants to oppose rights for
bargadars. also urged them to unite against the zamindars. It suggested
that tenants link up with the struggle against zamindari harassment in
other parts of the district and take up membership of the Bengal Krishak
115
and Raiyat Sabha. In opposing the government, the Congress in Midnapur
was always careful not to advocate retention of the status quo, but to 
argue for the extension of the rights of the entire body of tenants.
This latter aspect of its programme was to be of crucial importance 
in the next stage of the Tenancy Bill*
In formulating the new Tenancy Act, the government had to play a 
delicate game. On one hand, they had to protect some of the interests 
of the zamindars, who as a class, had remained loyal to the government;
108. Nihar, 1st May 1923.
109. GOB Legislative Dept., Collection of Opinions on the Bengal Tenancy
(Amendment) Bill, 1925, pp. 184-5.
110. Ibid, pp. 12,21.
111. Nihar, 8 th May 1923.
112. Ibid, 17th April 1923.
113. Ashutosh Jana, for example, claimed that the new Bill would destroy
those who have been supporters of the Government. Ibid 17th April* 1923.
114* Bengal Land Revenue Commission 1940, Vol 1, p.29.
115. Nihar, 10th April 1923.
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an the other hand, they had to retain the loyalty of the Muslim bloc 
in the Legislative Council so as to thwart the disruptionist tactics 
of the Swaraj Party, and this meant extension of rights to the ryots 
and a section of the under-ryots. The government could not hope to 
satisfy any of the competing interests fully, and therefore had to 
formulate the changes in such a way as not to antagonise any section.
The final draft of the Bill, which was to become the new Tenancy Act, 
expressed this exercise in tight-rope walking.
While not recognising the rights of bargadars and bhagchasis, the Bill
gave occupancy rights to that section of the under-ryots who paid fixed
cash rents, or delivered a fixed quantity of produce irrespective of
the actual gross produce, or who had a homestead on their lands, or
had occupied it for 1 2 years continuously and had been admitted in a
document by their landlords to have a permanent and heritable right.
These sections of under-tenants were also granted some protection
from arbitrary rent-increases. As with the under-ryots, the extension
of the rights of occupancy ryots too was subject to many qualifications.
Their holdings were declared to be transferable and heritable, but the
zamindars were entitled to a transfer selami amounting to 2 0 % of the sale
price or five times the rent. Moreover, the zamindars were given the
right of pre-emption on payment of the sale price plus 1 0% as compensation
to the purchaser. The occupancy ryots were also given full rights on all
trees on their holdings, the right to pay rent either at the zamindalrs
village office (i.e. not at the kutchery or by postal money order^and
they were given full rights to excavate tanks and build pucca houses
116without the payment of any selami.
The provisions of the new Tenancy Legislation were looked upon differently 
by the various classes involved. The zamindars looked upon them as a 
considerable, if not total, erosion of their powers. Raja P. C. Tagore, 
a leading zamindar in East Bengal observed to fellow - zamindar B. P. Singh 
Roy:
...the Zamindars are looked upon as 'bankers'; but without 
any inlets to their coffers, provided ’with only an outlet,
116. The Bengal Tenancy Act, pp. XXXV-XXXVII and Bengal Land Revenue 
Commission, Vol 1, pp. 25-30.
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they will be bankrupt in no time...I should venture to
think that your venerated ancestors would have thought
twice before taking Putnees from the Burdwan Raj if they
had known there was no permanency in Lord Cornwallis'
117Settlement.
Nalini Ranjan Sarkar, a leading industrialist and a prominent member
of the Congress also agreed that the Act "was in every sense a
revolutionary measure" which had reduced zamindars "to a merely
rent-receiving position with no powers of ejectment of tenants,
118enhancement of rents, etc, which he enjoyed before" Representing
the tenants' point of view, Khan Bahadur Azizul Huque welcome4the Act
for the very reasons espoused by Sarkar, but in various parts of
Bengal including Midnapur, tenants shared the views of Jitendralal
119Bannerjee who called it a 'Landlords Protection Bill'.
The cause of tenants dissatisfaction related to the concessions given 
to the zamindars in the 20% selami (originally fixed at 25%, but later 
reduced) and the pre-emption clauses. In many regions, the institution­
alisation of the selami at a 2 0 % rate from an arbitrary abwab was a great 
boon to the tenants, but in the Contai Khas Mahal regions where the 
tradition of selami had not existed, this was viewed with disfavour.
The pre-emption clause too, aroused fear that the zamindars would use 
this to convert all good lands into khas. In fact Nihar believed that
so much power had been given to the zamindars that tenants would be 
crippled, leading to the development of class-consciousness and consequent 
'Bolshevism'
Whether or not these fears were genuine or merely a part of a polemical 
exaggeration, the Congress organisation in Midnapur did organise 
politically against the anti-tenant clauses of the Bill. Initially, as 
with the clauses relating to bargadar rights, the Congress attempted to
117. P.C. Tagore to B. P. Singh Roy, 26th October 1938. B. P. Singh 
Roy Papers, 1 (NMML).
118. N. R. Sarkar, Land Reform. Its Means and Ends, Calcutta 1952, p.4. 
N.R.Sarkar 14, "(NMML).
119. BLC Progs, XXX,1, 7th August 1928, pp. 380-476.
120. -LliJbar, 13th September 1928.
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build up an united front with the zamindar lobby based on general 
opposition to government initiative. In January 1926, the three 
MLC's from Midnapur - Devendralal Khan, Mahendra Nath Maity and 
Pramatha Nath Bannerjee, organised a committee to coordinate 
opposition to the Bill. The committee included members of the pro­
tenant lobby like B. N. Sasmal and Sarat Chandra Jana, but also
included ‘loyalist1 Rai Manmatha Nath Bose Bahadur and other prov
121zamindar members like Upendra Nath Maity. Because of the eclectic 
composition of the membership, and given the specific nature of the 
government proposals, the Committee failed to get off the ground. In 
fact opinion in Midnapur was sharply polarised between the zamindar 
lobby and the tenant lobby. For the zamindar lobby, Ramani Mohan 
Maity, at a public meeting at Egra, raised fears that the provisions 
relating to the sale of land, possession of trees and excavating tanks
122would lead to friction and confrontation between zamindar and tenants. 
Devendralal Khan, the MLC, who was also the zamindar of Narajole, based 
his opposition on more selfish reasons; he was afraid of losing many 
lakhs of rupees from tenants getting possession of the Sal trees in his 
zamindari.
However, the majority of the Congress activists and the local paper,
Nihar, espoused the cause of the tenants. In Southern Midnapur,
particularly in the Contai Khas Mahals and the Mahisadal Raj, Congress
members like Adita Kumar Bankura helped to initiate and organise Krishak
124Samity's and mobilised tenants against zamindari harassment. These 
organisations now formed the backbone of the Midnapur Congress' opposition 
to the particular proposals of the Bill. Within the Legislative Council, 
Mahendra Nath Maity and Pramatha Nath Bannerjee made common cause with 
the 'Praja' bloc and members such as Jitendralal Banerji; Pramatha Nath 
Bannerjee, for example, proposed an amendment calling for the reduction
125
of the zamindar's selami from 25% to 1 2 % 'where it was the custom to pay'. 
After the Bill was passed in the Council, B. N. Sasmal came out from his
121. Ibid, 2nd February 1926.
122. Ibid, 2nd February 1926.
123. Article by Pramatha Nath Bannerjee, Ibid, 2nd October 1928.
124. Ibid, 24th June 1924, 14th May 1929 and 14th August 1928.
125. Ibid, 13th September 1928.
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Calcutta seclusion to speak at various public meetings against the
126
selami and pre-emption clauses, and Congress member Surendra Nath
Das openly called upon the Midnapur MLC^s to break with the official 
127Congress whip. So intense was the tenant resentment, that Nihar
expressed the hope that Sasmal would come out of his retirement and
lead a movement of tenants on the scale of the 1921 Union Board 
128agitation. Things were indeed hotting up in Midnapur, when the 
Karachi Congress and Gandhi’s Dandi march swept the country and led 
Midnapur into the Civil Disobedience movement in 1930.
The stand taken by the Midnapur Congress did not make the organisation 
very popular with the Congress leaders in Calcutta. Because of the 
particular understanding of the nature of the anti-imperialist struggle 
and the preponderance of zamindars in the Swarajist group in the Council, 
the BPCC did not make common cause with the struggle of the tenants. 
Forward offered a justification of the Congress standpoint:
The Congress Party, we repeat, stands by the principle
enunciated by Deshbandhu and will da everything in its
power to secure justice and fair treatment for the tenants.
But justice to the tenants should not involve injustice to
another class of the people who come within the category of
landlords. The one supreme test which the Congress Party
will apply in judging the merits of the Tenancy Bill will
be how far its provisions will help to extend the rights of
the people and will improve their economic and social
condition without doing palpable injustice to the landlords
...The Congress Party stand far a just and equitable adjustment
of conflicting interests for that alone will lead to that
solidarity among the people so essential for the growth of 
129nationalism.
Not mentioned in the editorial was the important fact that the Congress 
Party had received Rs 38,000 from the Bengal Zamindar Sabha and Rs 15,000
126. Ibid, 2nd July 1929.
127. Ibid, 3rd December 1929,
128. Ibid, 12th November 1929.
129. Forward, 9th August 1928.
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from Shasi Kanta Acharya, the Raja of Mymensingh, to campaign against 
130
the Tenancy Bill. As a result of these factors, Congress not only
supported the pre-emption and 2 0 % selami clauses, but also argued
against the tenants' right to trees on their holdings and the right
to excavate tanks at will. On the question of pre-emption, Congress
argued that this was a necessary safeguard to prevent the land from
passing into the hands of mahajans and Englishmen; excavating tanks
131on the other hand, would make the countryside unhealthy. When
Pramatha Nath Bannerjee argued against the Congress stand, Dr. B. C. Roy
informed him that he should either accept the Congress decision or quit
132and seek re-election as a 'Praja* representative. It was therefore 
with some justification that the British officials, keen to maintain 
the rigid Hindu-Muslim demarcation, could point to the Bengal Congress
133as the bastion of privilege acting against the interests of the 'peasantry*
It should also come as no surprise to note that besides the Midnapur
MLC's, Jitendralal Bannerji and the trade union leader Prabhavati Dasgupta ,
the main opposition to the Congress position on the Tenancy Bill came
from Muslim members such as Maulvi Asimuddin, Maulvi Jalaluddin and Maulvi 
134
Nurul Huq.
The ability of the bulk of the Midnapur Congress to distance itself from 
the official Congress on the land reform issue, was to be a crucial 
element for the growth of the party in the district. Unlike other 
districts, of Bengal, notably East Bengal, where Congress articulated 
the interests of zamindars and the bhadrolok middle classes, the local 
organisation in Midnapur emerged as a champion of the interest of all 
tenants i.e. both ryots and the jotedars. By actually understanding 
the intricacies of the landholding pattern and its subsequent translation 
into electoral arithmetic, Congress was successful in retaining and 
extending its political base in the area. Because of the absence of 
the communal issue in the district, the Congress was able to rope in the 
political dynamism of tenant-cultivators and the intermediate jotedars 
and therefore capitalise on the traditions of past tenant struggles and
130. Hijli Hitaishi, 2nd January 1930 and Bimalananda Sasmal,'Bharat 
ki Kore Swadhin Holo', Desh, 22nd August 1978.
131. Article by Pramatha Nath Bannerjee, Nihar, 25th September and 2nd 
October 192B.
132. Ibid, 13th September 1928.
133. Broomfield, QP.cit. pp.285-88.
134. Forward, 19th August 192Q.
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the Mahishya caste movement which had seen the growth of a spirit
135of *peasant-pride' among members of that caste. The reason for 
the growth of Congress in Midnapur is to be found not through a 
study of patronage networks, or abstract nationalist ideology, but 
in their ability to articulate the class interests of that propertied 
section of the rural population who made up the bulk of the voting 
population under the provisions of the 1919 Government of India Act.
The Indian Nationalist movement, was sustained and led to victory in 
its Gandhian phase, by a constituency that was created not by the 
subjective desires of its financiers and idealogues, but by the British 
Raj. It was from these propertied sections that Congress gat its 
dynamism and momentum, and also its inherent limitations.
Midnapur Congress S£. Calcutta
The picture this example has'given of the support base of the Midnapur 
Congress in contrast with the BPCC’s failure to articulate the interests 
of intermediate tenants impiies an estrangement between the PCC and the 
bulk of the Midnapur Congress organisation. Indeed, Pramatha Nath 
Bannerjee, a Midnapur MLC, warned his district organisation that they 
could not hope to get their voices heard unless they elected people
136who could represent the aspirations of their constituents honestly.
As a result, during the 1929 elections, the Midnapur DCC refused to
accept Devendralal Khan of Narajole, the sitting MLC, as their candidate.
This decision caused a great commotion in the BPCC offices in Calcutta,
as Devendralal was intimately linked with all the leading figures of the
Bengal Congress. Dr. B. C. Roy and Subhas Bose had to come down personally
to Midnapur, reconvene a DCC meeting, and use all their persuasion and
137coercion to get Devendralal renominated.
But this conflict between the district and Calcutta was not an isolated 
incident. Relations between the Midnapur Congress and the BPCC had 
not been cordial since 1923. However, the disagreements which were to 
reach their culmination during the Civil Disobedience movement, were not 
based as in 1928 on ideological questions. Political issues did play a 
part but they were most often subordinated to sharper issues of
135. See above chapters 3 and 4,
136. Nihar 13th September 1928.
137. Ibid, 14th May 1929.
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personalities, especially involving the two leading lights of the 
Midnapur Congress, B. N. Sasmal and Devendralal Khan.
Their rivalry was quickened by Sasmal*s relations with the controlling
group of the Bengal Congress after 1923. After their release from jail
in 1922, C. R. Das and his followers formed the Swaraj Party and embarked
on a Council-entry programme. Since the success of this strategy depended
on their ability to obstruct the functioning of Dyarchy, the Swarajists
considered all means necessary to achieve this end. Thus in their
electoral struggle to defeat Sir Surendranath Banerji, the Party paraded
a- prostitute who enlightened the electorate on the supposed sexual
138perversions of Surendranath; within the Council, in order to secure
the votes of non-aligned Muslim members, huge sums of money was paid out 
139in bribes. The idealism that had marked the Congress during the non-
cooperation movement was partially lost in the Swaraj Party's bid to
secure immediate advantages. Even Sir P. C. Ray was moved to say in
1924, that "no self-respecting person can stay amidst the unprincipled
140corruption and factionalism of the Swaraj Party'J It was in this 
atmosphere that the first break between Midnapur and Calcutta took 
place.
At stake was the position of Chief Executive Officer of the Calcutta 
Corporation, where the Swarajists commanded a majority. According to 
Sasmal, C. R. Das had promised him this job in 1924. However, influential 
Congress members raised objections to the appointment of Sasmal. Firstly, 
they argued that Sasmal, normally residing at Contai, did not have any 
experience of the problems of urban administration. Secondly, many 
members, notably the Kayasthas, raised objections to the caste of Sasmal 
whom they referred to as the 'Kaibarta from Midnapur'• This lobby 
proposed that Subhas Bose, a Kayastha, should be given the job instead.
The Kayastha lobby was backed by ex-detenus with wham Sasmal had come 
into conflict in 1920 on the question of the formeris misuse of Congress 
funds. Das, in spite of his ealier promise to Sasmal, could not afford 
to offend the powerful 'Kayastha clique' and supported the candidature of
138. Bimalananda Sasmal, Swadhinathar Phanki, Calcutta 1374 (B.S.) p.113.
139. Satcowripati Roy, Oral History Transcript No 267, (NMML) pp. 27-9.
140. B. Sasmal, Swadhinathar Phanki, p.115.
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141Subhas Bose who was then elected to the pest. In disgust, Sasmal
quit the Swaraj Party and resigned his seat in the Legislative Council.
The use of the caste factor in deciding the fate of Sasmal resulted in 
consderable sympathy for him in Midnapur, and he was able to retain the 
allegience of the Congress organisation there in spite of his resignation 
from the Swaraj Party.
From 1924 till 1926, Sasmal devoted his energies towards running the
District Board in Midnapur. C. R. Das, anxious not to lose the services
of the man who had built up the Congress in Midnapur and who had got him
142a seat in the Legislative Council, offered Sasmal the Presidency of the
Bengal Provincial Conference in 1925 to compensate for his inability to
143support him in the Calcutta Corporation; Sasmal declined the offer.
However, on the death of C. R. Das in 1925, Sasmal rejoined the Swaraj 
Party and resumed his seat in the Legislative Council. Following the 
overwhelming success of the Congress in the Midnapur Local Board elections 
of 1925, Sasmal*s popularity in the Congress(reached an all-time high, and 
he was called upon to preside over the Krishnanagar session of the Bengal 
Provincial Conference in 1926.
But outside the Congress, politics in Bengal had taken an ominous turn.
In 1923, C. R. Das had concluded the Bengal Pact with some leading Muslim
politicians of Bengal. Under the terms of this Pact, 55^ of all government
posts would be reserved for Muslims and in Local and District Boards the
majority and minority communities would divide seats in the ratio of 60:40.
To ensure religious tolerance and communal harmony, music was to be
prohibited before mosques and Muslims were to enjoy the freedom to perform 
144
korbani. The Bengal Pact, which gained the Swarajists a great deal of 
credibility among the Muslims, was a necessary tactical ploy to thwart 
government moves to create a gulf between Hindus and Muslims.
In April 1926, following an attack upon an Arya Samaj procession that was 
allegedly playing music before a mosque, communal riots broke out in 
Calcutta.
141. P. Pal, op.cit, p.37 and pp. 109-13. B. Sasmal, Swadhinathar 
Phanki, pp. 78-9.
142. In 1923, Sasmal had been elected to the Legislative Council from
both Midnapur and Diamond Harbour. He resigned his Midnapur seat 
and offered it to C. R. Das who was then elected.
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183
For four days, the city was in the grip of an orgy of communal
violence. The communal tension soon spread to the districts and was
sought to be exploited by politicians and religious fanatics. At Serajgunj
leaflets were issued urging jehad against Hindus; temples were desecrated
in Tipperrah; mosques were attacked in Sasaram; the Hari Sabha house at
145Natore was burnt; and there were accusations of rape all around. Nor 
was there any evidence to show that the violence was confined to religious 
extremists on both sides; Atulya Ghosh, a Congress activist in Hoogly 
district observed:
...many people became heroes overnight for committing cold 
blooded murders without any qualms. In Serampore, even those 
women from respectable homes who were under strict purdah 
entertained 'heroes' at their homes. It was a weird sight.
It was natural for goondas to participate in these outbreaks
146but educated men from respectable homes did not lag behind...
The communal tension affected the politics of both communities .gn 
Muslim side, it enabled politicians like Sir Abdur Rahim to pose as 
champions of the rights of the Muslim people. In the Congress camp, the 
ex-detenus who had formed themselves into the Karmi Sangh, started 
demanding the immediate repeal of the Bengal Pact. Even Gandhians like 
Dr. P. C. Ghosh of the Abhoy Ashram joined in the chorus:
...the Bengal Pact was a blunder both politically and morally.
It betrayed only the weakness of the Hindus. What held good in
Mr Das' time did not hold good now...Our Muslim brothers...were
becoming unreasonable in their demands day to day and the Hindus
147were yielding to these demands. This was sheer weakness.
On April 26th, the Swarajists rubbed shoulders with the Sanatanists at 
a meeting of the Hindus in Calcutta; the meeting also included represen­
tatives of the Marwari community led by G. D. Birla and Rai Bahadur 
Badridas Goenka:
145. Forward, April 17th-22nd 1926.
146. Atulya Ghosh, 'Kashta Kalpita' 47, Desh, 22nd April 1978, p.21.
147. The Mussalman, 29th April 1927.
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The whole atmosphere was vitiated with a fearful spirit of
revenge, especially dangerous because of its being exhibited
in a calm and deliberative meeting. The menacing attitude of
the Hindu youths of Bengal, particularly the student community,
who were as if out to fight the obnoxious Mussalmans was
revealed,..in its very ugliest form. They want no compromise
...They are resolute to present an inflexible stand in their
fight with the Mussalmans. They must be allowed to pursue their
aggressive policy; they would not follow the dictates of their
leaders who were termed cowards » accused of dereliction of their
148duties...They must have their angry Kali satisfied...
This bitter communal hostility did not remain confined to certain fringe 
groups but also affected the mainstream of the Congress. Forward, in an 
obvious display of partisan journalism, commented:
If there has not been as yet any bloodshed or loss of life in
the mufassil...it is because Hindus have not yet retaliated.
But even a trodden worm turns round. Some idea of the unenviable
plight of Hindus in East and North Bengal may be gathered from the
fact that they live in villages surrounded on all sides by a
preponderating Mahomedan element....In many villages...where
Hindus own cultivable lands there is not a single Hindu
cultivator. The Hindu jotedar will have no other alternative
than to dispose of his lands at a nominal price to the Mahomedans.
...Who knows...(they] will not sooner or later secure a Fatwa that
149it is sacrilege to pay rents to Hindu landlords?
Also involved in the communal question was the desire of the Big Five 
in the Congress (a group consisting of Dr. B. C. Roy, Sarat Chandra Bose, 
Nirmal Chandra Chunder, Tulsi Charan Goswami and Nalini Ranjan'Sarkar) to 
remove J. M. Sengupta from his position as Secretary to the BPCC. This 
they hoped to do by securing the repeal of the Bengal Pact at Krishnanagar 150
148. Ibid, 29th April 1926.
149. Forward, 22nd May 1926.
150. Ibid, 18th May 1926.
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Though Sasmal was not a member of either contending group, he, as
President of the Conference, became embroiled in the faction struggle.
At the meeting of the Subjects Committee, J. M. Sengupta, proposed that
due to inflamed passions and the absence of a proper atmosphere, the
Bengal Pact should not be discussed at Krishnanagar. This was opposed
by both the Big Five and the Karmi Sangh, and Sengupta's proposal was
151carried only on the casting vote of the President. Sasmal thereby
incurred the wrath of the entire Karmi Sangh lobby.
The success of Sengupta1s motion in the Subjects Committee left the 
Karmi Sangh without a cause. Since they could not hope to influence 
any decision on the Bengal Pact, they adopted a disruptionist strategy. 
First they insisted on Sasmal deleting that part of his speech which 
contained a bitter attack on the tactics of the terrorists (see Appendix 
1). Sasmal refused initially, but was persuaded by Sengupta and Sarojini 
Naidu to delete the objectionable section. Not satisfied, the Karmi Sangh 
seized upon a section of his speech which put forward the suggestion that:
Those who believe in immediate resort to violence should cut
off all connection with the Executive Committee of the Congress.
And those who for some reason ot other have become marked men
152should also keep away from these centres of work.
This was deliberately interpreted as casting "malicious aspersions upon
the political sufferers of the country" including Subhas Bose and others
153who had been detained under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act. The
Karmi Sangh vocalist, Amarendra Nath Chatterjee, raised a huge outcry and
demanded that Sasmal withdraw his remarks and tender an apology. This
Sasmal refused to do. Sensing the mood of the Conference, Sengupta joined
hands with the Karmi Sangh to introduce a resolution 'disassociating'
themselves from and 'deprecating* the remarks made by Sasmal. This was
passed overwhelmingly by the Conference whereupon Sasmal resigned and the
154Conference broke up in chaos.
Sasmal was subsequently blamed for the Krishnanagar fiasco. There is 
little doubt that Sasmal*s blunt but honest presentation of his own
151. Ibid, 23rd May 1925.
152. Ibid, 23rd May 1926.
153. Ibid, 2nd November 1926.
154. GOI H. Poll 172/1926 (NAl).
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contentious views exacerbated the already tense atmosphere of 
Krishnanagar. But Sasmal or no Sasmal, the Krishnanagar session 
was bound to be a stormy affair. The strong-arm tactics of the Karmi 
Sangh, egged on by the Big Five, were responsible for this state of 
affairs. Sasmal, irrelevant as he was in the actual dispute, was 
made a convenient scapegoat by both parties. Yet, Sasmal was the 
centre of an emotive controversy covering two themes central to Bengali 
politics, terrorism and communalism. Since there was little in Sasmal*s 
day-to-day conduct of politics that would merit discredit, the entire 
attack assumed ideolbgical overtones. The tremors of Krishnanagar were 
to be felt in the heart of Midnapur.
The Krishnanagar session left the Bengal Congress a divided house. The 
controversy aver the Bengal Pact had effectively split the Congress into 
even halves, with the 'no changers' supporting Sengupta, and the 'pro­
changers' supporting the Karmi Sangh and the Big Five. On 13th June, 
1926, Sengupta convened a meeting of the BPCC where he openly accused 
some members of the Executive Council of subverting the unity of the 
Congress and actively working against the Bengal Pact. He therefore 
urged the BPCC to elect another Executive Committee which would cooperate 
with him. This was interpreted by the Karmi Sangh as a deliberate move
against 'revolutionaries' in the Congress, and they walked out in protest
155
after Sengupta's motion was carried.
The month of June witnessed a flurry of accusations and counter­
accusations. Sengupta publicly accused the Finance Committee of the 
Deshbandhu village Reconstruction Fund of refusing to cooperate with the 
BPCC; he accused Forward of "a breach of faith with the Congress and the 
Swaraj Party". The Big Five in their turn demanded the immediate repeal
of the Bengal Pact, as the communal riots had transformed it into a dead 
156letter. The Karmi Sangh Manifesto went to the extent of saying that
in the forthcoming elections they would not support any pro-Pact
157
Congressman, as in their view the Pact was 'anti-national'.
155. Indian Quarterly Register, January-June 1926, p.85.
156. Forward, 25th June 1926.
157. Ibid, 3rd July 1926.
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However, the forthcoming elections, the pressure from the central
150
leadership and the monsoon rains cooled tempers down. Sengupta
made a joint statement with Tulsi Charan Goswami urging unity of the
Congress forces and an amicable resolution of differences. On 25th
July, the BPCC met to elect 30 new members td the Executive Committee
as the Congress Working Committee had asserted that it would not
stand for Sengupta's dictatorial methods and urged him to incorporate
159more 'dissidents' into the Executive Committee. A common list was
agreed upon by Sengupta and the Big Five and included prominent members
of the Karmi .Sangh like Amarendra Nath Chatterjee and Upendra Nath 
160Bannerjee. In order to make organisational elections 'impartial', 
the Executive Committee authorised a change of Congress returning 
officers, and in Midnapur, Sasmal was replaced by ex-detenu Jyotish 
Chandra Ghosh. Both the inclusion of the Karmi Sangh members and the 
change in Midnapur W-£y<&.seen by Sasmal as a slap in the face, and he 
along with a dozen supporters resigned from the Executive Committee 
in protest.
Though Sasmal could not carry any political heavy-weights with him, his 
resignation was the signal for many Muslims to sever their ties with the 
Congress. In a resignation letter, Maulvi Mujibur Rehman, Abdul Matin 
Chowdhury and Ashrafuddin Ahmad Chowdhury told the BPCC:
As we have already said, it is painful for us to sever 
connection with the Congress...We, however, hope to return 
to it when it again becomes truly national and when the
Mussalmans by their own exertions have sufficiently strenghtened
161
themselves so that the Hindus may meet them on equal terms.
Moreover, many Muslims withdrew their names as Congress candidates. On 
their part, the joint forces of Sengupta, the Karmi Sangh and-the Big 
Five launched a campaign of vilification against Sasmal. It was alleged 
that Sasmal was actually conspiring to oust Sengupta as President of the 
BPCC, and had been attempting to solicit Karmi Sangh support for his
158. Note by Motilal Nehru, 4th July 1926, AICC G57 (Il)/1926.
159. Ibid.
160. Indian Quarterly Register, July-December 1926, p.41.
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162venture. It was further alleged that he had divulged Congress
163
secrets to the Statesman newspaper* "Mr. Sasmal", remarked Forward
sneeringly, "will some day learn that it is neither prudent nor patriotic
164
to allow personal considerations to run away with one's judgement"
The conflicts in the BPCC and the ultimate resignation of Sasmal were 
to have profound effects on the politics of Midnapur district. Within weeks 
of Sasmal*s resignation, the BPCC began the task of selecting candidates for 
the coming elections to the Bengal Legislative Council. The Midnapur DCC 
had informed the BPCC of their decision to sponsor the candidatures of 
Sasmal„ Pramatha Nath Bannerjee and Mahendra Nath Maity for the three 
Midnapur seats. They were unwilling to extend support to Devendralal 
Khan, considering the letter's acceptance of the post of nominated District 
Board Chairman. But the BPCC was in no mood to support Sasmal*s 
candidature considering the stance he had taken in the recent factional 
squabbles of the Bengal Congress. Nor was Devendralal Khan unwilling to 
accept Congress nomination, especially as it granted him some sort of 
legitimacy for his recent actions. Moreover, Devendralal had in the 
past donated generously to the Congress coffers, and Dr. B. C. Roy, one 
of the Big Five, also happened to be his personal physician. These 
factors weighed heavily in favour of Devendralal, and for the moment
♦
his past conduct was forgotten as the BPCC strove to eliminate Sasmal
from his rural base. In late September, after Sasmal rejected the BPCC
offer to contest one of the South Midnapur seats, and leave the north
to Devendralal, the latter was officially selected as the Congress
candidate. On 25th September 1926, the Midnapur DCC met in an emergency
165
session and expressed dissatisfaction at Khan's nomination. Sasmal
on his part, brought the entire issue before Motilal Nehru, the Congress
President, who refused to intervene in provincial disputes and in fact
166
confirmed Devendralal's nomination. Moreover, Pramatha Nath Bannerjee 
and Mahendra Nath Maity refused to stand as BPCC candidates if Sasmal was 
refused a ticket. As a result, the BPCC set up Gangadhar Nanda and Rebati
162. Forward, 3rd September 1926.
163. Ibid, 4th September 1926.
164. Forward, 1st September 1926.
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Nath Maity as candidates for the two southern seats. This was in 
spite of the fact that the two had a long record of opposition to the 
Congress.
After the BPCC's final announcement, the three 'rebel' candidates could
not stake their claim on the 'Congress' label. At an election meeting,
Basanta Kumar Mazumdar, who had quit the BPCC with Sasmal, announced that
167the fight was between Mr. Sasmal*s party and the Congress. Indeed, both
Pramatha Nath Bannerjee and Mahendra Nath Maity did not care to hide the
fact of their personal allegience to Sasmal. But so strong was the
influence of Sasmal, Bannerjee and Maity over the local Congress
organisation that the bulk of the Congress activists in the district
supported them rather than the 'official' Congress candidates. In the
South Midnapur constituencies, especially Contai, there was the rather
ironic spectacle of the former opposition members around Hijli Hitaishi
giving their full support to the 'Congress' candidates. Even "
the Sub-Registrar and the Sub-Inspector of Police. extended: their 
169
support. Devendralal Khan was not however similarly handicapped. Not 
only did he manage to secure the services of senior Congress leaders like 
Dr. B. C. Roy and Tulsi Goswami to campaign for him, but he also managed 
to wrest control of the Ghatal Subdivision Congress Committee, though
170the senior leaders like Mohini Mohan Das were campaigning for Sasmal. 
Moreover, he managed to secure the full services of Upendra Nath Maity, 
whose base in the Midnapur town municipality Sasmal had not been able 
to break, and of Pandit Mokshada Charan Sannyadhai, a prominent religious 
figure of Midnapur who had campaigned for Congress in the Local Board 
elections of 1926. But on balance, the 'official' Congress candidates 
were more dependent on support from individuals outside Congress while 
the local Congress remained faithful .to its district leadership.
But the objective ideological climate was against Sasmal; like the rest 
of Bengal, Midnapur in 1926, was gripped by the growing Hindu-Muslim 
tension and the resulting communal outbreaks. Following the news of 
the Calcutta disturbances, the Hindu Sabha in Kharagpur stepped up
167. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 31st October 1926.
168. Hijli Hitaishi, 28th October; 11th November 1926.
169. Ibid, 2nd December 1926.
170. Forward, 8 th October 1926.
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its activities. They organised various meetings in the district
where inflamatory speeches were delivered against the Muslims. In
part the activities of the Hindu Sabha was directed against the Railway
Workers Union which took a conscious decision to remain aloof from
171communal disputes. But the Sabha*s activities did have the desired
effect of fanning the flames of communal tension. On 6 th May 1926,
the Shitala procession in Ghatal was held in a tense atmosphere with
Hindu and Congress volunteers forming defence squads to ward off some
172imaginary Muslim attack. On 17th May, communal riots erupted in
Kharagpur on the basis of a rumour that Muslims had taken away a Hindu
corpse and were cutting it up. The riots claimed 11 lives (7 Muslim and
4 Hindus) and Intelligence Reports stated clearly that the responsibility
173lay with the Hindu Sabha members.
The communal tension in Midnapur seriously affected the political position 
of Sasmal. Forces opposed to Sasmal went around the district citing 
Sasmal*s defence of the Bengal Pact and his close links with the Muslim 
members of Congress. A Bengali leaflet circulated in Midnapur and signed 
by among others, Upendra Nath Maity stated:
Birendranath Sasmal has given shelter in his own house to
those Muslims who have violated the honour of Hindu women
and destroyed or defiled Hindu temples. In fact Sasmal is
174
personally ready to embrace Islam any day.
Another Bengali leaflet entitled ’Hindus Beware' was anonymously circulated
which described Sasmal as a supporter of the banning of music before
mosques and the 80% job reservation for Muslims, and which appealed to
the Hindu voters of Ghatal not to vote for him for the sake of the Hindu 
175
religion. Sasmal*s Krishnanagar speech against terrorism was also
cited as an argument against him. At a public meeting, the Karmi Sangh
leader, Upendra Nath Bannerjee declared that Sasmal was a Police
informer who had been responsible for the arrest of Subhas Bose on
176
charges of terrorism. These accusations did make a significant headway 
among voters in an atmosphere where emotive passions ruled supreme.
171. R. N. Reid, District Magistrate to Commissioner, 30th May 1926,
GOI H. Poll 11 (VIIl)/1926 (NAI).
172. Forward, 6 th May 1926.
173. GOI H. Poll 11 (VIIl)/1926 (NAl) .
174. Bimalananda Sasmal, 'Bharat ki Kore Swadhim Holo', p,43.
175. Bimalananda Sasmal, Swadhinathar Phanki, pp. 138-40.
176. Ibid, p.140.
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On the other hand, the communal riots enhanced the political, credibility
of Devendralal Khan. A major financier of the Karmi Sangh in Midnapur,
177
Devendralal projected himself as the spokesman for the Hindus.
When the district authorities banned all processions with music for
two months, it was Devendralal Khan who led the protest along with the
178Executive Committee of the Hindu Sabha. In July, Devendralal went on
a tour of the district to set up Hindu societies which were linked to the
Hindu Sangathan movement; these organisations were also generously financed 
179by him. In short, the ideological climate generated by the communal riots 
in Bengal helped Devendralal to establish an alternative political network 
from that of the local Congress. It was this new 'Hindu network' based 
in the towns that was to give Devendralal his narrow victory over Sasmal 
in the elections. But the absence of the communal spirit in South Midnapur 
could not ensure similar victories for the 'official* Congress candidates 
there; in both Contai and Tamluk, the 'rebel' local Congress maintained 
their overwhelming political hegemony.
Following the 1926 elections and the BPCC disputes in early 1927, which 
left Sasmal in the political wilderness, relations between the BPCC 
leadership and the Midnapur Congress remained strained. The Midnapur 
Congress stayed aloof from the battles within the larger organisation, 
and with the exception of Devendralal Khan, had little or no influence
in Calcutta. This trend was to continue even during the Civil Disobedience
180
C3inp si cjn *
Conclusion'
In 1920, Gandhi had referred to Congress as a 'National organisation
providing a platform for all parties to appeal to the Nation'. Nehru
too was to reiterate the Congress' political hetrogeneity when he wrote:
"The Congress was a party in some ways; it has also been a joint platform
181for several parties" As a movement for political freedom based on a
multi-class strategy, Congress embraced within its fold disparate social 
elements. Thus 'radicals' like Nehru, Sahajanand Saraswati and Jayaprakash 
Nerayan co-existed in the organisation with 'conservatives' such as
177. Forward, 23rd May 1926, 7th September 1926.
178. Forward, 25th June 1926.
179. Ibid, 15th July 1926.
180. Englishman, 17th February 1927.
181. Jairus Banaji, op.cit. p.31.
192
Dr. B. C. Roy, K. M. Munshi and Satyamurthi. This is not to maintain 
that the various social forces and political tendencies co-operated 
in a relationship of harmonious equality. Indeed, the national 
objectives of the Congress maintained the political hegemony of the
national bourgeoisie through a leadership that was overwhelmingly
182
middle class in character. But what kept the radical elements 
within the Congress organisation was the ability of the Conservative* 
section, including Gandhi, to organise mass campaigns far the realisation 
of national independence. It was this mass character of the movement 
which distinguished it from say, the Kuomintang in China. As a Comintern 
observer pointed out in 1931, 'the masses do not yet believe in the
183treachery of the Congress because they think they are the Congress'
But the course of the nationalist movement did not follow a path of
linear growth. While the Congress leadership, and especially Gandhi, ^
were willing to put pressure on the colonial state through sporadic mass
mobilisations thereby weakening the 'left' currents within Congress, the
e
brakes were applied to prevent the emrgence of radicalisetion within the
course of the struggle. Indeed, the course of the struggle corresponds
to what Bipan Chandra has described as the' pressure-comprqmise-pressure'
184
strategy. The period 1922 to 1930 corresponds tc the 'compromise' 
phase of the national struggle. -But it was, above all, a short-term 
tactical compromise and not a capitulation to the forces of imperialism.
The period of Dyarchy must be analysed in terms of the tactical perspectives 
of the Congress.
However, the regional peculiarities of Bengal altered the nature of this 
short term compromise with the colonial state. As has been noted previously, 
the overwhelming dominance of European capital in Bengal and the consequent 
absence of an indigenous national bourgeoisie compelled the local Congress 
to look increasingly towards the parasitic landlords of Cornwallis' 
creation. To this was added the phenomenon of communalism which sharply 
polarised the province along religious lines and reinforced the regional 
class imbalances of the Bengal Congress. Whereas, in other parts of India
182. Ibid, p.31.
183. Ibid, p.31.
184. Bipan Chandra, 'Jawaharlal Nehru and the Capitalist Class, 1936',
EPW, Special Number, Agust 1975.
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Congress represented the aspirations of various segments of property, 
in Bengal, it became the movement of Hindu property, which in East 
Bengal was based on semi-feudal landlordism. This factor was 
responsible for transforming the Bengal Congress into a conservative 
political force devoted to thwarting the 'social engineering* of the 
British and Muslim representatives. It was to produce a situation whereby 
Congress became an isolated minority force whose occasional burst of 
pseudo-radicalism, best represented by the terrorist groups, signified 
political desperation rather than dynamism. For the Bengal Congress, 
the 1920s characterised not by mere organisationa 1 decline, but
by political degeneration.
The absence of large zamindars and any significant Muslim population in 
Midnapur ensured the development of the local Congress along different 
lines. In Midnapur, the Congress sought out and created a constituency 
based not on religion, but on the class interests of the propertied 
peasantry. In that sense, it was able to attract precisely that segment 
of the rural population which in East Bengal was to flock to the banners 
of the Krishak Proja Party and the Muslim League. It was because of 
these factors that Midnapur, almost alone in the whole of Bengal, was 
able to pursue the national. Congress strategy and mount an effective 
challenge to the colonial state during the Civil Disobedience Movement 
of 1930-34.
TABLE 6:3
Results of the 1925 Elections to the Bengal Legislative Council
MIDNAPUR NORTH
Devendralal Khan (Congress) 6927
B. N. Sasmal (independent) 6263
MIDNAPUR SOUTH
Pramatha Nath Bannerjee (independent) 3478
Gangadhar Nanda (Congress) 1785
Baranashi Banerji (Responsivist) 50
MIDNAPUR SOUTH-EAST
Mahendra Nath Maity (independent) 2019
Rebati Nath Maity (Congress) 21
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Appendix 1
S. N. Sasmal on Terrorism
(This is the extract from Sasmal's Presidential Address to the Bengal 
Provincial Congress, 1926, which was expunged following a popular 
outcry)
Secondly, I want to show you that we cannot build pure hopes on terrorism 
or anarchist conspiracies. It is true that anarchism is founded on self- 
reliance but it is apti-moral and productive of evil results. Most of its 
supporters become, in the end, cowards in respect of religion, morals and 
character and because it must achieve its object in secret, they became 
used to the practice of laying and attempt to take short cuts to liberate 
the country by avoiding arrest. In no country has the number of anarchists 
been more than a handful and I am not aware it is otherwise in this country. 
Being numerically small they always seek short cuts which they think they 
discovered, many of them return to their household duties but continue to 
pollute society by having recourse to thefts, dacoities and other misdeeds. 
The disregard to certain death and the indomitable courage which are 
required in open warefare are qualities which cease to exist in secret 
methods which on the contrary engender weakness due to uncertainty of 
death; and the result is that those adopting secret methods soon become 
unfitted for citizenship in their individual capacities. The degeneration 
of their character is exhibited by their coming to think more of themselves 
than of their country but at the same time demanding from the leaders 
rewards for their secret and unknown sacrifices. If the leaders refuse 
they do not hesitate to attempt to intimidate them by sending them pistol 
cartridges through the post or spreading entirely false and defamatory 
remarks about them. Nothing better can be expected from people who take 
as their maxim "no means is too low", as on one hand they do not hesitate 
in the name of the country to commit dacoity ori their own brothers, so 
when arrested they do not scruple to commit other dacoities on friends 
in order to get the funds for engaging counsel to defend them. Some of 
these men, it is said, do spying for government on a monthly salary. I 
am not surprised at such reports though others may be, for this is the 
inevitable fate of those who want to attain complete political independence 
for Bengal, or for the matter of that of India, though short cuts or who
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work in the belief that such independence be attained by means of secret
A
conspiracies of a handful of men. Perhaps they cannot realise that if 
ever Swaraj is established by the efforts of a handful of such men, it 
will be nothing beter than a sucking and grinding machine. That all the 
evils and wrongs which exist in the people in general should remain as 
before, and a handful of Bengalis should bring Swaraj to 30 crores of 
men and women. Heaven save us from such a fate.
Source: GOI H. Poll 172/1926 (NAl)
Chapter 7 197
THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT 1930-34
The spirit of nationalism has existed in India for many 
years, but if nationalism is combined with socialism the 
day of freedom would be hastened. I know if we spread 
socialistic ideas we are bound to come into conflict 
with the capitalists. But this should not deter us 
from working for the welfare of the peasants and the 
workers. They are the real sons of the soil and they 
truly represent the Indian nation. If they are organised 
we will have the real sanction of the people behind us.
This speech by Jawaharlal Nehru delivered at Lahore on the 8 th February
1929, was fairly typical of the fiery left-wing rhetoric that abounded
in the period immediately preceding the inauguration of the Civil
Disobedience Movement. The appointment by the Tory government of the
all-white Simon Commission to investigate the workings of the 1919 Act
caused a deep convulsion in Indian politics. As hartals and demonstration
against Simon became widespread, Indian politicians of all shades
momentarily rallied together to protest against what was regarded as yet
2
another racial affront. The veteran Bepin Chandra Pal came out of 
political retirement to deliver his emotive rallying cry:
Raise that cry, raise that cry my dear friends, here and outside.
Let Bengal and India resound once more with that inspiring magic
cry of Bandemataram. Let it be broadcasted from Calcutta to
3
Lahore and from Lahore via Karachi to London.
*
The Bengal Congress leaders issued a joint statement calling on people 
Mnot to attach even the semblance of popular sanction to its recommen­
dations"
...the call of this hour is to rally all the forces of nationalism 
and re-establish that national determination, the potency of
1. S. Gopal, ed, Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works, Delhi 1973 
Vol IV, p.3.
2. A notable exception was the small Communist Party which pursued the
Comintern's notorious Ultra-Left strategy of the period: Jairus
Banaji, 'The Comintern and Indian.Nationalism1International 111,4,1977.
3. Forward 17th November 1927.
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which has no limits.
The death of Lala Lajpat Rai following a police attack on a demon­
stration and detenu Jatin Das"fatal hunger strike, vitiated the 
atmosphere further and added to the nationalist intransigence.
The supporters of 1 Dominion Status* found themselves increasingly 
outflanked by the more militant ‘Complete Independence* camp and it 
required the adroit manipulative powers of Gandhi to preserve the unity 
of the Congress.
To add to the political-constitutional crisis, India was adversely 
affected by the crisis of capitalism that gripped Europe in 1929. The 
slump in world commodity prices hit just those raw materials and items 
of agrarian produce on which India* s ecport trade depended. In Bengal, 
the prices of raw jute and paddy fell drastically making it difficult
5
for cultivators even to recover costs. In Midnapur, the price of 
winter rice per maund slumped from Rs 5 - 0 in 1929-30 to fls 3 - 8
g
in 1930-31. Local sources told of a further fall in prices between 
1932 and 1933, so much so that paddy in Contai was selling for less
7
than Rs 1 per maund. Under these circumstances, cultivators and 
tenants rarely had enough money surplus to provide for their own simple 
reproduction and meet their cash rents or revenue demands or the interest 
on heavy loans incurred in the past. In the districts of Bogra, Pabna 
and Rangpur, more than 150 estates were auctioned for default of
g
revenue. Contai too noted a flurry of auction sales in July and
g
August 1932, after heavy rainfall had ruined the harvest. A last 
factor was that prices of agricultural staples lagged behind those of 
fully or partially manufactured commodities, leading to a steep fall 
in living standards in the rural areas (see Table 7:1).
Nationalist opinion in India blamed the depression in India on the
deflationary policies of the government and its practice of artificially
keeping the exchange rate high to favour remittances to Britain rather
4. Ibid, 9th November 1927.
5. GOB Board of Revenue, Report on the Land Revenue, Administration of
the Presidency of Bengal 1930-31.
6 . Rev-Gen XV/32/1931 (MRR).
7. Nihar, 14th March, 6 th September 1932, 28th March 1933.
8 . Advance, 18th September 1931, 19th June 1932.
9. Nihar, July-August 1932, Advance, 8 th June 1933.
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TABLE 7:1
Index of Wholesale Prices In Bengal (Base 1914 = 100)
Ballam Rice Table /\H
Year No. ~ 1  Rice Cereals Pulses Raw Jute Commodities
1928 141 136 133 157 100 145
1929 114 125 125 152 95 141
1930 105 1 1 1  120 119 63 116
1931 71 92 76 89 49 96
1932 58 69 58 92 45 91
1933 57 74 6 6  84 41 87
1934 63 63 69 84 39 89
1935 62 77 75 85 50 91
Source: Report of the Bengal Paddy and Rice Enquiry Committee, 
Alipore 1940, Vol. 1, p.25.
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10then reinvestment in India. The Indian bourgeoisie, now organised
in FICCI, was especially concerned about the abnormally high rate of
exchange of Rs - £ imposed by the 1926 Hilton Young Commission and
wanted it to be adjusted to its 'true1 exchange value of 1s 4d to the 
11
Rupee. A second major grievance was the refusal of the government
to implement, until 1930, the recommendations of the 1927 Textile
Tariff Board for higher import duty. Even when this was implemented
rthe Imperial Preference Clause aroused considerable opposition from 
12Indian circles.. All in all, the Indian bourgeoisie, led by energetic
campaigners like Birla, Thakurdas and Walchand Hirachand, and strengthened
by the demoralisation in the working class movement, was in a determined
mood to mount an offensive against those aspects of imperial policy
which conflicted with their rising aspirations. To that end, Gandhi
and the Congress organisation were important allies. As the
industrialist Lalji Naranji informed the Liberal leader M. R.Jayakar,
"Government indifference has driven...we capitalists to work with
13Socialistic organisations like Congress." This was made explicit by
the FICCI which in its 1930 session pledged full support to Gandhi's
14
minimum eleven point programme. In Gandhi and Congress, the Indian 
bourgeoisie had found a suitable vehicle for their offensive against 
the Raj.
The Bengal Congress
I went out on tour to North Bengal towards the end of 1925:
some of the sittings of the Bengal Provincial Congress
Committee which I had attended had filled me with great
misgivings about the internal discipline and strength of the
Congress in Bengal and I wanted to judge for myself how the
organisation was working in the districts. . , 1  found an awful
'rot' in the rural centres of Congress: in many places the
15organisation had ceased to exist...
This description by a Bengali journalist presented an accurate picture
10. Rajat K. Ray, Industrialisation in India: Growth end Conflict in 
the Private Corporate Sector 1914-47, Oxford 1979, pp. 247-50.
11. A. K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900-39, Cambridge 1972 p.64.
12. For an account of the political behaviour of the Indian bourgeoisie
during this period, see Sumit Sarkar, 'The Logic of Gandhian Nationalism 
Civil Disobedience and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact (1930-31} Indian Historical 
Review, III, 1, 1976.
13. Sumit Sarkar, op.cit, p.123.
14. Rajat K. Ray, op.cit, p.320.
15. Nripendra Chandra Banerji, quoted in J. H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict 
in a Phural Society: Twentieth Century Bengal, Berkeley 1968, p.268.
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of the state of the Congress organisation of Bengal in the period of
Cauncil-entry. Involvement in routine parliamentary activity and the
organs of local government had reduced the fighting spirit of the
Congress. The organisation had been considerably weakened and members
were concentrated in the towns; there were hardly any village Congress
16
committees, no volunteer corps or branches of the Hindustan Seva Dal.
The influx of the terrorist wings into the Congress, their role in the 
communal riots of 1926 and the abandonment of the Bengal Pact had not 
only alienated the Muslims, but had made them definitely hostile to the 
Congress.
By 1929, the Congress had become the focus for career politicians keen
to make a mark for themselves in the subordinate rungs of the administ- 
17rative apparatus. In July 1929, the Barisal Conference decided to
11
reject the Congress Working Committee decision to boycott the Councils.
The more sordid aspects of this trend were visible in the affairs of the
Calcutta Corporation^ rotten borough of the Congress. Here rival
factions led by the Big Five and Subhas Bose on the one hand, and J. M.
Sengupta on the other, squabbled amongst themselves for the share of
the spoils. Radical rhetoric flowed from both sides and dishonesty in
public utterances was rampant. Thus while Subhas Bose delivered emotive
speeches to the youth of Bengal, the hatchet-man of his faction, Dr. B.
C. Roy, was busy in Allahabad attempting to persuade Motilal Nehru to
19withdraw the CWC directive to hold demonstrations. In the 1930
elections to the Calcutta Corporation, Dr. Roy manipulated nominations
in a way so as to exclude the various DCCs, controlled by Sengupta,
20from the selection process. The result was that two rival Congress 
parties fought each other only months before the Civil Disobedience 
Movement was inaugurated. In utter exasperation Nehru wrote:
It has been an amazing sight. On the one hand the country 
ringing with preparations for civil disobedience; on .the 
other Congressmen spending their time and energy and money
16. K. S. Roy, Secy BPCC to Secy, AICC 14th February 1929, AICC 
p.24/1929 (NMML). A similar organisation crisis was also 
noticeable in the United Provinces; cf, G. Pandey, The 
Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh 1926-34t 
Oxford 1978, p.31.
17. Mussalman on 21st January 1927, claimed that Congress 
"Politics has been gradually veering round Bar Libraries and 
other centres of bourgeois influence"
Liberty, 16th July 1929.
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in attacking each other for the purpose of gaining admittance
21
to the Calcutta Corporation.
This episode was repeated in the 1933 elections to the - ' 1 _. _
Calcutta Corporation; factional rivalries sprang up wherever there was
some patronage to be dispensed. An example of this related to the
dispensing of flood relief to the victims of the 1931 floods in West
Bengal. Thus when the BPCC set upr a Flood and Famine Relief Committee
with Rabindranath Tagore as President, the Sengupta faction retorted by
setting up the rival Sankat Tran Samity with the eminent chemist Sir P.
C. Ray as President. Subhas Bose for his part accused Sir P. C. Ray of
misappropriating funds in 1922 and sought Gandhi's recognition for his 
23
Committee . Witnessing the absurdity, Tagore resigned from the
Committee and local District Magistrates had an amusing time playing
24
local Congress factions against each other. The significant point 
about the rival committees was that the controversy took place at a 
time when Gandhi'S'participation in the 2nd Round Table Conference was 
still uncertain and there were talks about resuming civil disobedience.
The factional disputes in the Bengal Congress were not conducted 
discreetly behind closed doors. Both Congress factions ran English 
dailies with the sole aim of hurtling abuse at each other. Liberty, 
the mouthpiece of the Bose faction, said of Sengupta:
If consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, and 
inconsistency the mark of a great soul, we must admit that 
Mr. J. M. Sengupta is the greatest soul living. Gifted with 
a wonderfully convenient memory, he forgets what he boldly 
declared the day before, and he has always been a puzzle to
25those who vainly try to reconcile his present with his past...
21. 'On the conflict in Congress Circles in Bengali by J. Nehru,
29th March 1930, AICC G120 (Il)/1930 (NMML).
22. Advance, 31st March 1933.
23. Advance, 23rd August 1931 and Bose to J. Nehru, 4th September
1931, AICC p.6  (i)/1927 (NMML).
24. Advance 6 th September 1931, and J. M. Sarkar, President Murshidabad 
DCC to Nehru, 2nd March 1931.
25. Liberty, 1st March 1930.
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Advance, the paper of the Sengupta faction was no less colourful. 
During the 1933 Corporation elections it headlined in bold prints
Who begged of Sir Charles Tegart for the loan of half-a-dozen 
European Sergeants after the Mayoral election of 1930 and 
appointed them in the Corporation and why? Let Dr. B. C.
Roy reply.2®
In public speeches, Sengupta hit out at what he called the 'money bags' 
of the Congress naming Dr. B. C. Roy, Sarat Chandra Bose and Nirmal 
Chandra Chunder in particular:
I , . Sengupta, am still alive. Let the BPCC office at 116
Bowbazar Street with their telephones, typewriters and chairs
go to sleep. I shall go forward and I shall take the whole
country with me and then in the place of this faked BPCC will
27establish the real BPCC for the fight that is approaching.
So intense was the factionalism and so bitter the rivalries, that the 
last words of Sengupta before being carted away to Burma to serve a 
prison sentence were, 'Dissolve the EC of the BPCC'. And it did not 
stop at words. Meetings of the Calcutta Corporation had to be 
adjourned because of clashes between rival groups. The nationalist 
paper, Amrita Bazar Patrika, described one episode:
Riff-raffs of society were then seen loitering in the Chamber 
and corridors with daggers in their possession-and it seemed 
that the Corporation belonged to nobody. There was (sic) the 
supporters of Mr. Bose led by the Bengal Students Association 
...There were the students belonging to the All Bengal Students 
Association. They were the supporters of Mr. Sengupta but in 
the beginning they seemed to be less vocal but presented a 
determined attitude. There were some Mahomedans raising war 
cries, some of whom were seen occupying the seats of the
26. Advance, 28th March 1933.
27. Advance, 2nd March 1930.
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Councillors. Then there were the Sikhs, the idle passers-by 
the Corporation employees and all sorts of people. Inside 
the Chamber, little boys were seen Quarrelling amongst them­
selves as to the superior merit and demerit of Mr. Bose and
Mr. Sengupta and soon they came to blows and only stopped 
28
when exhausted.
It was in such an atmosphere, bordering on absurdity, that the Bengal 
Congress conducted its politics.
Admist this comic drama, or what Nehru described caustically as a
'Gilbert and Sullivan opera' preparations went on for the Civil
Disobedience Council. Both groups contained dedicated militants who
set about making preparations for the coming struggle while being at
29
loggerheads with each other. The supporters of the BPCC made
strenuous efforts to recruit volunteers to the Congress. With Bose's
penchant for militarism, his Bengal Volunteers led by 'Captain'" J. Dutt
organised parades daily at Howrah and Central Calcutta where youths
30wearing khaki shorts attempted to emulate cavalry men. More often
initiatives towards agitational politics were organised by individual
Congressmen and nationalists who stood aloof from the internal power 
31struggles. But in the final analysis, the fact that civil disobedience
actually got off the ground in Bengal owed a lot to the gross over-
reaction by the authorities.. Before civil disobedience had actually
been initiated, the authorities in a pre-emptive move arrested Bose,
Sengupta, Bepin Behari Ganguly and Syed Jalaluddin Hashemy. On April
a
22nd 1930, Subhas Bose was severly beaten up at the Alipore Jail and
A 32Sengupta was put into solitary confinement. The Bengal government
even contemplated involving the entire Bengal Congress in a massive
Conspiracy Case, along the lines of the Lahore and Meerut Conspiracy 
33Cases. In fact, the heavy handedness of the authorities led to a 
massive wave of anti-police sentiment and thereby added to the support
28. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 8 th August 1930.
29. Hari Kumar Chakravarty, Secy DCC, to Nehru, 15th March 1930, AICC 
G120 (Il)/1930; and Satish Chandra Dasgupta to Nehru, 3rd April 
1930, AICC G86/KW(I)/1930 (AICC).
30. Liberty, 27th March 1930.
31. Thus the trade unionists Prabhavati Dasgupta and Baker Ali Mirza 
led 50,000 jute workers at Titagarth to a strike in a bid to involve 
the working class in the Civil Disobedience Movement, Liberty 20th 
March 1930.
32. Liberty, 23rd April 1930.
33. Irwin to Governor of Bengal, 24th April 1930, G0I H. Poll 248 
(KW)/1930 (NAI).
205
for civil disobedience. In a note to the government, Sir B. L.
Mitter, the Law member pointed out that the situation was ’calm* but 
* tense*:
Below the surface, there is a widespread almost universal
anti-government feeling which lends credibility to any
rumour tending to discredit the government...the wrongs of
the Police are magnified and made so many sources of 
34
disaffection.
And Bepin Chandra Pal too observed: "I never saw during a long public
life covering more than half a century, such bitter and almost
universal hatred of the British as seems to have posessed every class 
35 A
of our people"
Lastly, the inspiration provided by the heroism of the adventurous
Chittagong Armoury Raid cannot be under-estimated. In a situation where
the terrorist tradition was strong, even within the Bengal Congress, the
exploits of Masterda (Surya Sen) and his group provided the inspiration
necessary to continue the fight for all nationalists, especially those
Hindus in East Bengal who were surrounded by a politically hostile 
36population. All this was in an atmosphere where the legitimacy of 
British rule had been questioned and rejected by the overwhelming majority 
of the Bengali Hindu population.
The Midnapur Congress
If the Bengal Congress was organisationally weak and torn by factional 
disputes, Congress in Midnapur was a model of dedication and discipline, 
and rooted firmly in the district. The relative geographical isolation 
of the district coupled with the small numbers of absentee landholders 
ensured that Congressmen had their interests more in the district than in 
Calcutta. Although Congress was the dominant party, with total control
34. Note by Sir B. L. Mitter 15th May 1930, GOI H. Poll 248 (ll)/l930 
(n a i )•
35. F. R. March (i) 1930, GOI H. Poll IQ/VI/1930.
36. The hold of terrorism as an instrument of struggle was immense on 
Bengali Congressmen. In the 1930 Congress Session, 193 Bengal 
delegates voted against Gandhi's resolution condemning the Delhi 
Bomb Incident; only 63 supported Gandhi. Liberty 2nd January 1930.
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□f the District Board, Local Boards and most Municipalities, opposition
was not internalised but existed outside the Congress with strong loyalist 
37
overtones. This is not of course to maintain that intra-Congress
rivalries did not exist; but since the issue at stake did not concern
Midnapur directly, the disputes did not affect the overall unity of
the Congress in the district, except briefly in 1926. In fact after the
Big Five and Sengupta successfully engineered the political humiliation
of B. IN. Sasmal, the Midnapur Congress preferred to remain aloof from the
affairs of the Bengal Congress. The pressure from the ground against
large-scale involvement in the Big Five-Sengupta fight forced even
Devendralal Khan to organise a separate Midnapur Congress Relief
Committee when natural inclinations would have led him to back the
38official Bose-led committees. But absolute detachment was impossible 
given the important role the BPCC played in Congress affairs. When 
support had to be given, members of the Midnapur Congress by and large 
aligned themselves with the Sengupta lobby, though Devendralal Khan 
and Ram Sundar Singh were active supporters of Bose and the Big Five.
This particular alignment seems to have been caused not so much by any 
particular dislike for Bose, but by the almost universal resentment of 
the districts towards Nalini Ranjan Sarkar and Dr B. C. Roy. It was 
also dictated by the large scale involvement of the ex-terrorist Karmi 
Sangh in the Bose faction.
This conscious policy of non-interference in the affairs of the BPCC
e,
enabled the Midnapur Congress to devote its enrgies to campaigning
A 39
against the government rather than against a rival faction. This 
was aided by the existence of thriving village and thana Congress 
Committees built up by Sasmal and his successors in the District Board.
The stance taken by the majority of 1he Midnapur Congress on thej
question of the 1928 Tenancy Amendment Bill also enabled Congress to
relate to the ryots and jotedars on the basis of their material 
40interests. Thus in Tamluk subdivision alone, there existed at least
16 thriving Congress Committees, and in the district as a whole there
41were at least 4,000 active Congress members by July 1929. In
37. Only for a brief period, during the 1926 elections did the 
opposition merge its identity with the ’official' Congress against 
the 'rebels' led by Sasmal; see Chapter 6 .
38. Advance. 6 th September 1931.
39. F. R. June (i) 1931, GOI H. Poll 18/V/1931.
40. See chapter 6 .
41. Liberty. 24th July 1929 and GOB H. Poll 335/1931 No. 12 (WBSA).
207
addition, for youth there existed the All Bengal Youth Association
branch as well as the Midnapur District Youngmen's Association organised
by Profulla Tripathi and Bhagabat Chandra Das respectively. The financial
patronage extended by Devendralal Khan proved crucial in keeping these
42
organisations going. There were also individual Congressmen like 
Basanta Kumar Das, who operated under the auspices of the Abhoy Ashram.
In remote parts of the district it was the presence of colourful characters 
such as -- ^am Sundar Singh, a notorious troublemaker, which kept a 
personalised Congress organisation operating in Garbetta. But for an 
organisation that did not depend on strictures J.ike 'democratic centralism' 
it was the dedication of relatively unknown Congress workers like Sushil 
Dhara and Hansadwaj Maity which ensured the continued -■ existence of Congress 
organisations on the ground. They preferred to remain in complete obscurity 
as was the case with Sushil Dhara, who, while one of the main figures in 
the Mahisadal Congress, had not attended any major conferences as a 
Midnapur delegate until after 1934. Lastly, unlike other districts, the 
organisation of women was a central theme of the Midnapur Congress. The 
caste movement of the Mahishyas provided the necessary ground work which 
enabled school-rteacher Charushila Devi to organise a separate women's 
section of the Congress.
Thus in 1930, when the rest of the Bengal Congress was in the grips of 
political and organisational crises, Midnapur Congress had built the 
necessary infrastructure to get on with the work of civil disobedience.
So great was the confidence of the district Congress workers, that they 
were prepared to take on the British Raj without outside aid. As G.
Singha, the Dictator of Tamluk Civil Disobedience Council summed up the 
situation:
All along Midnapur DCC have been trying to work with as little 
outside control as possible and they gave practical autonomy to 
all its subdivisions...(Tamluk DCC) never acted as a branch or
43was dictated by BCCD or any of the other organisations of Bengal.
42. Forward, 17th and 22nd August, 1928.
43. G. Singha, 'Civil Disobedience in Tamluk',AICC G86/1930 (NMML).
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Civil Disobedience in Midnapur
Less than a year before civil disobedience was inaugurated in India, 
the authorities viewed the situation in Midnapur with amazing 
complacency. The Commissioner for the Burdwan Division assured his 
superiors in Calcutta that the situation wds not comparable to 1921:
The Muhammadans -stand aloof. Mr. Gandhi is a spent force.
There is no great Hindu leader to arouse the masses. Only
44
the Bhadrolok element is likely to be affected..•
This optimism had disappeared nine months later. Witnessing the progress 
of the movement in the district, F. G. Lowman, the Inspector General of 
Police^ wrote in despair:
I am very pessimistic regarding Midnapore. The whole area
through which I travelled...appears to have been thoroughly
impregnated with the seeds of Civil Disobedience and I feel
that we shall only root out this evil by arresting every
single volunteer that we can lay hands on. I had no idea
that Congress organisation could enlist the sympathy of
such ignorant and uncultivated people..., but the fact
remains that they have done so and that their organisation
45has been extraordinarily good.
The importance of the movement in Midnapur is attested by the fact that
in the first phase of the movement (April 1930 to February 1931) 1,426
persons were convicted for participating in the movement out of an all
46
Bengal total of 12,256.
Although the Civil Disobedience Movement was not inaugurated until April
1930, preparations in Midnapur had begun much earlier. As a first
gesture of defiance Ram Sundar Singh moved a successful motion in the 
District Board calling for the Congress flag to be hoisted over the
44. Commissioner to Chief Secy, GOB, 30th September 1929, GOB, H. Poll 
403/1929 No. 6  (WBSA).
45. F. G. Lowman to Chief Secy, GOB, 12th June 1930, GOI H. Poll 240/ 
1930 (NAI).
46. The numbers of convictions for other West Bengal districts were: 
Calcutta 2,289, Bankura 635, Howrah 609, 8 urdwan 538, 24 Parganas 
532, Hoogly 300, Birbhum 94, Murshidabed 8 8 . Nihar 21st April 1931.
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District Board building on the 26th January 1930. Independence Day
was celebrated by means of a mass rally in Midnapur town, and Dr.
Prafulla Chandra Ghose and Satish Chandra Dasgupta addressed meetings
48
all over the district explaining the message of the Lahore Congress.
In March, a session of the Midnapur District Workers Conference was
convened in the Narajole kutchery and was attended by 1,700 activists.
The Conference made organisational preparations for the coming campaign
and appointed a Dictator and a cabinet of five Congressmen to conduct 
49
the struggle. Later all the subdivisional Congress Committees were
given virtual organisational autonomy. And as a first test of the mass
movement, the Congress successfully called for a boycott of the by-elections
to the Legislative Councils necessitated by the resignation of Congress 
50legislators. The overwhelming success of this boycott was an important 
indicator of the popular support for the Congress among the propertied 
sections of the population.
The breaking of salt laws which Gandhi intended as a symbolic gesture of
defiance, had a particularly strong appeal for the people of Contai and
Tamluk. In the days before private salt manufacture. was banned in
India, Contai and Tamluk, being coastal areas^were major centres of salt
production. Not surprisingly therefore both the regions were selected
as centres for the inaugration of civil disobedience. Volunteers from
all over Bengal flocked to Contai, Tamluk and Ghatal to initiate the
campaign. The BPCC-controlled BPCDC organised six centres in the
district under their direct supervision and a contingent of the
Deshbandhu Civil Disobedience Platoon was despatched to Daspur in 
51Ghatal. But most of the 60 illicit salt manufacturing centres that
mushroomed in the district by June 1930 were organised through local
Congress initiative and not as a reult of the activities of volunteers 
52
from outside. In fact the Dictator of the Tamluk CDC complained "that
53though asked for, BPCC never rendered the least help to Tamluk...,,
47. D. B. Progs, 25th January 1930.
48. Liberty, 21st and 31st January 1930.
49. Liberty, 22nd March 1930.
50. So successful was this election boycott, that in the Tamluk
constituency, only 455 of a registered 11,564 bothered to vote; in
17 of the 26 election centres, voting did not exceed 10. Jud-Gen 
XV/11/1930 (MRR).
51. AICC G8 6  KW(I)/1930 (NMML), GOI H. Poll 14/20/1931 (NAl).
52. Nihar, 3rd June 1930.
53. AICC G86/1930 (NMML).
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In the case of Midnapur, as with the rest of Bengal, it was the
gross over-reaction of the authorities that transformed civil
disobedience from a volunteer movement to a mass movement. One of the
centres of the Congress operation was Pichaboni where Jhareshwar Majhi
had already had a Congress organisation going locally* and which was
54
only 15 miles from Contai town. Here on 6 th April, the salt laws
were broken by Congress volunteers. The police retaliated by arresting
Dr. Prafulla Chandra Ghose, Pramatha Nath Bannerjee and Prafulla Chandra
Sen and systematically beating up all volunteers including women. The
reported assault on women volunteers said to be led by Shamsudduha, the
Additional Superintendent of Police, was given wide publicity by the
55Congress which described Contai as under a 'Police Raj*• The police
action had the effect of drawing in the villagers to the movement. The
situation was very tense and at Gopinathpur when the police contingent
attacked a satyagraha centre, an infuriated crowd chased the local
daroga and a jamadar to a local school building. The building was then
set on fire by the crowd and the two escaped with their lives because
of the rescue efforts of two volunteers. The subdivisional officer,
Mr. Gaffur, hurried to the place accompanied by 150 policemen and began
an indiscriminate wave of repression which led to local people abandoning
56their villages for a week. The spontaneous outbreak of the crowd at
Gopinathpur was also due to the fact that the police, while attacking
57the satyagrahis had also disrupted the proceedings of a busy hath.
On the 1st June 1930, a police party was pelted with stones at Potapdighi 
village in Potashpur thana, following the arrest of some local Congress­
men. Thereafter, the ASP, Mr. Shamsuddoha arrived on the scene with 25 
armed policemen and looted the entire village. A crowd of about 200
collected near the village and hurled stones at the police. The police
58
then fired into the crowd and killed two villagers. On the 6 th June 
1930, the police fired into another crowd at Balishai, a small market
54. P. J. Griffiths to Burrows, Commissioner, 25th June 1934, GOB 
H. Poll 325/1934 (WBSA).
55. Liberty, 20th April 1930.
56. 'The Bengal Council of Civil Disobedience Calcutta: A Brief 
Account of its Work' AICC G86/1930 (NMML).
57. Nihar 27th May 1930.
58. AICC G86/1930 (NMML).
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centre near Contai town.
The spreading news of police atrocities, plus the clever use of busy
haths as sites for breaking salt laws, enabled the Congress actively
to involve the local population in the civil disobedience movement.
On the 4th June 1930, when the police went to Chechua hath to arrest
four volunteers, the market crowd attacked them and killed two Sub-
Inspectors. A police party was then stationed in the area. But this
caused so much resentment that the Congress was able to mobilise a crowd
of 6,000 people which attacked the police camp from three sides. In the
battle that ensued, eight villagers were killed and 2 2  injured, but the
59police were forced to abandon their camp. Until a large contingent 
of punitive police arrived to retrieve the situation, the government, 
by their own admission, lost control of the ten mile radius surrounding 
Chechua hath.^ ~*
The indiscriminate use of violence by the police was a major factor in 
developing the salt satyagraha in Midnapur into a mass movement. The 
news of police atrocities was successfully used by the Congress to 
harden the attitude of the local people against the government. Nor 
were these stories all concocted. A non-official enquiry committee 
led by J. N. BasU, a member of the Legislative Council^came to the 
conclusion:
The Police generally acted with deliberate and indiscriminate 
violence for which there was no justification on the ground 
of upholding law and order or otherwise. The destruction of 
houses and belongings was wholly unjustifiable and showed a 
a serious deterioration and degradation in the quality and 
standard of administration. The acts were such that instead
of inspiring respect for law, they brought the administration
6 1
into widespread hatred and contempt.
The publication of this Report or the general widespread condemnation 
of the Midnapur incidents did not have any effect on the hard-line
59. GOI H. Poll 14/20/1931 (NAl)
60. Report by Md. Karim, ADM, 7th June 1930, GOI H. Poll 248/1930 (NAl).
61. 'Law and Order in Midnapur 1930. As contained in the Reports of the 
Non-Official Enquiry Committee1 Calcutta 1930, p.17 GOB H. Poll 
249/1930 (W8 SA).
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approach of the district authorities. Refusing to understand the 
political aspects of civil disobedience, James Re die ^  the District 
Magistrate commented with alarming callousness:
I see very little hope of any measure of peace until we have
0 2
had a few more shootings.
Tied to government heavy-handedness was the conscious use of Muslim 
officials to quell a population that was overwhelmingly Hindu.
Gaffur and Shamsuddoha, were both Muslims. In fact Pedie consciously 
attempted to use the few Muslims in the district as a bulwark against 
Congress. In every village he visited, he first took any Muslims
03
there were aside and tried to solicit information. At Bhagawanpur, 
a centre of the movement, the local daroga-Rehayat Bux - personally
64organised gangs of Muslims to loot villages and terrorise the people. 
Besides increasing communal antagonisms, this policy had the paradoxical 
effect of hardening people*s attitude against the government.
Secondly, the timing of the Salt Satyagraha (April to August) {coincided 
with the slack season for cultivators. This meant that crowds at haths 
and satyagraha centres were more inclined to observe, if not actually 
participate in, the proceedings. Congress volunteers made full use of 
this phenomenonjtaking care to show their defiance of law at crowded 
gatherings where police action was bound to generate a greet deal of 
excitement. It was a not uncommon strategy for transforming a crowd of 
observers into an active body of participants.
Nevertheless, with the coming of the monsoons and the return of the 
cultivators into the fields, the Congress leadership had to alter their 
style of agitation. No longer was it possible to rely on the anger and 
spontaneity of the impersonal crowd; it was necessary to extend the 
influence of the Civil Disobedience Movement into the community as a 
whole. The chosen issue was the chaukidari tax. Whereas it was 
possible to break the salt laws by the ’voluntarism' of the committed
62. Pedie to Chief Secy, GOB, \2 June 1930, GOI H. Poll 248/1930 (NAl).
63. Interview with S. K. Gupta, Calcutta, August 1978.
64. Prabodh Chandra Basu, Bhagawanpur Thanar Ithibritta, Calcutta 1976 
pp. 127-8.
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few, the task of compelling the rural community as a whole not to 
pay chaukidari taxes was more challenging. In this campaign, the 
heroism of the individual would be politically ineffective; what 
was needed was the collective determination of the community to 
risk not lathis and bullets, but large-scale state appropriation 
of their property. Hence, the issue of non-payment of the 
chaukidari tax concerned not merely the individual, but the whole 
family. It was a movement that required less activism, but no less 
determination.
It was in the anti-chaukidari tax campaign that the sustained efforts 
of the Congress since 1921 bore fruit. The nature of the movement 
meant that an organised political presence was required in almost 
every village of the district. Moreoever in a rural society where 
the tradition of independent organisations was noticeably absent among 
the poor, the success of such a movement depended on the political 
support given to it by the more prosperous section of the community
i.e. those who controlled land. It was to this section that the 
poor looked for a political lead and, more often, for their livelihood. 
The absence of any radical tradition made paternalism and primordial 
loyalties very powerful forces in Midnapur. It was in this context 
that Sasmal1s strategy of enlisting the support of the propertied rural 
population was to prove invaluable.
The caste factor too was of some significance. The Mahishya caste 
movement in the first quarter of the century not only elevated the 
caste in the ritual hierarchy, but established a strong sense of pride 
in being Mahishya. This gave Contai and Tamluk, where Mahishyas 
dominated both economically and numerically, a strong sense of 
communal solidarity. On a political level, caste reinforced, 
ideologically, the levels of dependence that had been established by 
control of land. This ideological caste solidarity was a crucial 
factor in sustaining the Civil Disobedience Movement in the face of 
very severe repression. The success of the Movement in the Sabang 
thana can also be attributed to the communal solidarity that existed 
among the Santhals through the mediation of the tribe. The failure 
of the second Civil Disobedience Movement to get off the ground in 
parts of Ghatal and Sadar subdivisions can be partially attributed
214
to the lack of solidarity resulting from the absence of a dominant 
caste or tribe.
Lastly, the popular aspects of this new phase in the Civil Disobedience
Movement must be emphasised. In earlier chapters we have examined the
failure of the colonial government to acquire political legitimacy
65
through its administrative structures. The government's attempts 
to gain a greater control over rural Midnapur through the establishment
of Union Boards was foiled by a popular movement arising out of local
65
factional disputes. The authorities were therefore put in the
rather unenviable situation of wanting to do away with the old
chaukidari system but not having the required political muscle to
introduce Union Boards. This ensured that one of the most potent
sources of all-class rural discontent remained in existence awaiting
to be exploited by Congress agitators. The movement against the
chaukidari tax was therefore, to use the terminology of Laclau the
instrument of ‘popular democratic interpellation1 in what was posed
67
as a 'people/power bloc' contradiction.
The first stage of the anti-chaukidari tax campaign involved crippling 
the administrative apparatus of the tax collection. This entailed 
asking or forcing village chaukidars and daffadars to resign from 
their posts.
The exact number of chaukidars who resigned is not known, but Congress
records suggest widespread success for 1he movement (see Table 7:2)
and the government put the total number of resignations for the district
66as a whole at around 1,000. There can be little doubt that the 
resignation of the chaukidars resulted in the general dislocation of 
the district administrative machinery. James Pedie, the District 
Magistrate described the situation:
At the worst period practically the whole of Tamluk and 
Contai subdivisions plus the thanas of Mohanpur, Dantan 
Narayangarh and Sabeng of Sadar subdivision were out of 
hand. There were no chaukidars, daffadars; Presidents 
Panchayat, even when loyal, could do nothing; processes
65. See Chapter 2.
6 6 . See Chapter 5.
57. Ernesto Laclau Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, London 
1979, pp. 143-193.
6 8 . Pedie to H. Tuffnell-Qarrett, 7-1Cth January 1931, GOB H. Poll 
249/1930 No. 2 (V/BSA) .
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TABLE 7:2
Resignation of Chaukidars in Midnapur During the Civil Disobedience 
Movement









+ Figures only from Union No. 4 and 5 available. 
Source: AICC G86/1930 (NMML)
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were not being served; serious crime was not being
reported; practically no complaints were being
received by the SDO's; and to such an extent had some
of the areas got out of hand that the D.M. and A. D. M.
were insulted by cultivators in the worst manner possible
and Congress in their bulletins, which were issued daily,
pointed out that our attempts to reason with the people
69
were only signs of weakness.
Government officers believed that Congress coercion was the main
factor responsible for the mass resignations. No doubt there was
an element of truth behind this contention. Congress volunteers
harassed serving chaukidars and made life miserable for them. Thus
chaukidar Adhar Sag of Sindumuri village (Sabang thana) was socially
boycotted and refused labour for cultivation as a result of which his
sugar cane crop died. In Subhi village (Nandigram thana) the paddy
crop of Upendra Nath Jana, Panchayat President, and daffadar Ramnath
Dinda were destroyed in the dead of night. The house of daffadar
Adhaita Charen Hurait of Dulalpur village (Potashpur thana) was
70looted and his property destroyed as he had refused to resign.
Even zamindars were not spared. Rai Saheb Tripura Charan Ghose, who 
was also the President of the Panchayat, was attacked by his own 
tenants when he asked them to pay taxes. He was subsequently 
socially boycotted and could obtain no agricultural labour or even 
supplies of milk; the artists of the village also refused to make
71
the images of Durga for his puja. These incidents show the impact 
of village solidarity; few chaukidars could afford to risk social 
ostracism as they were dependent on other villagers for services.
The response to the Congress call for the non-payment of the
chaukidari tax was also considerable and, in some cases, spontaneous.
In Sabang, where nearly all Congress volunteers had been arrested
72previously, only 432 out of 15,536 paid their chaukidari tax. 
According to Congress reports, in Union No. 7 of Contai thana only
69. GOB H. Poll 249/1930 No. 2 (WBSA).
70. GOI H. Poll 14/20/1931 (NAl).
71. 'General Note on Tamluk', 29th December 1930, GOB H. Poll 
249/1930 No. 2C (WBSA).
72. 'Challenge' 1 1 th August 1930, AICC G86/1930 (NMML).
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6 8  of the 1,718 ratepayers paid the tax; and in Union No, 4 of
73Mahisadal thana, only Rs 600 of Rs 1,600 were paid. So strong
was the response to the Congress campaign, the villagers risked
large scale property attachments and ruthless beating up of
individuals. Congress sources told of Gokulnager village (Moyna
th^na) where the villagers refused to pay their tax of Rs 11/4 and
consequently had 29 houses, 3 granaries, 2 cowsheds and one kutchery
house burnt down by the police; yet not a single anna of the tax was 
74
paid. In the same thana not a single individual reportedly paid
75his taxes and the police destroyed Rs 1,000 worth of property.
When civil disobedience was resumed after the inconclusive 2nd Round
Table Conference, the non-payment of chaukidari tax was resumed. This
time the government was better prepared and immediately banned all
Congress organisations. Repression was far more severe but the anti-
chaukidari tax campaign no less effective. Fearing large-scale
destruction of their property, villagers organised watches to spot
approaching police contingents. When the police party was sighted
the entire village was evacuated in minutes with villagers taking
76their cattle and valuables with them. Attachments, when they were
made, were particularly severe. In villages Saterchak and Girichak
(Mahisadal thana), 6  cows and 2 bullocks worth Rs 200 were attached
77for non-payment of Rs 7 chaukidari tax. Moveable property worth
Rs 150 belonging to Advaita Charen Pramanick of Gholepukur (Bhagawanpur
78thana) was attached for non-payment of Rs 3 - 8  in tax. When punitive
tax was imposed, the repression was further intensified. The villagers
of Rajarampore, Mahisgoth, Barbaichlaria and Chaksimulia (Mahisadal
thana) were given less than a month to pay a total of Rs 1,000 in
punitive tax. In Nandigram, Congress sources reported that 79 people
including children died of exposure and starvation after leaving their
homes to prevent the payment of punitive tax which was assessed at
79four timejthe chaukidari tax.
The success of the Congress campaign against chaukidari tax had severe 
repercussions on the morale of the British government. The British 
officials who were accustomed to viewing the Civil Disobedience
73. AICC G86/1930 (NMML).
74. 'The BCCD: a Brief Account of Its Work', Part II, AICC G86/1930 (NMML).
75. Ibid.
76. Report by SD0 Contai, 28th August 1930. GOB H. Poll 249/1930 No2C (’WBSA).
77. Advance. 1st October 1932.
78. Advance, 30th November 1932.
79. Advance, 8 th January 1933.
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Movement as a * law and order' problem were particulary disheartened
after large troop stationing, route marches, forcing people to salute
the Union Jack, imprisonment and attachments failed to improve the tax
80
collections substantially. The Congress movement had cost the 
government its political credibility, and the effect this had on the 
poorer sections of the population was remarkable. A frustrated 
Additional District Magistrate summed up the prevalent official 
feeling:
The ordinary cultivator even when reasoned withtsimply
squatted on his haunches and laughing sarcastically said, *We
know how powerful the Sarkar is. Formerly even the zamindar
of Narajole had to make an appointment with the DM and the ADM
before he would find an opportunity to see them. Now we find
the DM and the ADM coming round to us, villagers, begging us 
81
to pay our taxes.
Indeed, the Civil Disobedience Movement cost the government its last 
ounce of political credibility in Midnapur.
Although the Civil Disobedience Movement, unlike the Non-Cooperation 
Movement, did not at any point rule out any compromise with the British 
government, the Congress in Midnapur set about undermining the basic 
legitimacy of the colonial rule by setting up its own courts of law. 
Like the chaukidariiax campaign, the establishment of parallel 
arbitration courts depended on the ability of the Congress first to 
undermine the existing structures of colonial rule, and secondly to 
acquire that degree of political credibility itself to be able 
effectively to enforce its decisions. Hence it was an exercise in 
establishing Congress, not merely as a political party, but as the 
legitimate political authority in the district.
The Congress took advantage of the political impasse following the 
Gandhi-Irwin Pact to get the parallel courts off the ground with
80. General note by the ADM Midnapur, 3rd November 1930, GOB H.
Poll 249/1930 No. 2B (WBSA). The entire pattern of official 
repression has not been descibed in any detail in the chapter.
81. GOB H. Poll 249/1930 No. 23 (WBSA).
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32
the minimum of government interference. The courts were set up 
in early 1931 with the idea that the political truce between Congress 
and the government would be short lived. Working from this assumption 
the Congress attempted to replace its organisation for the village
police thereby working "upon the minds of those who are at the moment
83undecided which side to take" In fact the terms of the Pact, 
which legalised the private manufacture of salt, released the political 
prisoners and halted the collection of outstanding punitive tax, was 
seen by the Congress and the population of Midnapur as a complete 
vindication of the agitational programme. In this jubilant mood, 
Congress was provided with a conducive atmosphere in which to initiate 
their parallel courts.
There were at least 31 parallel courts established in Midnapur, of 
which 16 were in the Tamluk subdivision alone. It was only in southern 
Midnapur that the courts appear to have had any significant impact. The 
courts confined themselves to civil disputes only, though the Salishi 
Board at Chongra Chak (Moyna thana) also reviewed criminal cases. The 
courts were best organised in Mahisadal where villages had three courts 
- pratham consisting of young men, maddham of elder men and uttam of the 
old men. Themaddhanrcourts possessed certain revisional powers. The
courts acquired some legitimacy among the people, so much so, that on one 
occasion it was in session until 5a.m. At Sutahata, the Congress 
establishing roving courts which toured the villages settling disputes 
of all sorts. A fee ranging between Rs 1 and Rs 1-4 was also charged 
per petition. The Congress also planned to establish a hierarchy of 
courts, with an Appeal Court in the subdivisional headquarters, but in 
fact they did not go beyond the village level.
In the absence of any ’independent* sources it is difficult to form 
any balanced view of the impact these parallel courts may have had on 
the district. From government sources it appears that the courts had 
a substantial authority in Tamluk, but less so in Contai where, the
B2. The government was caught unaware and did not know how to deal with 
this phenomenon. After all, the establishment of arbitration courts 
was not an offence in itself. GOI H. Poll 14/8/1931 (NAl).
83. Chief Secy, GOB to Commissioner, 19th May 1931, GOB H. Poll 335/1931
No. 3 (WBSA).
84. F. R. March (l) 1931, GOI H. Poll 18/3/31.
85. Commissioner to Chief Secy, GOB, 28th May 1931 GOB H. Poll 335/1931
No. 5 (WBSA) Significantly women were excluded, though they formed
a major part of the movement.
8 6 . D. M. to Commissioner, 26th May 1931, GOB H. Poll 335/1931 No. 5A 
(WBSA].
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local Bar viewed their growth with obvious disapproval. On the 
whole the courts depended on communal acquiescence for tfceur authority, 
defaulters or violators risking social excommunication. Thus it was 
possible for the Contai court to order a tenant to pay Rs 36 to his 
superior landlord, or the Ranichak court to fine one Mahendra Jana 
for assault. But occasionally this authority did not hold. In a 
custody case, when the Congress court assigned a child to the father's
care, the disgruntled mother filed a regular case in the subdivisional
_*.‘88court.
In the final analysis, the evidence suggests that the parallel courts 
were effective in precisely those regions where Congress support 
corresponded with the existing power structure or traditional caste 
cluster at the base. This would explain why the courts were successful 
in Tamluk and Contai where a dominant caste status of the Mahishyas also 
corresponded with their control of the land. In that sense, the parallel 
courts cannot be equated with the Marxist notion of 'dual power' as it 
did not entail a disruption in the existing patterns of class domination; 
they arose in the abnormal situation of a breakdown of the political 
legitimacy of foreign rule. This is in no way to deny the fact that 
considering the enormity of the project, the establishment of parallel 
courts, along with the other manifestations of the Civil Disobedience 
Movement, was a success story for the Midnapur Congress.
Social Character of the Civil Disobedience Movement in Midnapur
Midnapur occupies a very prominent place in Bengali nationalist mythology. 
Of late, with the greater access to private papers of leading nationalist 
politicians and their supporters, the role played by the Indian bourgeoisie 
in the national struggle is coming into great prominence. Along with this 
realisation, there is a growing tendency in Indian historiography to 
discover conflicting trends in the nationalist movement; a first one
under the firm grip of the Congress 'right wing' and the bourgeoisie,
87. Report of F. W. Kidd, S.P. Midnapur, 11th June 1931, GOB H. Poll 
335/1931 No. 15 (WBSA).
8 8 . GOI H. Poll 14/8/1931 (NAl).
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and a second that was more militant and therefore a threat not only 
to colonial rule, but also to the indigenous social order, especially
to the likes of Birla, Thakurdas and Shri Ram. Midnapur is cited as
89
an instance of this second trend. Undoubtedly the participants in 
the Civil Disobedience Movements displayed great courage and determin­
ation in their fight against the repression of the colonial state. But 
sheer militancy does not in itself make any movement a threat to the 
existing social order just as militant wage demands do not pave the 
way for socialism. In India, the national bourgeoisie accepted the 
need for sporadic mass mobilisations against the imperial power to
exact an increasing number of concessions and the Civil Disobedience
90Movement was part of such a strategy. Moreover, though the national
bourgeoisie commanded almost absolute ideological hegemony in the
national movement, it did not possess a corresponding role economically
or politically. Hence it was compelled to ally itself with seemingly
radical Socialistic 1 forces advocating a state capitalist development 
91
for India. In such a situation, only a working-class-led upsurge 
committed to socialism as the stage of Indian development could
92realistically have posed any threat to the national bourgeoisie.
At the height of the second Civil Disobedience Movement, when government
repression had reached a fierce pitch, more than 1 0 , 0 0 0  people were
93arrested in Contai and Tamluk alone. These high figures reveal the 
popularity of the Congress struggle among the people of Midnapur. To 
the extent that people from nearly all sections of society actively
participated in the movement, it might be possible to describe it as
popular in the sense of embracing all the people. Such a conclusion 
would necessarily consist of an analysis of the 1 crowd* minus 
considerations of programme or leadership. While noting the existence
B9. The most notable example of this farm of historiography is Sumit 
Sarkar, op.cit.
90. Jairus Banaji , op .cit. pp. 25—31,
91. K. N. Raj, The Politics and Economics of Intermediate Regimes.
R. R. Kale Memorial Lecture 1973, Gokhale Institute of Politics
and Economics n.d.
92. This argument is explained briefly by A.R. Desai 'The "Two Stages" 
Theory of Revolutions in the Third World* in A.R.Desai [ed), Peasant 
Struggles in India, Oxford 1979, pp. 751-9. Also see Leon Trotsky, 
Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects, New York 1970; and 
Alex Callinicos, 'Simply a Matter of Time?', New Statesmen,
16th November 1979, pp. 768-9.
93. AICC 4/1932 (NMML) Figures for January to July 1932.
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of people from all social classes in the crowd, it is only the 
examination of the latter facets that provide us with the necessary 
clues to ascertain the social character of the movement.
In a note to the government during the early stages of the movement,
Sir B. L. Mitter, the Law Member, spoke of the 'young zemindars' siding
94actively with the Congress. The age factor might not have been crucial 
in deciding the attitude of the Midnapur zamindars, but all evidence 
points towards zamindars in the district being favourably disposed towards 
the Congress. One of the biggest zamindars of the district, Devendralal- 
Khan of Narajole, was a leading Congressmen though he personally 
remained rather inactive when repression was intensified. However his 
secretary, Jnanendranath Bose, organised his political affairs and courted 
imprisonment on behalf of his mentor, aid the Narajole kutchery was 
requisitioned by government for the use of the troops stationed in. 
Midnapur town. The zamindari family of Das Mahapatra was among the 
leading lights of the Congress organisation of Panchrole; the Raja of 
Tamluk, the Dulai family in Tamluk and the zamindars of Kuai in Cantai 
were among the other zamindars in the forefront of the movement. The 
younger sons of the Nandas of Mugberia participated actively, as did 
Sachindra Nath Maity, the son of lawyer Upendra Nath Maity who had good 
connections with the landed families of Midnapur. But in a society where 
petty zamindars abounded, the distinction between zamindars and jotedars 
was not of any major consequences. What is definite is that that the 
wealthier sections of the rural population gave solid support and 
leadership of the movement. The authorities too were well aware of  ^
this and in their attachment operations came down heaviest on this 
section. The Congress files provide a wealth of details alleging the 
financial losses suffered by those participating in the movement. Thus 
at Paikbazar in Contai, the leaders, the zamindari Kayla family, —  
were assessed at Rs 10 chaukidari tax, and were looted of valuables worth 
Rs 2,600. From the house of Hrishikesh Ghosh of Mohanpur in Garbetta, 
the police looted Rs 2,000 in cash notes, Rs 1,250 in silver, 39 gold 
sovereigns, 400 tolas of gold, 100 tolas of silver and brass utensils 
weighing 50 to 60 maunds. This was perhaps an exception, and Banamali 
Manna of Gokulpur (Moyna thana} was: more typical of the average village
94, Note by Sir B. L. Mitter, 15th May 1930, GDI H. Poll 248/11/1920 
(NAI).
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leadership. He was assessed at Rs 2 - 8  chaukidari tax, possessed 4
houses and a granary containing 100 maunds of paddy. In the same
village was also Parameshwar Bhunia, assessed at Rs 1 - 4 in chaukidari
tax, possessing 3 houses and a granary, and Trailakshya Manna assessed
95at Rs 1 - 8 , possessing 4 houses and a cowshed. These figures do not
reveal the total income and wealth of the families, but merely that
which was destroyed or expropriated by the police. But doc v suggest
strongly that the leadership of the movement was firmly in the hands of
the prosperous elements in rural society. This is also the conclusion
of Atulya Ghose who organised the movement in Arambagh, in the neigh-
96bouring district of Hoogly.
Besides ideological considerations, notably a strong emotive nationalism, 
economic considerations also determined the. behaviour of the leadership. 
The economic depression which hit India affected the prices of agricu­
ltural commodities greatly. The prosperous ryots, jotedars and 
zamindars were the only section of the peasant community who had a 
disposable surplus in their hands. The slump in prices affected their 
livelihood the most, as they depended on selling to provide a major part 
of their income.
The participation of this section of the rural population also determined
the Congress decision to concentrate on the non-payment of chaukidari
taxes rather than advocate non-payment of rent. The acts of defiance
against individual zamindars must not be seen as aspects of an imaginary
class struggle but as that resulting from their political opposition to
the Congress. Thus the decision of the people of Mahisadal not to pull
the rath (chariot) of the Garga family during the Jagannath festival
was not a result of any anti-zamindari activity of the Congress, but of
97family's refusal to hoist the Congress flag on the rath. In fact, 
the inauguration of the Civil Disobedience Movement coincided with a 
concerted onslaught by the jotedars to collect 1 to 1^ maunds of paddy 
per bigha from the bhagchasis, in addition to half the harvested crop. 
Moreover, this jotedar onslaught occurred in precisely those areas,
like Hijli, Khejuri, Keoramal and Hara, where the Congress had a
. 98strong presence.
95. These have been compiled from 'The BCCD: A Brief A ccount of Its 
Work, Part 2' AICC G86/1930 (NMML).
96. Atulya Ghose, 'Kashta Kalpita' 31, Desh 31st December 1977, p.41.
97. Advance, 20th July 1932.
98. Nihar, 12th and 26th May, 1931.
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In Khejuri, the local Congress leader, Nikunja Behari Maity, had to
intervene to prevent the jotedars exacting these illegal dues after
99the bhagchasis had organised themselves against the jotedars.
There is no evidence to suggest that the Congress, in other parts 
of the district, took any action to safeguard the interests of the 
bhagchasis. In fact, Nikunja Behari Maity*s settlement in Khejuri 
resulted in some significant victories for the jotedars including 
their right to collect half the hay. It is also to be noted that it 
was only in the lands held by the European-owned Midnapur Zamindari 
Company that Congress advised tenants not to pay rents; this campaign 
resulted in losses for the company between 1932 and 1935.^^ So 
strongly was the Congress identified with the rural rich, that it 
was possible for some radicalised activists to initiate a Kisan
101movement in Contai denouncing Congress as a 'capitalist' organisation,
102or for others to initiate a bhagchasi movement in Sutahata. It is 
not surprising that Tamluk subdivision, a stronghold of the Congress 
until as late as 1967, also became a stronghold of the Communist 
Party and one of the centres of the 1946-47 Tebhaga Movement directed 
against the jotedars.
No less active in their support for the Civil Disobedience Movement
were the merchants and traders. The shopkeepers of Contai town decided
to observe a week's hartal following the arrest of Gandhi in April 1930.
They cut off all food supplies to the local British officials and the
District Magistrate hsd to make arrangements for the direct supply of 
104provisions. In July 1930, 600 maunds of Liverpool salt lay untouched
in Midnapur town railway station because of blacking by carters and local 
105shopkeepers. Some traders in the towns refused to sell foreign 
cloth, sugar and cigarettes made by the Imperial Tobacco Company 
for fear of being harassed by Congress picketers, especially women 
who participated in the picket of shops }0SBut coercion could not have 
been the determing factor. Even after government troops had restored 
the formal authority of the Raj, traders refused to stock British goods.
99. Nihar, 30th June 1931.
100. Oral Evidence of the MZC. Report of the Bengal Land Revenue 
Commission, 1940, Vol IV, pp. 248-9.
101. Proceedings of the Revenue Conference, 14th June 1938, GOB H.
Poll 283/1938 (WBSA).
102. P. J.Griffiths to Commissioner, 10th August 1934 GOB H. Poll 
325/1934 (IVBSA).
103. Sunil Sen, Agrarian Struggle in Bengal 1946-47, Delhi 1972, pp 43-44.
104. Liberty 9th April 1930.
105. Telegram P. No 1747 P.S. GCS to GDI Home Dept, 10th April 1930, G0I
H. Poll 248/1930 (NAl).
225
In April 1933, the District Magistrate specially convened a meeting
107for traders to persuade them to sell British-manufactured goods.
When punitive tax was imposed, the traders were singled out for
especially severe treatment and 'special' taxes were levied on
10Qall those sympathetic to Congress. Purnanda Sanyal of Sanyal
Brothers in Midnapur town, who was later to become a Dictator of the
Local Civil Disobedience Council, had to vacate his coal godown on
109the instructions of the police. Kishan Chandra Saha, the
proprietor of Saha and Company, Surendra Nath Setua, a cloth merchant
and Gosto Behari Dutta, a hardware merchant, were among the numerous
traders arrested and sent for trial for closing their shops on hartal 
110days. The Congress on its part, also went out of its way to
secure the support of the traders. Prominent Congressmen like
Bitarem Sakseria, Besantalal Murarka and Krishnadasji, who had
credibility among the trading community in Calcutta, were brought
111to Midnapur to influence the traders in the district. A Congress-
inspired Trade Association was set up in Midnapur town by Binoy Jiban
Ghose and Sadananda Sanyal to stop the sales of foreign goods and
112promote indigenous manufacturers. So great was the Congress
influence that even the Asiatic Circus held a charity performance
113and contributed Rs 445-7 to the district Congress coffers.
In terms of economic functions, the shopkeepers, traders and merchants 
could be broadly grouped under the term 'marketeers'. The marketeers 
were certainly dependent on their ties with British commerce and 
industry, more so than their Indian 'industrial' counterparts. This 
was inevitable in a situation where Indian industry, except in certain 
sectors, was still in its infancy and indigenous manufacture scarce. 
However paradoxically, it was this group that was also a leading 
element in the nationalist struggle. Certainly in Midnapur, where 
the purchasing power of consumers was relatively small, mere .so in 
the light of the depression, the marketeers had little to gain 
economically by supporting the Congress boycott programme. Yet in 
Midnapur, as in the rest of India, economic instincts were not
106. Liberty, 24th July 1930.
107. Advance, 27th April 1933.
108. Ibid, 13th June 1933.
109. Ibid, 28th August 1932.
110. Ibid, 2nd and 15th October 1932.
111. Ibid, 29th December 1931,
1 1 2 . Ibid, 9th July 1931.
113. Ibid, 22nd July 1931.
226
pursued to their logical political conclusion. The emotive
ideological impact of nationalism was to contribute partially to
this phenomenon. Rajat, Ray has also suggested that the trading
difficulties encountered by the marketeers in the twenties and the
thirties radicalised them as a body and moved them closer to
114nationalist politics. Also to be considered are -the trading
links the marketeers of Midnapur had with the Marwari community of
115Calcutta, who were the leading financiers of the Congress movement.
The prominent role played by menJ of property in'the Civil Disobedience 
Movement in Midnapur ensured that the movement was in little efenger 
of being radicalised in any socialist direction. It should always be 
borne in mind that the ryots who formed the backbone of the Midnapur 
Congress were not an undifferentiated lot and consisted in part _ both 
of cultivators with two to three bighas of land, and of jotedars with over 
a hundred bighas in their possession, who employed bhagchasis and agri­
cultural labour and who combined cultivation with sub-landlordism.
However, with the momentum of the struggle and in recognition of the 
difficulties faced in East Bengal where Congress was strongly identified
with the Hindu zamindari .interests, various 1 centrist1currents arose
116within the Congress itself. A prime example of this was Bankim
Mukherjee's motion at the 1931 Behrampur Provincial Conference which
urged the BPCC "to identify itself with the cause of the vast peasantry
of Bengal with the intention of starting country wide no-rent and no- 
117tax campaign..." What lay behind this and other seemingly radical 
proposals was the assumption of a simple division in the countryside 
between 'peasants* and 'zamindars'; the complexities in the actual 
pattern of land control and the differentiation of the peasantry was 
not taken into account. Hence the Kisan Sabha could glibly talk of an
114. Rajat Ray, pp. 309-10.
115. A link can be detected in that it was contingents from Midnapur 
who were sent to Ihe predominantly Marwari Burrabazar area of 
Calcutta to picket those shops dealing in foreign cloth. Panchanan 
Ghoshal, Police Kahini, Calcutta 1382 B.S. pp. 75-92.
116. The most accurate analysis of centrism is offered by Trotsky:
"Speaking formally and descriptively, centrism is composed of all
those trends within the proletariat and on its periphery which most 
often represent various stages of evolution from reformism to 
Marxism...or vice versa. Both Marxism and reformism have a solid 
social support underlying them. Marxism represents the historical 
interests of the proletariat. Reformism speaks for the privileged 
position of the proletarian bureaucracy and aristocracy within the 
capitalist state. Centrism as we have known it in the past, did 
not have and could not have an independent social foundation" Leon
Trotsky, The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, New York, 1971
pp. 2 1 0 - 1 1 .
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anti-zamindari peasant unity which was valid only as a single­
issue campaign. In any case, bhagchasis and agricultural labour 
were by definition and practice excluded from this mythical 
alliance. As Barrington Moore astutely pointed out:
Revolutionaries cannot appeal to the rural proletariat,
even under peaceful guises without antagonising the mass
118
of small and medium peasants.
When Congress spoke of representing the interests of the peasants*,
they meant the propertied sections of the peasantry. And as Hobsbawm
has remarked, this normally means a movement devoted to securing the
119interests of the rich peasants. In spite of its remarkable
militancy, the large-scale involvement of the rural people and even
the organised intervention of low castes like the Satgopes and the 
120Namasudras, the Civil Disobedience Movement in Midnapur remained 
confined to a struggle for political independence from British rule; 
it challenged the legitimacy of British rule not its state structures
117. The motion was narrowly defeated. GOB H. Poll 839/1931 
Pt. K. W. (WBSA).
11Q. J. Barrington Moore, Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern 
World, London 1967, p.384.
119. E. J. Hobsbawm, 'Peasants and Politics', Journal of Peasant 
Studies, Vol I, 1 .
120. GOB H. Poll 249/1930 (WBSA).
121. D. Simeon, 'A Historical Characterisation of Indian Nationalism* 




A Npte on Terrorism in Midnapur 1930-34
"The revolvers of individual heroes instead of the people's cudgels and 




Ever since the Swadeshi movement and the 'martyrdom' of Khudiram Bose and 
Prafulla Chaki, terrorism had exercised a considerable hold on the bhad- 
rolok youth of Bengal. Impatient with the methods of the traditional 'mass' 
politicians, a large section of youth saw in terrorism the only viable and 
uncompromising opposition to British rule. This hold was reinforced by an 
almost aesthetic rejection of the 'primitivism' and non-violence creed of 
Gandhism. According to Bhupati Majumdar, a member of the so-called Jugantar 
Party:
Gandhi's name was almost nauseating to us. I said that he wanted
that cowards should be more cowardly to get independence. What did
he mean by it ? The only way left was to fight and fight with modern
2
weapons. There was no other way out .
3
Indeed, the appeal was "more emotional than intellectual'' , and this was 
cultivated by popular Bengali authors such as Sarat Chandra Chatterji 
who gave terrorism a distinctly romantic touch in Pather Dabi. This 
romantic aura was further perpetuated by the daring Chittagong Armoury 
Raid and the heroic last stand of the 'revolutionaries' in the Jallal- 
abad mountains overlooking Chittagong. Moreover, Gandhi's uncompromising 
hostility to all forms of armed action did not help matters either. His 
condemnation of 'Bhagat Singh worship*, which he characterised as
4
'goondaism and degradation* , merely increased the unorthodox appeal of 
the terrorist tradition.
The hostility of right-wing Tory politicians and spokesmen for the 
European community to the Indian nationalist movement, especially during 
Civil Disobedience, further increased the appeal of terrorism. In the
1 . Leon Trotsky, Against Individual Terrorism, New York 1974, p 13.
2. Interview with Bhupati Majumdar, Oral History Transcript, 235, NMML, p 11.
3. Interview with Pannalal Dasgupta, Oral History Transcript, 103, p 1 .
4. Advance, 31 July 1931.
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House of Lords, Lord Elibank demanded that all negotiations with Gandhi
should be broken off and government should deport Gandhi and Hhis fellow
5
conspirators to some island in the Indian Archipelago" • So great was the 
Tory antipathy to the cause of Indian nationalism, that in the words of 
Bernard Shaw: "They (Tories) might not merely send him (Gandhi) home,
g
but shoot him. Many Tories would be delighted to do it" • Not to be
outdone, the European community in India called for more repressive
measures and formed Royalist defence contingents to combat ‘sedition*.
According to T.Chapman-Mortimer of the West Bengal Branch of the European
Association, "The Europeans mean what they say, and the sooner the
delusion of other people that we are going to hand over control is
7
broken, the better" • In this atmosphere, the idea of any negotiated 
settlement with the imperial power did not seem very attractive to 
nationalist militants*
Government repression further added to the drift to militancy. During 
the Civil Disobedience movement, the government not only gave itself 
arbitrary powers of arrest but also passed a Press Bill that effectively 
muzzled the press. The police carried out indiscriminate raids on 
Congress offices and beat up demonstrators and picketers. In Midnapur, 
the District Magistrate was vested with extraordinary powers under the 
Bengal Suppression of Terrorist Outrages Act, 1932. The Act was used 
indiscriminately on all the Congress leaders who had their houses 
seized by police and who were themselves either imprisoned or banned 
from the district. All *bhadrolok* residents were instructed to report 
the movement of youths in their localities. A teacher of the Hamilton 
School, Tamluk, was fined Rs 6  by the Subdivisional Officer for failing
g
to report to the thana the departure of his son from Tamluk • In October 
1933, the District Magistrate imposed a dusk to dawn curfew on all 
* Hindu bhadrolok youth* and forbade them from using bicycles at any
5. Advance, 26 November 1931.
6 . Ibid, 31 October 1931.
7. Ibid, 24 September 1931.
8 . Ibid, 20 July 1934.
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Q
time • In October 1934, the District Magistrate prohibited all Hindu
students, except with special permission, from studying in schools that
10
were situated beyond 3 miles from their homes • Moreover, the army was
periodically marched through villages and all local dignitaries were
expected to attend and salute the British flag or explain their absence
11to the local officer • This intense repression effectively served to 
make open organisation more difficult and forced the militants into 
small conspiratorial groups*
One particular episode in Midnapur heightened nationalist bitterness
and increased the credibility of the 'revenge killing* of individual
terrorism. On 16 September 1931, the guards in Hijli jail, a few miles
from Kharagpur, opened fire on the prisoners and killed two of the
political detenus* This incident provoked widespread condemnation.
"Life in Bengal", commented Advance, "has become unsafe. It has become
unsafe not because of the ordinary criminals but because of the
12
goondas who are maintained on the taxpayers hard earned money" *
The poet Rabindranath Tagore addressed a warning to the government:
I am here only to give warning on behalf of my countrymen, that 
a government however proud it may be of its enormous resources 
for repression of freedom can never afford to lose its dignity...
□ur people may not have the physical means for resisting 
injustice but no power can obstruct them from passing moral 
judgement, and on their judgement must every government, 
however utterly alien it may be, depend for its very 
existence^.
But government was not sensitive to what they saw as periodic outbursts 
of Bengali emotionalism%and in 1932, appointed a former Commandant of 
the Hijli Jail as the District Magistrate of'Midnapur. In the face of 
such overt provocation, it is hardly surprising to note that he was 
shot by terrorists in September 1933.
9. Advancet 8  October 1933.
10. Ibid, 5 October 1934.
11. Ibid, 18 January 1934.
12. Ibid, 19 September 1931.
13. Ibid, 27 September 1931.
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However, though the second phase of terrorism in Bengal had its roots in
the growing challenge to British rule, its adherents never saw it as a
political tactic to supplement an overall strategy. The terrorist
conception of politics was predominantly military; they saw the use of
arms as the sole expression of militancy. This left them without any
concrete strategy for attaining freedom except an optimistic belief
that the 'masses' would emulate their actions. Thus, the operation of
the Chittagong Armoury Raid was chaotic:
On that night, Chittagong was in the hands of revolutionaries
but they had limited imagination... They were very vague.
They raided everything, entire town was in their hands but
they did not know what to do next. At that time, the younger
generation and their leaders..., did not have the idea how to
develop that struggle into some sort of guerilla warfare or to
continue it for that kind of thing. Their idea was to give a
blow and in the course of it get themselves killed, martyred.
... it was a brave action but not a very imaginative 
14idea.
Moreover, the terrorist tradition flourished most in East Bengal, in an 
atmosphere of political hostility. The Civil Disobedience movement did 
not attract the sympathy of the predominantly Muslim population there.
In Dacca for example, the outbreak of terrorism coincided with large 
scale rioting directed against H&ndus and nationalists. It was this 
inability of Congress to get any mass movement off the ground that 
provided the impetus to the terrorists. Their actions reflected the 
growing political desperation of the Hindu bhadrolok minority.
Terrorists operating in Midnapur earned some notoriety for their success 
in assassinating three consecutive District Magistrates between 1930 
and 1933. If government reports are to be believed, their actions were 
very sympathetically received in the district given the widespread 
police repression. Moreover, the acts of political assassination in
14. Interview with Pannalal Dasgupta, Oral History Transcripts, 103, 
NMML, p 7 and 9.
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Midnapur differed in one major respect from those in other districts of 
Bengal in that they were carried; out in the atmosphere of an existing7 
mass movement.kIndeed, the murder of British Magistrates merely 
complemented the other acts of subversion carried out by the Congress 
and its sympathisers.
However, while noting the parallel contribution of terrorism to the Civil
Disobedience movement in Midnapur, it must be pointed out that the
terrorists did not organise in conjunction with the Congress; their
activities were quite unrelated to the mainstream of political activity
in Midnapur. Though the government attempted to implicate the entire
15
district Congress in the •terrorist conspiracy', in particular the
Bengal National Volunteer group led by Profulla Tripathi, all the non-
official accounts point in a separate direction. Atulchandra Basu, for
example, suggests that: though the terrorists came into active politics
via the Bengal National Volunteers, they were then recruited into the
terrorist groups by men such as Dinesh Gupta, Sasanka Oasgupta, Parimal
Roy, Fanindranath Kundu, Braja Kishore Chakravarty and Shanti Sen, all
16
of whom operated from Calcutta and quite independently of Congress ..
In fact, given the district Congress' past record of utter hostility to 
the terrorist tradition, it is hardly surprising that this was indeed 
the case. Moreover, at times the 'Voluntarism• of the terrorist groups, 
operating from the outside, actually hindered the progress of the 
Civil Disobedience movement. Atulya Ghose recounts his experiences in 
Daspur:
Bbth Anukul Chakravarti and I were arrested in connection with 
the murder of a constable in Daspur. Daspur is in the Ghatal sub­
division. In 1930 many people had broken the law and courted 
arrest in Ghatal, but after the murder police oppression was at 
its peak and seven villages were burnt to the ground.
In 1932 we could not get a favourable response from Ghatal. The 
reason is quite clear. Where non-violent mass movements have
15. For a particular instance of such obviously fabricated evidence, see 
P.J.Griffiths to Burrows, 16 June 1934, GOB H.Poll 325/1934 (WBSA).
16. Atulchandra Basu, Medinipure Boma 0 Pistol, Calcutta 1369 B.S. , 
pp 132-3.
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occurred, people have knowingly tolerated severe oppression. For
non-payment of Rs 2 Chaukidari tax people have allowed their
cattle to be confiscated. People have had their lands - their
only source of livelihood - attached. But in spite of all this
people had not been cowed down. But they could not tolerate
oppression simply because some outsiders had come and killed
two darogas or three constables. Where villagers had taken an
active part, oppression could not crush the movement... Where
non-violent movements have assumed popular dimensions, the
villagers have been willing to tolerate repression. But they
are unwilling to tolerate repression for an act of violence ---
17which they have not been a party to.
Indeed by its very nature,terrorism remained a minority current in the 
nationalist movement in Midnapur. A political strategy that depended on 
mass passivity and change from above was bound to be eclipsed in the 
wake of a larger movement with mass participation.
17. Atulya Ghose, 'Kashta Kalpita', 31, Desh, 31 December 1977, pp 41-2.
Chapter 8 2
Conclusion
At the turn of the century, and in consequence of the financial crises 
of British India, the Raj was compelled to intervene more actively in 
the affairs of the hitherto untouched localities. In Bengal, as we have 
seen, this intervention took the form of plugging revenue loopholes in 
agricultural taxation, introducing new taxes such as the Public Works 
Cess, streamlining the complex array of tenancy legislation, bringing 
village government within the orbit of officialdom, and expanding the 
arena of local self-government. But these new measures were not 
accompanied by any fundamental change in the structure of district 
administration, which remained 'paternalistic* and personalised. This 
was not only the result of an inability to comprehend the nature of 
the economic and political changes that had taken place in Bengal, 
but a corresponding short-sightedness in financial policy which hoped 
for a dramatic increase in government revenue without the accompanying 
infrastructural inputs. The result was that by 1905 Bengal was in the 
throes of a deep administrative crisis.
The British policy in Bengal also hoped that by widening the arena of
government they would be able to draw in a large network of 
'collaborators* who would be involved in the structures of official 
institutional politics. The expansion of local self-government projects 
was seen as part of this endeavour. But thanks to the political myopia 
of the officials, every effort was made to restrict access to these 
new bodies and control was firmly vested in the hands of District 
Officers. As a result, instead of widening the political arena, the 
Government of Bengal, at least in Midnapur, merely created unrepresentive 
self-perpetuating cliques. Till 1920, the colonial authorities had 
been completely unsuccessful in acquiring that legitimacy which had been 
their aim since Lord Ripon.
Moreover, British policy in Bengal was based on a static perception of 
the revolutionising effects of the Permanent Settlement which had 
created the zamindars - the 'natural leaders'. Midnapur, far from
following Cornwallis' model, presented a complex picture of more than
3000 petty zamindars, the occasional large zamindar, and a body of 
tenure-holding ryots varying in size and influence. It was the growing
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assertiveness of this last category, led by the prosperous jotedar 
intermediaries, that the government failed to recognise. The jotedars, 
along with many petty zamindars from whom they were not substantially 
differentiated, except in juridical terms, were the real power-holders 
in rural society through their control of rent (as distinct from fixed 
land revenue), credit and marketing operations. Moreover, they shared 
with the less-prosperous ryots a common antagonism vis h. vis the 
bhagchasis.
The power of rural property increased in the first two decades of the 
century through the Mahishya caste movement. This movement inculcated 
a spirit of peasant pride in the large Mahishya population in 
Midnapur, and fostered an artificial notion of brotherhood tempered by 
caste and occupation. The political impact of the caste movement was 
profound. It glassed over the real class differences in the countryside 
and instead developed a vertical 'peasant' identity. Given the already 
prevailing structure of power in rural Midnapur, the caste movement 
consolidated the existing hold of the jotedars; it negated the 
immediate development of conscious class politics in Midnapur.
But thanks to the existing British policy, the political potential of 
the jotedars was not incorporated into the mainstream of institutional 
politics. Institutional politics still remained the prerogative of the 
small number of bhadrolok lawyers and other professionals in the urban 
enclaves. There the intellectual currents of nationalism were to find 
a small responsive audience, especially in the wake of the Swadeshi 
movement. But the inability of the Midnapur 'nationalists' to link their 
politics with the growing aspirations of the indigenous power structure 
was to spell doom for both the militant 'secret societies' and the 
constitutionalist agitation against the proposed partition of Midnapur 
district.
The Government of India Act of 1919 and the Bengal Village Self Government 
Act altered the parameters of politics in Midnapur. Thanks to the 
expansion of the electorate which gave the franchise to the 'well-to-do 
cultivators' and the removal of bureaucratic obstacles from the organs 
of local self-government, new openings were created for the enlargement 
of the political audience. This government initiative also corresponded
236
with the radical change of style of nationalist politics following the 
emergence of Gandhi. The Non Co-operation movement, coming in the wake 
of a severe economic dislocation, was the focal point for the emergence 
of various localised movements of dissidence against the Raj. In 
Midnapur, it witnessed the successful movement against Union Boards led 
by B.N.Sasmal which enabled Congress to gain an initial foothold among 
precisely that section which had been enfranchised in 1919. The 
movement in the Jungle Mahals, though directed against European interests, 
was of a more radical character and was at variance with the pattern of 
politics established by the Union Board agitation. But the important 
feature of 1921-2 was the fact that for the first time a firm connection 
had been made between the hitherto-elitist tradition of nationalist 
politics and the indigenous non-institutional rural politics.
Indeed, the fact that this new style of politics emerged in the course 
of the Non Co-operation movement would call into question those 
theories that have sought to link politicisation with government 
initiatives. In Midnapur, politicisation and the new pattern of political 
activity did not emerge automatically from the government reforms.
The elections to the Bengal Legislative Council in 1920 (which Congress 
boycotted) clearly showed the limits of participation. The colonial 
government in Bengal, at this conjuncture, did not have the requisite 
base or the political imagination to enlarge the boundaries of 
political participation. In Midnapur, it was the local initiatives 
fostered by the Non Co-operation movement that altered and enlarged the 
political audience. These initiatives, in their ideological articulation, 
proceeded on the lines determined by the existing patterns of class 
relationship, but they corresponded to the new structural changes in 
political law introduced by the colonial authorities. Hence in 1922, 
Congress was able to intervene effectively in the new colonial structures 
because the political basis for doing so had been established during 
the Non Co-operation movement. The importance of dyarchy and the District 
and Local Boards between 1923 and 1930 lay in the fact that Congress 
decided to participate and give these political forms some credibility.
But in 1930 when Congress opted out of participation the credibility 
of these bodies disappeared overnight. The importance of government 
structures did not lie independently within these structures, but in the 
subjective intervention within them by Congress. Indeed, by 1930, at
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least in Midnapur, Congress had become the legitimate political 
authority; the Raj was incapable of political initiatives without its 
cooperation•
But the exact nature of Congress intervention within the structures of 
colonial rule was to determine the social character of nationalist 
politics in Midnapur well beyond the formal declaration of independence 
in 1947. B.N.Sasmal, who was the Congress*s leading strategist in the 
period before Civil Disobedience, used the powers and the limited 
patronage of the District and Local Boards to establish the political 
hegemony of the Congress as an organisation. By effectively 
neutralising the countervailing powers of the official machinery and by 
utilising the powers of the Boards for organisational-political ends, 
he was successful in providing for Congress the necessary environment 
for the spread of nationalist politics. In this particular strategy,
Sasmal and the Midnapur Congress completely at variance with other 
nationalist politicians intervening in colonial structures whose style 
of politics did not constitute any departure from the pattern set by 
their non-party predecessors. Moreover, since participation had a 
distinctly political and organisational appendage to it, district politics 
iAj2_y.i(2_>not predominantly governed by the •patronage*, syndrome. Hence the 
pattern of district politics as 'purely factional* or consisting of 
"interest-swopping, horse-trading and parlour diplomacy as rural 
politicians strove to capture points of executive power", cannot be 
held to be true for Midnapur. 'Constitutional* politics in the district 
had definite social and ideological dimensions.
But there were limitations to the effectiveness of District and Local 
Boards as agencies of political mobilisation. Besides the significant 
fact that their resources were minimal, the more obvious fact was that 
the state was not controlled by the Congress. Since the livelihood of 
people in the district was controlled by forces and powers beyond the 
reach of district politicians, Congress had to play a definite 
oppositional role and postulate its own vision of society. This it did
1. D.A.Washbrook, The Emergence of Provincial Politics: The Madras 
Presidency 1B7Q-192Q, Cambridge 1976, p 173.
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by articulating the class interests; of the broad range of tenure-
holders or what Rajat Ray described as ’dominant village lineages'
2
subjected to superior landlords. This phenomenon gave the Midnapur 
Congress a definite ideological orientation separate from the dominant 
tendency within the BPCC, and nowhere was this more evident than in the 
particular stance taken by the district Congress towards the provisions 
in the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1928. Moreover, it was this definite 
orientation which prevented the Midnapur Congress from falling prey to 
the personalised factionalism of the Calcutta leadership. The only 
occasion, as we have seen, when Calcutta was able to successfully outwit 
the local leadership was in 1926, when district politics acquired a 
sudden communal dimension fostered from the outside.
This specific social base which the Midnapur Congress gradually acquired
was put to the test during the Civil Disobedience movement which was
/
initiated at a time of severe economic depression. During this movement, 
Congress was able to operate without the organisational constraints of 
1921 and successfully to pose as the parallel political authority at a 
moment of outright confrontation. The streamlined organisation based 
on rural property successfully conducted a movement that displayed 
considerable militancy without correspondingly upsetting the prevailing 
pattern of class relationship in the countryside. To that extent, 
Midnapur did not deviate from 'the logic of Gandhian nationalism' 
which itself was a movement representing the interests of property 
under the ideological hegemony of indigenous capital. It was this 
characteristic that marked the Indian nationalist movement from other 
populist or millenetrian currents, and that contributed to its inherent 
dynamism and the accompanying constraints in a situation of distorted 
capitalist development.
Since this thesis set out to examine the structure of local politics in 
Bengal, it is necessary at this stage to discuss the typicality or 
otherwise of the Midnapur experience. Historians who have examined this
2. Rajat Ray, 'Political Change in British India', IESHR, XIV, 4, 1977, 
p 508.
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question are unanimous in their contention that Midnapur constituted
an exception to the dominant trend in Bengali nationalist politics. To
John Gallagher what was unique about Midnapur was the ability of the
3
leadership to take up issues 'popular with the richer peasants*. At
the opposite end of the spectrum, Sumit Sarkar saw in Midnapur a form
of radical peasant nationalism which threatened to upset both the
4
British and the Congress applecarts. In this thesis, we are in broad 
agreement with the conclusions of Gallagher.
The nationalist movement in Bengal was perennially handicapped by a 
permanent East-West divide. The Bengali Hindu bhadrolok, which 
constituted the driving force of the Congress was^drawn substantially 
from East Bengal where they constituted the bulk of zamindars and other 
non-productive intermediaries. Benefiting tremendously from the 
expansion of English education, they increasingly took to the 
professions in the 19th century and supplemented their earned incomes 
with extractions from land. A significant proportion of them were 
absentee too, a factor which did not aid social relationships in a 
part of Bengal where the overwhelming mass of the cultivators were 
Muslim. The overtly Hindu idiom of the Swadeshi movement widened the .• 
gulf between the two communities and, aided by the imperial power, 
Muslims became the counter-weight to the Congress in Bengal. Though 
there was a momentary alliance between the two communities during the 
Non Co-operation and Khilafat movements, the old ruptures showed up 
again during the administration of dyarchy. Now the numerical 
dominance of the Muslims was compounded by their growing importance in 
the Legislative Council and the District Boards. The Congress leadership 
could not have been unaware of these developments, but thanks to the 
social composition of its membership in East Bengal who felt 
threatened by a dual British-Muslim onslaught, it was unable to 
relate to the newly-enfranchised Muslims in East Bengal. Instead, the 
Bengal Congress, thanks in no small measure to the tense communal 
situation, increasingly took on the paradoxical role as the defender of 
the status-quo. During the debates on the Bengal Tenancy Act, it
3. John Gallagher, 'Congress in Decline: Bengal 1930-39', in Gallagher, 
Johnson,Seal, ed, Locality, Province and Nation,Cambridge 1973, p 294.
4. Sumit Sarkar, 'The Logic of Gandhian Nationalism: Civil Disobedience 
and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact', Indian Historical Review, III, 1, 1976.
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progressively projected itself as the champion of the zamindars, and in 
the 'rotten borough* of the Calcutta Corporation refused to increase 
the quota of Muslim recruitment. Not surprisingly, Congress found itself 
increasingly in the wilderness and ineffective during the Civil 
Disobedience movement, and the sharp rise in terrorism in East Bengal 
during the 1930s can be partially ascribed to the growing bhadrolok 
desperation in the face of political isolation and hostility. After the 
Communal Award of 1933, the Congress withdrew more and more into its 
elitist shell notwithstanding the pseudo-radical rhetoric of Subhas // 
Bose. It was only the second partition of Bengal in 1947 that rescued 
it from its role of a permanent and ineffective opposition.
Clearly, the course of pre-independence Bengali Congress politics
raises some doubts regarding the historians' description of the
5 6
bhadrolok as 'traditional intellectuals' and * socially autonomous*•
No doubt there were individuals of bhadrolok origin who espoused
radical causes, but the bhadrolok as a group were certainly too
enmeshed in their immediate social situation to serve as progressive
forces in the nationalist movement in Bengal. More than ever before,
they were blinkered to the consequences of the prevailing disease of
communalism. As a result they conducted themselves in a style which the
development of politics had rendered obsolete.
Yet politics in Midnapur did not fall into the pattern set by the rival 
factions of the Bengal Congress. The peculiarities of the landholding 
pattern in the district, especially the absence of multiple categories 
of intermediaries, negated the development of any substantial middle 
class dependant on absentee rent as a supplement to professional 
income. Given the relative simplicity of landholding and the general 
absence of absentee landlordism, the contours of rural power were 
clearly established. This was supplemented by the absence of communal 
divisions in the countryside and, indeed, the development of an * 
all-round peasant brotherhood through the aegis of the Mahishya caste 
movement. The assertiveness of the tenure-holding ryots and jotedars
5. Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-6, Delhi 1973, 
pp 513-4.
6 . Rajat Ray, op.cit, p 496.
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also prevented the emergence of the 'high landlordism' that characterised
7
many districts in East Bengal. Consequently, Congress, in its political
intervention, based itself on the prevailing pattern of rural domination
and articulated the aspirations of that section against the colonial
state and other class forms of nationalist politics. Whereas in other
parts of Bengal,Congress allied itself to classes on the defensive, in
Midnapur it was able to project the aspirations of sections of society
that not only wielded effective rural power, but had also been brought
into the forefront of institutional politics by the Government of
India Act of 1919. In a sense, the pattern of Congress politics in
Midnapur corresponded to those established by the organisation in the
8
Andhra Delta and parts of Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat. In East Bengal, 
the style and dynamism of the Midnapur experience was effectively 
captured by the Krishak Praja Party and the Muslim League, which 
directed it towards Pakistan.
Modern historiography has increasingly questioned the 'populist'
perceptions of the 'real India' comprising ’ static and non-antagonistic
g
village communities. The British conquest led to a process of combined
and uneven development of capitalism. The growing commercialisation of
agriculture in various parts of India accentuated the process of
differentiation of the peasantry. This process took concrete shape in
the late-19th and early-20th centuries leading to the emergence of what
historians have variously perceived as 'rich peasants' or 'rural elite'
10
tied to the world market. In the rice-exporting economy of Midnapur,
7. K.K.Sengupta, Pabna Disturbances and the Politics of Rent 1873-85, 
Delhi 1974, pp 95— 147.
8 . Articles by D.A.Low, Brian Stoddart, David Hardiman and G.Pandey, in
D.A.Low, ed, Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle 
1917-47, London 1977.
9. For a recent critique see T.J.Byres, 'Of Neo-Populist Pipe-Dreams: 
Daedalus in the Third World and the Myth of Urban Bias', Journal of 
Peasant Studies, VI, 2, 1979.
10. N.Charlesworth, 'Rich Peasants and Poor Peasants in Late Nineteenth 
Century Maharashtra', and D.A.Washbrook, 'Economic Development and 
Social Stratification in Rural Madras', in C.Dewey and A.G.Hopkins, 
ed, The Imperial Impact; Studies in the Economic History of Africa 
and India, London 1978, Jairus Banaji, 'Capitalist Domination and 
the Small Peasantry: Deccan Districts in the Late Nineteenth 
Century', in Banaji, Patnaik, et al, Studies in the Development of 
Capitalism in India, Lahore 1978.
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this phenomenon was associated with the jotedars producing for the market 
on the backs of petty commodity producers. In other words, as we have 
noted, rural society was divided into distinct class categories 
consisting of objectively antagonistic groups viz. zamindars, jotedars, 
ryots, bhagchasis/bargadars and agricultural workers. We have also 
observed that the nature of landholdings in Midnapur, especially the 
preponderance of petty zamindars, determined why the bulk of that group 
was closely associated with the jotedars. But we have also noted that in 
spite of objective class contradictions the jotedars and the ryots were 
united in political action under the unifying banner of the legal 
category *tenure-halders'. Midnapur, we have therefore concluded, did 
not experience any class struggle in spite of the objective economic 
basis for such a conflict.
The ties of caste and the existence of a strong sense of caste-
consciousness were partly responsible for this. Anthropologists have
noted the overwhelming influence of kinship ties or biraderi among the
'middle peasants', especially as such ties offer the protection and
11security of kinship combinations against 'deviant' landlords. In Bengal, 
where law constituted an important force in the regulation of social 
relationships, the legal unity fostered on jotedars and ryots offered 
such a protection to the latter in their dealings with antagonistic 
classes viz. zamindars and bhagchasis. Moreover, the Mahishya caste 
movement was never an exclusive movement; its adherents strove to gain 
recognition for themselves as a clean peasant caste and always retained 
a strong bias towards occupational peasant solidarity as, we may note, 
in the support given to the Namasudras. These factors contributed to 
obliterating real class differences and projecting an united front of 
tenure-holders based on existing patterns of class hierarchy. These ties 
were again reinforced by the varying degrees of economic dependence of 
the ryots on jotedars.
Moreover, the ryots occupied a position in rural society which might be
12
termed as one of 'contradictory class locations'. As rent payers,
11. Hamza Alavi, 'Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties', Journal of 
Peasant Studies, I, 1, 1974, pp 55-8.
12. I have borrowed the term from Erik Olin Wright, 'Class Boundaries
in Advanced Capitalist Societies', New Left Review, 9B, 1976, pp 3-41.
243
they occupied a contradictory location with thBir superior landlord; as 
occasional minor sub-landlords, their interests conflicted with the 
bhagchasis; as employers of labour, they came into conflict with bhagchasis 
and landless labour; and as receivers of credit and marketers of grain 
they felt the weight of economic dependence on jotedars. Hence, given 
their contradictory class location, their political alliance with the 
jotedars was by no means inevitable except insofar as they had common 
antagonisms. In the final analysis, their political allegiances were 
determined by the actualities of the political process.
The nationalist movement in India sought to project the vision of a
'national unity* against imperialism. In 1920 Gandhi had referred to
Congress as a "national organisation providing a platform for all
13parties to appeal to the Nation". This particular 'umbrella' conception
of the Congress as a neutral body mediating between divergent interests
in indigenous society was an useful mechanism for concealing the
reality of the movement. In the process of mass mobilisation Congress
chose precisely those issues that would not antagonise any particular
group and keep this illusory unity intact. In Midnapur for example, the
Congress leadership chose the key issues of Union Board taxation and
non-payment of the unpopular chaukidari tax in their moments of
confrontation with the British. Both these issues concerned all classes
in rural society and were therefore perfect mechanisms for concealing
other antagonisms. Congress was not prepared to unleash, on a national
scale, social forces that would endanger the basic class structure of
14society. Thus in 1922, after 'the foetid smell of violence' in Chauri
Chaura, Gandhi called off the Non Co-operation movement. The Bardoli
resolution advised "Congress workers and organisations to inform the
peasants that withholding of rent payments is contrary to the Congress
15resolutions and injurious to the best interests of the country".
13. Quoted in Jairus Banaji, 'The Comintern and Indian Nationalism', 
International, III, 4, 1977, p 31.
14. Ibid, p 29.
15. Quoted in B.B.Chaudhury, 'Agrarian Movements in Bengal and Bihar
1919-39', in A.R.Desai, ed, Peasant Struggles in India, Oxford 1979,
P 342.
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Nehru, according to a sympathetic biographer, knew that the no-rent
campaign in Uttar Pradesh was "part of the class war; but he preferred
to project it as an aspect of the struggle against the British". And
in 1938, Vallabbhai Patel could not have been more explicit:
ComradB Lenin was not b o m  in this country and we do not want a
Lenin here. We want Gandhi and Ramachandra. Those who preach class
17hatred are enemies of the country.
Even the radicals seemed to agree with Patel. In 1939, P.C.Joshi, the
General Secretary of the Communist Party told Kisan Sabha activists:
The major class division is between imperialism and the Indian
people, the greatest class struggle is our national struggler
the main organ of our struggle is the National Congress. Any
course that takes the kisan away from this straight course
18separates him from the people.
Moreover, the radicals were further handicapped by their acceptance of
the two-stage theory of social change which permitted confrontation if
19directed against ‘semi-feudal landlordism' only. When Congress 
permitted the use of radical tactics in thB politics of confrontation, 
these tactics were kept sectional and directed solely against government 
or European interests. In Midnapur, as we have noted, confrontation 
between the Santhals and the Midnapur Zamindari Company was encouraged 
solely because the latter was European-controlled. During the Civil 
Disobedience movement again, a no-rent campaign was initiated by Congress 
activists in only those areas held by the European company. Thus, the 
mechanics of political mobilisation by Congress negated the prospects 
of any upheaval within society. Naturally this meant that structures of 
indigenous class domination were reinforced and social change postponed 
for a later date. Under these circumstances, given the reality of the 
political process, it is hardly surprising that the ryots in Midnapur 
accomodated themselves to the dominant political current led by the 
effective wielders of rural power - the jotedars. It is also not 
surprising to note that it was the jotedars who benefited - most from the
16. S.Gopal, Jaweharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol 1, London 1975, p 208.
17. Quoted in B.B.Chaudhuri, op.cit, p 366.
18. P.C.Joshi, 'Kisan Movement', National Front, 2 April 1939. (I am 
grateful to Shri Prakash for this reference).
19. The tebhaga movement was a departure from the logic of the CPI's 
agrarian strategy.
anti-zamindari legislation after independence.
245
Besides the exigencies of political conjuncture, a factor that was of
paramount importance in deciding the alignment of ryots was their
attachment to property. We have seen this highlighted during the tenant
struggles of 1908-12 and 1924-28, when ryots were vociferous in their
protests against any incursions on their rights and privileges. This
phenomenon, stemming from the appearance or the retention of 'the
20
external attributes of independent producers', made them lean towards
conservative political currents. Indeed, the record of radical agrarian
movements in Bengal has shown that though individual 'middle peasants'
have occasionally sided with the underdogs, as a class they have either
21
aligned themselves with the forces of reaction or remained passive.
This factor has compelled the Marxist left, eager to win their support, 
to abandon any notions of a revolutionary agrarian programme, and instead 
to concentrate on piecemeal reforms such as government subsidy of 
agricultural inputs. As Hobsbawm pointed out accurately: "The difficulty 
encountered by Indian communists in their peasant work today is that
they can effectively appeal to some but not all rural strata, and in
22
appealing to some, automatically tend to antagonise others". This 
dilemma continues to haunt all movements for radical change in India.
The national movement, this thesis has argued, was therefore not a mere
opportunistic 'ramshackle coalition* or a patching together of various
expressions of dissidence. It was an assertive movement based on the
existing patterns of indigenous class domination on the basis of property.
Those historians searching for a progressive or indeed revolutionary
current among lathi-waving peasants in Midnapur, need only consider
23
Zinoviev's warning in 1922: "Do not paint nationalism Red".
20. E.Preobrazhensky. Quoted in Jairus Banaji, 'Modes of Production in 
a Materialist Conception of History', Capital and Class, 3, Autumn 
1977, p 35.
21. Sunil Sen, Agrarian Struggles in Bengal, Delhi 1972. K.Sarkar,
'Kakdwip Tebhaga Movement', in A.R.Desai, ed, op.cit, pp 469-85.
Samar Sen, ed, Naxalbari And After, Vol 2, Calcutta 1978, pp 203-26.
22. Quoted in E.Hobsbawm, 'Some Reflections on 'The Break-up of Britain*', 
New Left Review, 105, 1977, p 23.
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